795B.11/2–1554

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Eisenhower1

Dear Mr. President: I have received your gracious letter of January 2, 19542 and again express Korea’s gratitude to you for your generous offer of the aid and assistance funds and ratification of the Mutual Defense Pact.

The most vital question which concerns us is whether Korea can survive as an independent nation. We have stated publicly many times that any peace which allows a million or more Chinese communist troops to remain in Korea is not and cannot be acceptable, for this will lead Korea to the same path as China. We have stated also that out of the seven million north Korean population, only three million remain alive. A report received eight months ago revealed that three thousand of our people in the north are dying daily, either of hunger, cold, disease or murder. How many more have been destroyed since I do not know. Yet we are engaged in idle, meaningless peace talks.

Still you ask us to cooperate with you and to promise not to renew war. How can we cooperate with anyone who considers Korea’s survival as of secondary importance? And how can we promise not to renew war if none of our friends is concerned about getting the Chinese out of Korea without unnecessary delay? How can we save our own people in the north who are being driven out of their homes into Sinkiang and other parts of Manchuria? And who is to stop the Chinese communists from coming daily to permanently settle in our northern Provinces?

Your peaceful means of unifying Korea cannot be interpreted otherwise than a determination to avoid possible conflict with the Soviets, whose program calls for destruction of “imperialistic” and “capitalistic” America. Has not the Armistice arrangement put the communists in an infinitely stronger position than they were? What did the United States accomplish by the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Joint Commission Conference during [Page 1746] the years from 1945 to 1948? How can we pin further hopes on the meaningless political conference?

When your message informing me of your decision to withdraw two divisions of the U.S. Army from Korea was delivered to me by Admiral Radford on December 24, 1953, I accepted it without comment. What could I have said, when told that it was your decision? We Koreans cannot ask our friends to stay and fight for us for an indefinite period of time. When Admiral Radford told me that the two U.S. Divisions would leave their weapons with the ROK Army I thanked him.

To confess the truth I did believe that our fight against the communists was not only for the freedom and independence of Korea but also for the freedom and security of the United States and other free nations. Now I am convinced that our friends and others do not share this belief. If they do, how can they stop the war and make peace? Have we accomplished war’s original objective?

And there is another point which we cannot afford to ignore. America’s program for rebuilding Japan both economically and militarily makes the Korean people profoundly nervous. The American people do not heed our friendly warning against trusting the Japanese too much, just as they ignored it until after the Pearl Harbor disaster. They would rather count on their former enemy than listen to their friend who remained loyal all the bygone years. The Japanese officially declared that 85 per cent of all the property in Korea is theirs and that Korea should pay for the damage done to their former property in Korea by the war. They try to come to our territorial waters to fish as they did for the last forty years, but the Korean fishermen who thereby lost their means of livelihood will not tolerate them and there will be a clash between the coasts of the two countries so as to maintain peace. Instead of defending Korea’s position, the U.S. Government has taken sides with Japan and refuses to judge who is the aggressor. It is becoming quite clear to the Koreans that the United States has no intention of treating the two countries on a just and equal basis.

American aid funds given for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Korean economy have been spent more for Japanese economy than Korean economy. A total of $515 million allocated for Korea through the ECA and UNKRA agencies has been used in importing consumer goods and the machines of old and obsolete models, which the Japanese themselves are replacing with modern U.S. and German makes. This has been and still is being done according to the U.S. policy, as I was told by a high U.S. authority. If that is the case, United States should give all the aids to Japan, instead of giving some to Korea “for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Korean economy” which is only in name while the actual aid goes to the building up of the Japanese economy. The reason why ECA returned $30 million of the aid funds to the U.S. Treasury in the first year and $60 million in the second year [Page 1747] on the ground that there was nothing more to do with the money was because Japan had not enough consumer goods ready to fill the orders at that time.

Under these circumstances, we see no hope in the U.S. Government. So long as we continue to cooperate with the United States we will either be another China or once again the Korea of the last forty years. If we have to be sold to either of our enemies, we would rather fight until we are united with our own people. If we succeed, we will become free men, or slaves if we fail fighting alone, but we will be united. This may simplify the matter for you to solve as you wish. I deeply regret that we have been a cause of great trouble for the United States and other U.N. nations. The time is here when we must decide either one way or the other. Please tell me frankly what your present policy is regarding the unification of Korea.

With continued best wishes for your health and success,

Sincerely yours,

Syngman Rhee
  1. The following note appeared on the source text: “This letter was withdrawn by Pres. Rhee in accordance with my suggestion to Ambassador Yang, and was not delivered to Pres. Eisenhower. It is therefore NOT an official document. WSR.”
  2. Ante, p. 1685.