Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, “Korea: Increase in ROK Forces (NSC Action No. 1043–b)”

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council

top secret

Washington, April 7, 1954.

Subject:

• Expansion of Republic of Korea Forces

Reference:

• NSC Action Nos. 1043–b¹ and 1054–b²

The enclosed memorandum by the Secretary of Defense and its attached statement of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1043–b, are transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Tuesday, April 13, 1954, at 9:30 a.m.³

The NSC Planning Board has considered the enclosures, as also directed by NSC Action No. 1043–b, and concurs therein, subject to the following:

a. The Department of State member reserves his position with respect to the proposal to limit to one the number of ROK Air Force fighter wings equipped with jet-type aircraft (par. 7–d of the JCS memo).

b. Final approval of the detailed recommendations as to the improvement of the ROK force within currently authorized force goals should await completion of the studies now in preparation in the Department of Defense on cost data and time scheduling.

c. Decision as to the practicability of a joint U.S.–ROK program for reserve forces in Korea should await further study.

d. Further consideration should be given to the possibility of employing one or two ROK divisions at an appropriate time in support of the struggle against Communist aggression in Indochina. (See NSC Action No. 1054–b)

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure and that access to it be very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

top secret

Washington, April 2, 1954.

Subject:

• Expansion of Republic of Korea Armed Forces

1. Recognizing the urgent requirement for data on which to base decisions concerning the possible expansion of ROK armed forces, I am forwarding herewith, in partial fulfillment of the requirement set forth in NSC Action No. 1043–b, a memorandum dated 31 March 1954, containing the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject.

2. Under present conditions, I agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the security of the Republic of Korea depends on the deterrent effect of the military posture of the United States and on the immediate employment of U.S. forces in support of ROK forces in the event of Communist aggression in Korea rather than on the size of the ROK armed forces themselves and, therefore, I concur in the conclusion stated in paragraph 7 of the JCS memorandum. Any further expansion of ROK forces beyond that outlined in this paragraph should be justified on the basis of political rather than military considerations.

3. The cost data and time scheduling for the implementation of the JCS conclusion, which are now in the process of preparation within the Department of Defense, will not be ready for Council consideration at the meeting on 8 April 1954. It can be stated, however, that under present plans for the MDAP program, it is not contemplated that the equipment required to implement paragraph 7 of the JCS memorandum will be made available until FY 1956. It should also be recognized that the Republic of Korea does not possess the economic capability of sustaining the forces recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, without continued U.S. aid. Therefore, in assessing the total cost of these proposals, consideration must be given to both economic and military assistance, and the program as a whole must be weighed in terms of the policies set forth in NSC 162/2.⁴

4. With respect to the establishment of a practicable joint ROK–U.S. program for reserve forces in Korea, the Department of Defense has not yet completed its study of this aspect of the problem. When specific recommendations have been developed in this regard, they will be immediately forwarded to the National Security Council.

5. This memorandum, plus the cost data and time schedule for the implementation of the JCS conclusion, which are to be submitted later, will constitute the complete Department of Defense report required pursuant to NSC Action No. 1043–b.

C. E. Wilson

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

top secret

Washington, March 31, 1954.

Subject:

• Recommendations of the Korean Minister of Defense Concerning Expansion of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum dated December 23, 1953, subject as above, and to a memorandum by the Acting Secretary of Defense dated February 24, 1954, subject “Augmentation of ROK Armed Forces,”⁵ which noted the President’s request that the Department of Defense study and report to the Council, through the NSC Planning Board, on the desirability of an increase in the ROK Army divisions from the 20 presently authorized to 35, as suggested by the ROK Government.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied, in light of the current national policy, the recommendations of the ROK Government for an expansion of their armed forces. Many of the considerations which influenced the military strategy recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (in a memorandum for you dated December 9, 1953, subject: “Military Strategy and Posture”⁶) to support the National Security Policy set forth in NSC 162/2 are also applicable to the problem of expanding the ROK forces. Some of the more important of these considerations which are considered applicable are restated below:

a. “NSC 162/2 stresses the need for greater reliance upon our allies for the provision of indigenous forces, particularly ground forces, in countering local Communist aggressions, with greater stress upon our atomic capability as our major contribution to the needs of collective security. …” (In this connection the determination to use U.S. atomic capabilities in the event of a renewal of hostilities in Korea by the Communists had subsequently been approved by the President as indicated by NSC Action No. 1004–a.⁷)

b. “In the Far East the U.S. must assist in defending the off-shore island chain (Japan, Ryukyus, Formosa and the Philippines) and Korea.”

c. “The major deterrent to a renewed aggression in Korea should be Chinese Communist and North Korean fear of atomic retaliation, coupled with the announced intention to resist renewed aggression. Thus our forces in the Far East should be given the capability of employing atomic weapons immediately, both in retaliatory attacks against targets in Communist China and in support of ROK troops in Korea.”

d. “U.S. foreign aid should be meted out to our allies with discrimination in order to help them to generate and maintain reasonable and attainable military forces which can best complement the U.S. contribution.”

