Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 187th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 4, 19541
eyes only
The following were present at the 187th NSC meeting: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; [Page 1756] the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Morrison for the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Commissioner Campbell, AEC; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Mr. Cutler and Mr. Jackson, Special Assistants to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
At the outset of the meeting the President, in a humorous tone, said that if any member of the National Security Council or anyone who attended its meetings had talked to the Alsops for more than 30 seconds in the course of the last four weeks, that individual was to make a date to come in and talk with him.
[Here follows discussion on items 1. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”, 2. “Status of U.S. Programs for National Security as of December 31, 1953”, 3. “U.S. Objectives in the Event of a General War With the Soviet Bloc”, 4. “United States Policy Toward South Asia”, and 5. “Report by the Director, Foreign Operations Administration”.]
6. Proposed ROK Offer of Troops to Laos (NSC Action No. 1043–a; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 2, 1954)2
Mr. Cutler called attention to the three studies of this problem which were attached to the Planning Board’s recommendation that the offer of a Korean division to Laos be rejected. While the Planning Board was in unanimous agreement that General Hull should be instructed to tell President Rhee that the United States felt that this offer should not be made, Mr. Cutler pointed out the difference in opinion between the Departments of State and Defense with regard to the basis on which this opinion was to rest. The State Department believed that General Hull should explain this decision as motivated by “military considerations”, whereas the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that it should be based upon “the best interests of the free world”.
The President said, with great emphasis, that he thought the basis should be that public opinion in the United States would never support the removal of an ROK division for adventures in other parts of the world while the United States itself was still obliged to maintain forces [Page 1757] in Korea. He would certainly hate to have to explain such a situation to the mothers of American soldiers.
Secretary Smith said that this was precisely what the State Department had in mind when it spoke of rejecting the offer for military reasons.
The President then asked Admiral Radford for his views. Admiral Radford replied that he had felt that military reasons offered the soundest basis on which to reject Rhee’s offer, but that the Chiefs of Staff had out-voted him on the issue. He therefore proposed that the Joint Chiefs should send General Hull a message indicating that he was to frame a rejection, in talking with President Rhee, on military grounds, and then to add what the, President had said as to the impossibility of public acceptance of this move in the United States.
The President replied that he did not think the basis he had in mind should be described as “military reasons”, but simply as domestic political reasons. In any case, he wanted General Hull to make quite clear to President Rhee that domestic opinion in the United States would never stand for the removal of a Korean division to Indochina.
In that case, Admiral Radford said, it was necessary to say nothing more than this in the JCS instructions to General Hull.
The Vice President commented that the best way of handling Rhee, in his opinion, was simply to tell him the truth.
The National Security Council:3
- a.
- Discussed the subject on the basis of the recommendation contained in paragraph 4 of the reference memorandum.
- b.
- Agreed that the Department of Defense should transmit a message to General Hull4 directing him to advise the ROK Government that, after full consideration at the highest levels in the United States Government which commends the ROK Government for its determination to combat communist aggression in Asia even outside the borders of Korea, it is considered that it is not desirable at this time that a division of the Korean Army be sent to Laos because U.S. public opinion would not support the maintenance of U.S. forces in Korea while ROK forces were withdrawn from Korea for action elsewhere.
Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.
[Here follows discussion on items 7. “Assurances to the French in Connection With the European Defense Community”, 8. “Law Regarding the Order of Succession to the Presidency”, and 9. “Status of Projects”.]
- Drafted by Gleason on Mar. 5.↩
- For text of NSC Action No. 1043–a, see footnote 1, supra. The memorandum from Lay is supra.↩
- The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 1054, a record copy of which is located in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.↩
- Telegram JCS 957963, Mar. 4, to CINCFE, exclusive for Hull, not printed. (JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–54))↩