795B.00/7–1454

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

confidential

No. 5

Subject:

  • Conduct of the ROK National Assembly Elections of May 20, 1954.

Enclosed are five memoranda1 by American Embassy officers who unofficially observed the May 20 National Assembly elections. The conclusions reached were reflected in the telegraphic reporting of the Embassy but it is believed that more detailed information may be desired for research purposes. With the exception of the memorandum on observations in the Pusan B District, these papers are being made available to the British Legation and to the Principal Secretary and Australian Delegate of UNCURK, with the understanding that the information is for background purposes and would not be publicly attributed to [Page 1797] American Embassy sources. Two memoranda by officers of the British Legation were transmitted to the Department by Embassy despatch No. 22, June 4, 1954,2 and the UNCURK Principal Secretary and Australian Delegate briefed the American Embassy officers on their observations during the election period.

The conduct of the 1954 Assembly elections contrasted unfavorably with that of the Assembly elections in 1948 and 1950. Police interference in varying degrees was very widespread, and in at least a few districts such interference created serious incidents. The election committees, composed predominantly of government officials and with almost no opposition party members, functioned practically as adjuncts of the administration and were largely ineffectual in maintaining a free atmosphere. The presence of plainclothes police in polling places was common. When UNCURK observers requested an explanation, the local election committee personnel explained that they had requested these policemen to help maintain order during the voting. The non-appearance, for no clear reason, of the poll watchers of candidates other than Liberal Party candidates was also common. Stuffing of ballot boxes was reported for the first time in Korean elections—the most conclusive case being the discovery of a bundle of ballots in Pusan C District.

While such overt last-minute interference probably was not of primary importance and the actual balloting was on the whole comparatively free, police action prior to the election day appears to have substantially affected the outcome. It was clearly an important factor in reducing the Assembly seats won by independent and Democratic Nationalist Party candidates and in gaining a majority for the Liberal Party, which until shortly before the elections had been troubled by serious internal conflicts. Limited police measures in favor of the Liberal Party may have caused certain popular reaction against the Liberal candidates, particularly in urban areas, but in most districts where pressure was rigorously applied (Pusan B being a notable exception) the Liberal Party candidates were elected.

The elections of May 20, 1954 provide evidence of the resurgence of old authoritarian traditions coupled with the development of a one-party system. These two related developments, in retrospect, appear to have gained headway beginning in 1951 after the North Korean aggression of June 1950 had led to UN and Chinese Communist intervention and a military stalemate. They are still far from complete. At the moment the opposition is alive although weakened and intimidated force in Korean politics. It is apparent that President Rhee does not wish a strong opposition to exist, although he has repeatedly stressed the desirability of maintaining the facade of an opposition party. The [Page 1798] development of democratic processes in Korea should, of course, be considered within the perspective of the short and turbulent history of the Republic of Korea—and also in contrast to the Communist regime in the north. Nevertheless, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the trend of recent political events in the ROK is tending to compromise the democratic framework established here in 1948 and may, if not arrested, ultimately undermine it.

The conduct of the elections and the continuing authoritarian trend have a bearing on the ROK’s international position. For one thing they tend to blur the ideological issues involved in the struggle between the ROK and the North Korean Communist regime. From this standpoint it may have been fortunate that developments in Indo-China helped prevent the Korean elections from becoming an issue at Geneva. Over the long run, however, authoritarian trends in the ROK may reduce world sympathy and support for the Korean cause. The UNCURK report is a problem in this context. Censure of the election procedures would benefit the Communists and be unlikely to affect ROK policies except to aggravate ROKUNCURK relations. At the same time a laudatory report would fly in the face of news reports and would tend to support Communist claims of partiality on the part of UNCURK. The results of the elections of 1954 do not, as did those of 1950, serve to repudiate charges of government control over the elections, and parallel discussion of elections in North Korea, which would bring the report into more favorable perspective for the ROK, is hard to inject. UNCURK is apparently deferring its report largely for this reason and is expected to follow a middle course, not “white-washing” the elections but not roundly condemning the ROK either.

The May 1954 elections and the one-man, one-party trend which they reflect have a direct bearing on United States relations with the Republic of Korea. The ROK Government is publicly interpreting the elections as a strong endorsement of President Rhee’s administration and policies even though the Liberal Party received only thirty-seven percent of the popular vote. The narrowed role and influence of the opposition as a result of the elections may encourage President Rhee in his tendency towards obstinacy and intransigence in dealing with the United States on issues arising between the two Governments. On the other hand, the present leaders of the Liberal Party, despite the tactics employed by them in the recent elections, at least pay lip service to democratic methods and Western standards of government. Although the political principles of these leaders may be compromised through their dependence on President Rhee and the ruthless struggle for personal power and influence in which they must compete, as a group they nevertheless represent an improvement from the United States viewpoint over the Liberal Party leaders of 1952 and early 1953.

[Page 1799]

Action Requested:

It is requested that the Department reproduce and return five copies of this despatch and enclosures to the Embassy by air pouch.

For the Ambassador:
John A. Calhoun

First Secretary of Embassy
  1. These enclosures were attached to the source text, but they are not printed.
  2. Not printed. (795B.00/6–454)