795.00/6–2954: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State
3257. Repeated information Seoul 285, Taipei 183, Saigon 84. Reference: Deptel 2876, June 26.1 With Geneva out of way would from viewpoint this post see little reason hold up second stage redeployment much longer.
Immediate thought which occurs to me is whether it is in fact necessary to make public announcement of plans for further redeployment of US forces from Korea. President’s December 26 statement made clear our intention of redeploying forces under proper safeguards. I have received the impression from talks with military members of General Van Fleet’s mission that natural attrition would reduce our forces in Korea progressively and that in fact redeployment is thus constantly taking place. The Communists do not deem it necessary to make public announcements of deployment of their forces. Why should we?
If, however, it is necessary, as I suspect it is, from a domestic political point of view, to make an announcement concerning further redeployment, I strongly urge that it not be done in isolation but in the context of our overall Far Eastern policy. Merely to announce the withdrawal of more US divisions from Korea might well be interpreted as sign of weakness but if this withdrawal is related to overall American planning for Asia it might have the following compensating advantages:
- 1.
- It would evidence US concern not exclusively with Korea but in building up strategic reserve of US strength which would be ready to meet new aggression elsewhere.
- 2.
- By announcing greater availability of troops released from Korea we might well strengthen our bargaining position in connection with Indochina situation.2
- 3.
- Redeployment of troops from Korea could mean more assets available for contribution to any Southeast Asian collective security system which might be developed.
- 4.
- While not primarily for Tokyo comment, continued withdrawal of US troops from Korea would seemingly reinforce our statements to Rhee that we will not support a military move north.
- 5.
- The continued withdrawal from Korea could indicate desire of the US to find peaceful solutions and not view all problems solely in terms of military solutions which many Asians now charge US with doing.3
Immediate effect of any announcement in Japan might well be double-edged. On the one hand it would point up the need for all countries in this area to increase their efforts at self help both military and economic. On the other hand it could reinforce an already evident wishful tendency to conclude that Japan is right in not taking the military threat to her security as either urgent or grave. Japan’s attitude of course would be further affected by whether or not US troops would be deployed all the way to the US or whether some of them would come to Japan and Okinawa.
I hope to meet with Briggs and Generals Hull and Taylor here this week end after which we may have further comments to submit either individually or collectively.
- Printed as telegram 1043 to Seoul, June 26, p. 1815.↩
In telegram 2944 from Saigon, June 30, the Embassy staff gave its view of redeployment as follows:
↩“So far as Indochina is concerned we would much regret to see this redeployment at this time.
“If US troops are now withdrawn from Korea to ZI, it will be difficult to convince Mendes-France Government that French Expeditionary Corps should not likewise be removed from Indochina and furthermore pace of such evacuation might indeed be stepped up.
“With or without public announcement Communists will most certainly know that US is reducing its military commitments in Far East and this will likewise become known to Asiatic peoples generally. Although so far as Indochina is concerned local governments are now without hope of US military intervention in war here in time to redress present deteriorating situation, some of these governments may still feel there is a chance that US and other Western powers will underwrite a viable system of collective defense for Southeast Asia. Surely they will, however, be forced to doubt bona fides of any proposal for such a collective system which we might put forward, if at same time we draw our troops home.” (795.00/6–3054)
In telegram 726 from Taipei, June 28, Rankin gave his view of redeployment as follows:
↩“I believe that further reduction US Forces in Korea under present conditions would be interpreted as sign of weakness; and that no statements or explanations I can imagine would obviate this impression, unless they were to include convincing announcement to effect that total anti-Communist strength in East Asia was actually being increased.”(795.00/6–2854)