795B. 11/7–754

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin)

secret

Subject:

  • Proposed Visit to Washington by President Rhee

Participants:

  • His Excellency Dr. You Chan Yang, Ambassador of Korea
  • Mr. Pyo Wook Han, Minister of Korean Embassy
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Robert J. G. McClurkin, Acting Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Ambassador Yang came in to bring the signed original of President Rhee’s letter of July 1 [2]1 replying to the Secretary’s letter of June 18.2 The text of this letter had been received from Seoul as the Embassy’s telegram No. 6.

Ambassador Yang said that he hoped that President Rhee would come to Washington and that he had been urging him to do so. If he should come, he thought that it ought to be before Congress adjourns. The Secretary said that he certainly hoped so, because he was sure that he would have an excellent reception here and that it would be a very fine and stimulating thing to have him visit this country and have him address a joint session of Congress.

In response to a question from the Secretary, Ambassador Yang said that he believes what President Rhee really wants is to have ROK forces built up so that they compare favorably with the Communist forces. Precise details could be worked out if President Rhee comes much better than they can by letter. Ambassador Yang added that he [Page 1830] had talked to Admiral Radford, who suggested a continuous build-up with some sort of reserve system. The Secretary commented that this reserve system seems to be the only way in which the ROK economy could stand such a build-up. As new men are brought into the armed forces, the old could go into some sort of reserve units.

Ambassador Yang then went on to stress the desirability of building up a manufacturing capacity in Korea for small arms and ammunition so that Korea, as well as Japan, could serve as a source of supply for Southeast Asia.

The Secretary said that he would want to talk to both the President and the Secretary of Defense about President Rhee’s letter within the next day or two and then would be in touch with Ambassador Yang. However, it would be very difficult to give an advance commitment on something where the details—which are very important—have not yet been worked out. On our side we cannot work out the details until General Van Fleet gets back here with his recommendations.

Ambassador Yang concluded by saying with respect to the further strengthening of the ROK forces, “You do not need to worry. We will never take unilateral action until you give us the go sign.”

  1. Ante, p. 1818.
  2. Ante, p. 1808.