Office of the Historian

795.00/5–1454: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea1

top secret
limit distribution
Washington, May 14, 1954—7:50 p.m.

924. Your 1141.2 We have received following information from Defense which provides partial answer questions raised reference telegram. No doubt General Taylor can provide detailed information his actions implement this policy. You may consider it desirable arrange with General Taylor for you and him to talk with President Rhee or Sohn or both about this policy.

1.
CINCFE is under instructions support and maintain 20 Division ROK Army.
2.
CINCFE has submitted proposed tables organization and equipment for 20 Division force. These proposed tables were drawn up in conformity with certain JCS criteria for equipping foreign forces and in light of foreseeable matériel and funds available CINCFE.
3.
After proposed tables reviewed here CINCFE was advised of further reductions to be made to eliminate specific non-essential units and equipment unless he could provide justification to contrary. Subject these specified modifications CINCFE was authorized put proposed tables into effect.
4.
In general terms decision organize and equip ROK forces on more austere basis than U.S. units was made in recognition of following two facts:
a.
Certain service and support units normally part U.S. formations are not essential to effectiveness ROK forces which can be streamlined compared U.S. standards.
b.
Equipment and logistic support 20 ROK Divisions on U.S. standards would jeopardize other essential U.S. military commitments.
5.
Four specific factors necessitate organization and maintenance ROK forces on relative austere basis:
a.
Probable future availability funds and equipment.
b.
Budgetary limitations.
c.
Other world-wide commitments.
d.
Status U.S. reserves of equipment.
6.
CINCFE and 8th Army are of course continuing follow their present instructions to support 20 Division ROK Army. Problem they face is how force should be composed. 8th Army has been experimenting for months devise prototype ROK division that can have maximum military effect with minimum logistic investment. Any “cutting to the bone” such as mentioned in reference telegram applies this effort and does not pertain to reduction over-all 20 division level.
Dulles
  1. This telegram was drafted by McClurkin and cleared by Drumright.↩
  2. Supra.↩