795.00/5–2854: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
1259. Repeated information Tokyo 746, Geneva 132. Geneva for USDel; Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Deptel 956,1 repeated Geneva 280, Tokyo 2637.
Before approaching Rhee with negative response to his request for modification termination clause pending defense treaty, I believe desirable consider what we not seek in connection therewith, together with certain broader issues. Do we now, for example, favor further postponement entry into effect treaty (with ROK still presumably bound leave armed forces under UNC Command), or do we prefer entry treaty into effect leaving for subsequent discussion such matters as relationship US/UNC Forces to ROK Forces?
As to specific question set forth last paragraph Deptel 956, I can conceive of few worse moments to approach Rhee for commitment leave his forces under UN Command than meeting at which President likely [Page 1801] be informed of our refusal accept his cherished amendment to defense treaty.
It would be preferable at this time not raise issue relationship ROK Forces to UN Command but to work this out on pragmatic basis depending on developments. Furthermore, do we not as practical matter have strong leverage on ROK in that we can always if Rhee threatens remove forces from UN Command counter with statement further logistic support in that case will not be forthcoming? (I have not seen CINCUNC’s C 68127 commenting on Embtel 12132 but I have discussed this question with General Taylor).
However in broader perspective these are all items within general area of US–ROK relations which if considered piecemeal or on ad hoc day-to-day basis seem unlikely result in solutions fully satisfactory our interests. More effective approach, in accordance with general tenor Embtels 1155 and 12103 (repeated Geneva 72 and 101; Tokyo 685 and 718) would be through recognition that on failure Geneva Conference to unify Korea, US–ROK relations should be re-examined, re-defined and if necessary restated to Rhee. This means economic, military and political matters would all be placed in hopper and that from those ingredients we would propose to construct definitive US position with accompanying statement our intentions and capabilities which Rhee would then be called upon to accept or reject. In this I emphasize that Rhee is likely be extremely difficult beginning moment we concede (what he has all along declared) that Geneva Conference unable unify Korea. That may well be time for re-examination our relationship in all particulars, and thereafter time for straight talk accompanied by such show of firmness as may be required to make our policy stick.
- Supra .↩
- Neither printed, but see footnote 4, supra .↩
- For the texts of these telegrams, dated May 11 and May 19, respectively, see vol. xvi, pp. 244 and 292.↩