3. In a memorandum for you dated February 11, 1953, subject: “Further Expansion of the ROK Forces”,⁸ the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the establishment of a 20 division force goal as the maximum that the ROK manpower and economic potential with U.S. assistance could support. On February 12, 1954, the Commander in Chief, Far East, reiterated the view that the 20 divisions were adequate and the maximum supportable by the ROK.

4. The present study indicates that currently authorized naval and air force goals are also adequate and that an expansion of them, as in the case of ground forces, is beyond the ROK capability to support from a manpower or economy viewpoint. The study also indicates that the equipping of a ROK Army beyond 20 divisions would be largely at the expense of the U.S. Army strategic reserves.

5. Additional factors which have been considered in connection with the proposed expansion of the ROK forces are contained in the Appendix hereto.

6. The considerations in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 above relate only to active armed forces as proposed by the ROK Government. Within the limitations of manpower and matériel resources of the ROK, further study may prove that ROK security could be enhanced by organization and training of sizeable reserve forces to augment their active forces in time of emergency. The size of such reserve forces would be governed primarily by the availability of equipment to be furnished from U.S. sources. Therefore, it may be desirable to determine whether it would be practicable and feasible to develop a joint ROK–U.S. program for reserve forces. In the event the two governments determine that a reserve program for ROK armed forces is practicable and feasible, it may be indicated also that, as reserve forces are built up, active forces can be somewhat reduced.

7. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that the ultimate force goals which are currently authorized by the President are adequate and are the most the ROK Government can support with U.S. assistance at this time. Within this force structure, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that an improvement of the force is possible through:

a. Continued development on an austere basis of the ROK Army to a field army which is capable of sustained combat operations.

b. Continued modernization of the ROK Navy as currently authorized.

c. Reorganization of the ROK Marine Corps from a brigade of scattered small units to a combat-capable division.

d. Modernization of the ROK Air Force by reequipping the existing fighter wing with jet-type aircraft, and by the establishment of an efficient tactical control organization (see paragraph 6 of the Appendix hereto).

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the conclusion in paragraph 7 above be adopted as the Department of Defense position on this subject.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix

Additional Factors Considered in Conjunction With the Proposed Expansion of the ROK Forces

1. ROK Recommendations

a. On October 7 and 21, 1953, the Korean Minister of Defense, in letters to the Secretary of Defense,⁹ recommended certain actions to be taken to expand the ROK forces. The recommended additions to the ROK forces are summarized as follows:

(1) ROK Army—additional armored and artillery units, and one airborne RCT.

(2) ROK Navy—6 DD, 16 DE, 4 AM, 2 AO, 2 AE and 1 AR.

(3) ROK Air Force—5 fighter wings, 2 light bomb wings, 1 reconnaissance wing, 1 transport squadron and necessary command and supporting units.

b. The ROK Prime Minister, in a letter to the Secretary of the Army, dated January 22, 1954,¹⁰ requested U.S. support for the organization and activation of 15 to 20 additional divisions for the ROK Army.

2. Currently Authorized Strength of ROK Armed Forces

As currently authorized by the Secretary of Defense and the President, the strength of the ROK armed forces is as follows:

• Army—655,000 personnal (20 divs)
• Navy—15,000 personnel (maximum of 83 ships)
• Marine Corps—23,500 personnel (now organized as a brigade)
• Air Force—9,000 personnel (one fighter wing)

3. Considerations Affecting the ROK Army Expansion

a. There are currently 18 fully-equipped combat-ready ROK Army divisions. An additional Corps Headquarters and field army headquarters have been activated in order that the ROK Army may ultimately assume field army status. The Secretary of Defense has authorized the expansion of the 2 remaining divisions from a cadre basis to full organizational strength utilizing equipment of the 40th and 45th U.S. divisions upon their redeployment during the 3rd and 4th quarters of FY 1954. This expansion is now in progress. The Department of the Army is currently reviewing the tables of organization and equipment for the ROK field army. The equipment to be provided, however, will be on an austere basis and only for those units essential for the operation of the ROK Army.

b. In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense dated February 11, 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the ultimate force goal for the ROK army be established at 20 divisions as the maximum that ROK manpower and economic potential could support with U.S. assistance. On February 12, 1954, CINCFE stated that 20 ROK divisions was adequate and that this force was the maximum which the ROK could support with U.S. assistance.

c. With regard to the military strategy, and implementing actions therefor, in support of NSC 162/2, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum dated December 9, 1953, and expansion of the ROK Army beyond the 20-division force would have serious logistical implication in equipping these additional divisions at the expense of the U.S. Army strategic reserves.

Therefore, ROK Army development on an austere basis should continue only toward the goal of a 20-division field army which would be capable of sustained operations.

4. Considerations Affecting the ROK Navy Expansions

In a recent review of the ROK Navy requirements, it was determined that the ultimate force goals should include the following additional ships: 2 DE, 4 PCEC, 12 LSM, 4 LST, 1 ARL, 1 YO, 3 AKL, within a personnel increase from 10,000 to approximately 15,000. This ultimate force goal was subsequently approved by the Secretary of Defense for MDAP planning. The development of ROK naval forces to this goal will eventually give the ROK a balanced, small but well-equipped Navy which is within the capability of the ROK to support and operate with U.S. assistance.

