795B.11/7–1054:Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
priority
28. Repeated information Tokyo 15. Tokyo pass CINCUNC exclusive for General Hull for the Secretary. Reference my telegram 27,1 repeated Tokyo 14.
President Rhee’s references this morning to his July 1 [2] letter2 raise question whether he might consider extension official invitation visit Washington following receipt his letter as constituting tacit acceptance thereof as basis Washington talks. I think there should be no ambiguity on this point and that in any reply made to Rhee extending official invitation it should be made clear that this cannot be construed as acceptance his terms as basis for discussions. This can, perhaps, be done by stating that problems raised in his letter and other outstanding matters between our governments will form basis for Washington talks.3
Rhee’s reversal re Washington visit probably results from number of recent developments which may have convinced him that now is most propitious moment for him put forward his ideas re development antiCommunist alliance in Asia. Although this necessarily speculative, following factors may have influenced him: (1) rapid deterioration in Indochina situation and possible collapse French military and diplomatic efforts; (2) fear recent Churchill–Eisenhower meeting may lead to softening in US policy against communism in Asia; (3) feeling that recent statements by Senator Knowland, and subsequently by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, regarding Communist China membership in UN afford useful framework for presentation his ideas; (4) knowledge that General Van Fleet returning to US and conviction that his report will be sympathetic to Rhee’s views and that Rhee can follow it up effectively by personal appeal to administration.
In above connection we anticipate Rhee will make strong efforts vis-à-vis high US officials including Congress and administration as well as American public, seeking support for his thesis combining Free Asian manpower with American guns and equipment against communism in Asia.
Tentative makeup of party to accompany Rhee suggests his primary interest and purpose will be to discuss military matters and specifically mobilization greater ROK manpower with US underwriting program. In formulating program for presentation to Rhee I again urge there be consideration of all major problems now facing US and ROK, as outlined [Page 1833] my telegram 12, July 6, 1383, June 23, and 1358, June 18 as well as General Hull’s recent messages these subjects. Placing question expansion ROK armed forces in context US world-wide aims and responsibilities and in relation to other outstanding US-ROK problems probably offers best hope of obtaining helpful collaboration from Rhee, who seems likely in any case be difficult to handle.