Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/1–2654: Telegram

The Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) to the Department of State

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Munsan-ni, January 26, 1954.¹

237. Repeated information New Delhi, Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC Tokyo unnumbered. Reference my telegram 236.²

1. Commie letter to Dean and their four-point summary statement today demonstrate again they are interested only in setting date for resumption of talks and will make no move whatsoever correct record or meet us regarding satisfactory basis for resumption. We considered during recess advisability returning letter to Communists but decided it would put U.S. Government in poor posture and appear picayune.

2. Their tactic today is in effect indefinite recess of liaison meetings particularly in view their abrupt departure from meeting before recess agreed to and their going over our heads directly to Ambassador Dean.

3. We regret we could not carry out instructions in paragraph 2, Deptel 210.³ Without appearing over-anxious or off balance by their letter and tactic, we tried to keep meetings alive but Commies, probably sensing this, suddenly walked out. Their conduct and typewritten statements showed that they had prepared it. They would have done the same had we proposed recess till tomorrow or Thursday which we decided inadvisable as immediate gambit on return after recess. It clearly was intention Communists take matter out of liaison meetings today which they made certain by walking out.

4. Matter is now directly up to Department and Ambassador Dean almost in form of peremptory, intransigent demand accept unconditional renewal of talks, on a take it or leave it basis. Quite typical. After leaving our 8th December proposals on table and later charging us with treachery and perfidy, they now insist on our complete concession to their position on resumption. Though the tone of their letter and statement today is moderate, it is inflexible and curt.

5. I assume letter suggested in paragraph 3 of Deptel 210 is now overtaken by Commie letter. In our statements today we summarized briefly efforts bring about political conference and pointed out it was they who requested liaison meetings and they who wish recess them. The use of MAC and possibly an Embassy officer designated as “liaison secretary” for a continuing channel could be specified in any reply from Ambassador Dean or from me.

6. Concerning nature and timing of reply, and particularly the 1 February date, we are not in a position to judge, on a local basis and without the information available in Washington, the implication of UNGA and Berlin. But, after our endeavor to negotiate in as unchallenging and unprovocating but firm a way as possible the question of conditions, we do not see how U.S. could concede to Communist representatives under the circumstances here. Re GA, viewed from here we wonder if not possible for US to take offensive if GA must meet to make strong case for our efforts and against Communist intransigence, as well as Communist activities North Korea.

7. Any reply should, among other things, rebut their contention liaison meetings began on “exactly” the basis they set—namely to agree on date. I specified “conditions” in all three of my letters. Perhaps it might be a good tactic for me to reply on behalf of Ambassador Dean or simply on instructions so as not to engage him as yet in this controversy.

8. We take it from paragraph 3, Deptel 210 that in event of Communist recess—which now in effect—we would not continue here indefinitely either as liaison channel or for initial resumption of talks. We await Department’s instructions. In face of today’s episode we dislike idea standing by much longer in area of Panmunjom.

9. I asked Bond this afternoon to convey results of today’s meeting officially to Dr. Pyun whom I met briefly yesterday with the Ambassador. I have also informed General Lacey.

Young

1. There was no indication of time of transmission on the source text, which was received at the Department of State at 11:15 p.m., Jan. 26.
2. In this telegram, Jan. 26, Young reported that at the fifth meeting of the liaison secretaries, the Communist side handed the U.S. liaison secretary a letter for Dean and proposed to recess the meeting to await a reply. After a 30-minute recess, the U.S. liaison secretary countered that the persistent Communist refusal to discuss conditions for resuming talks and their present move to bypass the meetings by communicating directly to Dean indicated that they did not wish the liaison meetings to continue. The Communists replied with a four-point summary of their position: 1. demanding immediate unconditional resumption of the talks; 2. accusing the United States of undermining the discussions by suspending them; 3. rejecting the need for a new basis for the negotiations; and 4. reiterating that they had no intention of correcting the record. The Communist side then proposed another recess to await a reply to their letter and walked out without waiting for the U.S. response. (795.00/1–2654) A text of the letter to Dean, which made essentially the same points as the four-point summary, can be found in telegram 235 from Munsan-ni, Jan. 26. (795.00/1–2654)
3. Supra.