Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/3–154

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)

top secret

[Washington,] March 1, 1954.

Subject:

• Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Korea and the Korean Political Conference.

There is attached a memorandum on the above subject for your signature, in accordance with your request of today.

In his telegram, Ambassador Briggs is referring to a long discussion which took place in John Allison’s office on Wednesday, February 24. General Hull, General Harrison, Ambassador Allison, Ambassador Briggs, Mr. Parsons,¹ Mr. Calhoun and I participated. A number of matters came up which the group wished me to take up in Washington. Among these was the subject of Briggs’ telegram No. 841.² General Hull reported that the Department of Defense was considering unit withdrawals this year which would lead to redeployment of most, if not all, of our forces from Korea within a year or two. He mentioned the possibility of leaving a token force and a large military mission in Korea for purposes of training and possible operational control. General Hull pointed out that the rapid and substantial reduction in our forces in Korea might adversely affect United States relations with the ROK. He felt that it would greatly lessen our influence there, at least the influence of the United Nations Command and the Eighth Army.³

I gathered from General Hull’s remarks that his planning for redeployment had reached a pretty advanced stage and would proceed forthwith. Therefore, I raised the question of the relationship between the planning, public announcement and actual troop movement and the position to be taken at the Korean Political Conference in Geneva on the withdrawal of foreign forces. I suggested that it would be advisable for State and Defense seriously to consider deferring any announcement or implementation of further redeployment until we determine at Geneva whether any agreement on anything is to be obtained. Both General Hull and General Harrison appeared somewhat doubtful that it would be possible to hold up this matter pending the outcome of the Political Conference. However, everyone at the meeting agreed this was an extremely important question which should be taken up as soon as possible in Washington.

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Acting Secretary of State⁴

top secret
special handling

[Washington,] March 1, 1954.

Subject:

• Troop Withdrawal from Korea and the Korean Political Conference.

I believe it will be necessary in the near future to take up with the Department of Defense the question of future redeployment of United States forces in Korea in connection with the objectives which we intend to seek on this question at the Korean Political Conference.

Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement recommends a political conference to settle “through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.” It is likely that the Communists at Geneva will concentrate their efforts on obtaining agreement on prompt withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. This is probably their principal objective in Korea. The Communists are not interested in immediate unification of Korea unless it is under complete Communist control.

The interest of the United States and the United Nations will be directed more where it is a question of unification than toward the withdrawal of forces. The continued deployment of United Nations forces in Korea will provide us with substantial leverage at Geneva in attempting to negotiate with the Communists a satisfactory agreement on unifying Korea.

If we carry out or make public plans for additional redeployment of United States divisions from Korea before or during the Political Conference, we will be weakening and perhaps eliminating our major bargaining power at the conference table. To make known in advance that the United States is planning to withdraw the bulk of its forces will give the Communists a substantial tactical advantage. Ambassador Briggs has strongly recommended, and I concur, that information regarding withdrawal of United States forces from Korea be restricted to the maximum degree possible.

Recommendation

I recommend that you discuss this matter in the near future with the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense,⁵ and that you make the following points:

(a) Final decisions on the timing, speed and amount of additional redeployment from Korea should be deferred until the outcome of the Korean Political Conference can be determined;

(b) Plans for redeployment should be correlated with our substantive position to be taken at Geneva;

(c) Every effort should be made to prevent our plans on redeployment from becoming public knowledge prematurely.

[

W.B.S.

]

1. James G. Parsons, Counselor of the Embassy at Tokyo.

2. In this telegram, Feb. 28, Briggs reported as follows:

   “During my talk with General Hull February 24 he outlined in general terms planning which proceeding in Defense Department re deployment US Forces Korea. In connection with eventual dissemination this information I urge that Department consider this question in relation to our substantive position on withdrawal forces from Korea at Geneva conference. While as I understand it decision on redeployment can be expected soon, I recommend strongly that information regarding that decision be held as closely as possible. I recognize that it has to be discussed with a number of other governments including that of ROK but would hope that in doing so we should take every precaution to avoid plans becoming public knowledge. It becomes increasingly apparent that major Red Chinese objective at Geneva will probably be to obtain withdrawal foreign forces from ROK. To make known publicly in advance of or during conference fact we are contemplating withdrawal bulk our forces might give Communists substantial tactical advantage at conference table.” (795.00/2–2854)

3. A marginal note referring to this sentence read as follows: “I believe it will have adverse repercussions generally in East Asia. E[verett] F. D[rumright]”
4. This memorandum was drafted by Young and cleared by Drumright and was sent through Murphy.
5. A marginal note by Smith read as follows: “Sec. Wilson agrees. Done by phone.”