5. Considerations Affecting the ROK Marine Corps Expansion

On February 12, 1954, CINCFE stated that one ROK Marine Division is adequate and all that the ROK can possibly support with U.S. assistance. As presently constituted, the ROK Marine Corps is organized as a brigade of smaller units which have thus far operated in a special mission role which tended to reduce the development of its full combat capability. This force should be reconstituted as a division-type force within the existing personnel ceiling and made capable of sustained combat operation.

6. Considerations Affecting the ROK Air Force Expansion

On February 12, 1954, CINCFE forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the ROK plan for expansion of its Air Force, together with comments of the Air Force Advisory Group, Korea, Commander, Fifth Air Force, and COMFEAF. CINCFE concurred with the recommendations of COMFEAF as to force goals for the expansion of the ROK Air Force. These force goals, considerably below the ROK proposed plan for expansion to 8⅓ wings, are as follows:

• 6 Fighter Bomber Squadrons
• 1 Composite Group
• 1 Air Tactical Control Squadron
• 1 Tactical Control Group
• 1 Communications Group
• Sufficient personnel and equipment to man a 9-airbase complex on an austerity basis.

As a result of studies carried out by Headquarters, USAF, it has been concluded, however, that the ROK Air Force should not be expanded but that the existing fighter wing should be re-equipped with jet-type aircraft and an effective tactical air control organization should be established within existing personnel ceilings. This proposed re-equipping of the ROK Air Force cannot be accomplished prior to FY 1956 inasmuch as funds MDAP and/or USAF, are not available within existing approved programs. Factors leading to this conclusion are listed below.

a. Essentially, all matériel required for logistic support would have to be furnished by the U.S. with the possible exception of food and clothing, and the cost to the U.S. of maintaining and insuring the operation of this force would be high as compared to the cost necessary to support an equivalent Title I, II, or III force. Therefore, from the standpoint of economical use of matériel resources world-wide, it would be better to allocate those resources to Title I, II, or III countries and to continue planning to utilize USAF forces to meet the majority of air force requirements in Korea.

b. The existing ROK Air Force fighter wing is now equipped with obsolete propeller-type aircraft (F–51s) which are becoming increasingly difficult to maintain because of an acute shortage of replacement spare parts. Unless these aircraft are replaced with modern equipment for which spare parts can be supplied, the operational capability of the ROK Air Force will steadily decrease.

c. Equipped with obsolete aircraft, the ROK fighter wing would be ineffective either in a ground support or an air defense role against a superior North Korean Air Force equipped with MIG 15s. The ROK fighter wing must be re-equipped with jet-type aircraft if it is to be retained as an effective combat unit.

d. Conversion of the ROK fighter wing to jet aircraft at this time would facilitate a future expansion of the ROK Air Force if the necessary resources should subsequently become available.

e. The major deterrent to renewed aggression in Korea should be Chinese Communist and North Korean fear of atomic retaliation, coupled with the announced intention to resist renewed aggression. Even if the ROK Air Force should be expanded as proposed by the ROK Minister, the U.S. would not be relieved of responsibility to provide this deterrent. On the other hand, it is considered important that the ROK be provided with a token force in the interest of morale and national prestige. A force of the size which now exists, if equipped with modern equipment, is considered to be adequate for this purpose.

f. In anticipation of ultimate withdrawal of all USAF units from Korea, including tactical air control organizations, it is considered desirable that an efficient tactical air control organization be established within the ROK Air Force. Such an organization would not only be necessary to the efficient operation of the ROK Air Force, but would facilitate operation of USAF aircraft in support of ROK ground forces upon a renewal of hostilities.

g. Since the U.S. is committed to support the ROK in the event of renewal of hostilities by the Communists, it is to the U.S. advantage that the existing air base complex in South Korea be maintained and capable of sustaining combat operations. A ROK Air Force of the type indicated above should facilitate the maintenance of these bases in an operational status.

h. The existing USAF matériel commitments, both to MDA Programs and USAF organizations, will not permit satisfying the proposed re-equipping of the ROK Air Force without causing slippage in existing programs.

1. NSC Action No. 1043–b read as follows:

   “Noted the President’s request that the Department of Defense study and report to the Council, through the NSC Planning Board, on the desirability of an increase in the number of ROK Army divisions from the 20 presently authorized to 35, as suggested by the ROK Government.” (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)

2. For text of NSC Action No. 1054–b, see the memorandum of discussion at the 187th meeting of the NSC, Mar. 4, p. 1755.
3. For the memorandum of discussion at this meeting, see infra.
4. The reference was to “Review of Basic National Security Policy,” Oct. 30, 1952, approved by the President on that date. For documentation on the NSC 162 Series, see volume ii.
5. Neither printed.
6. Not printed.
7. For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 179th meeting of the NSC, Jan. 8, p. 1704.
8. Not printed.
9. Neither printed.
10. Not printed.