Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/1–2354: Telegram

The Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) to the Department of State

secret
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Musan-ni, January 23, 1954.¹

232. Repeated information Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC unnumbered.

• Part I.

  Communists’ unwillingness meet today (mytel 231²) and postponement meeting to 26 January—six days after previous meeting—further evidence Communists’ present disinterest in these meetings and in reaching agreement on satisfactory conditions for resumption. While intention charge US on PW issue at today’s MAC meeting may have been one reason for their postponement simultaneous liaison meeting at Panmunjom, it may have something to do with opening Berlin conference Monday,³ arrival there of Chinese delegation and Soviet demand for Chinese participation five-power conference.

• Part II.

  Re Deptel 204,⁴ it therefore seems to us current efforts negotiate resumption of talks and arrangements Korean PC have reached point diminishing returns at Panmunjom. I believe consideration should be given to complete review of PC problem, to recessing liaison meetings indefinitely next week, and to our return thereafter to Washington for consultation. This suggestion based on following considerations as seen from here:

  1. Main purpose Korean PC as stated paragraph 60 of Armistice Agreement and paragraph 11 of terms of reference should be reappraised in light developments since 27 July. Thus, non-repatriated PWs no longer pertinent; North Korean-Peiping 10-year pact and Chinese activities North Korea indicate possibility peaceful unification Korea even more remote than previously appeared to be, as indicated mytels 199⁵ and 201⁶ and the consensus of foreign observers here; threat of unilateral ROK action, while not to be entirely discounted, also seems lessening; and our own announcement withdrawal two divisions and probable withdrawal some ChiCom troops indicate possibility slowly making such adjustments on a de facto basis in absence PC.

  2. While we not at this time advocating whole idea Korean PC be dropped or that US change posture seeking a PC in order carry out UN objectives re Korean unification, we suggest objectives should be realistically re-examined on basis current situation, since it may be pressure and need for PC lessened. Moreover, PC would give Communists best forum push proposals for date and manner withdrawal foreign military forces which might be undesirable and untimely from viewpoint our own military plans.

  3. At same time difficult to see any great pressure on Communists convene Korean PC of type envisaged in Armistice Agreement in view factors mentioned in paragraph 1. Of course, it continues to be Communist aim get US Military Forces out of Korea, but their principal objective now may be gain propaganda forum along lines their 30 November proposal. They will probably continue press for this type PC in order enhance their prestige by means of this international conference and to seek introduce broader issues. As indicated today’s MAC meeting they still insist PC take up PW issue, which creates another obstacle to agreement on PC. On balance, over-all situation does not appear conducive rapid bridging differences between Communists 30 November and our 8 December proposals even under best of negotiating conditions.

  4. It would be hard conceive less propitious conditions bridge gap than existing situation at Panmunjom, where thus far unable even agree renew attempt to bridge it. Despite our somewhat indirect approach, liaison meetings seem to have drawn lines between two sides more rigidly as to rectifying record, it even more difficult either side modify its position without risk having it dramatized in world press as major retreat. Moreover, after their defeat on POW issue, Communists under great pressure counterattack US with propaganda, especially at Panmunjom scene of defeat. At MAC meeting today, which conducted in very tense atmosphere, Communists made wild charges and issued warnings. In short, atmosphere Panmunjom such now, and likely remain so some weeks, that modification Communist position in liaison meetings appears most unlikely.

  5. In face continuation liaison meeting deadlock, effectiveness argument contained Deptel 208⁷ re negotiations continuing Panmunjom steadily diminishing, if it is not already outdated, though it has served useful purpose for past three months. In liaison meeting 20 January, mytel 229,⁸ Communists displayed irritation effectiveness this argument so far and may feel continuation liaison meetings disadvantageous to them. This may partly explain today’s postponement. For this reason they may well make it increasingly difficult for us maintain liaison meetings and dignity too. They may try bring about indefinite recess, or do so in effect by increasing intervals between meetings.

  Communist statements in meetings, propaganda, and remarks reported by Indians (mytel 206⁹) indicate to me Communists believe we are “manipulating” Panmunjom talks chiefly to detour GA. Peiping Radio today sharply accuses us deliberately delaying talks and PC in longest radio notice yet given to liaison meetings. We cannot force Communists make something of these meetings if they refuse budge on correcting record or if they are seeking another locus. Also, our effort will become increasingly transparent.

  6. In considering alternative courses to present, suggest Department should also take into account undesirability of adding to prestige Peiping and North Korea regimes, especially in Asia, by continuing trying to negotiate with them on behalf of US and 16 Allies on ground Communist choosing despite insults and intransigence, which as indicated paragraph 4 above seem likely continue. Should not three months effort be enough demonstrate our good faith and intentions? Will longer period, in face continued intransigence, not be viewed as vain attempt travel dead-end road, if not positive sign weakness?

  7. While appreciating reasons outlined Deptel 208¹⁰ for forestalling February GA, we feel strong case could be made out in GA, if it must meet during next month, for our 8 December proposal, which Communists left lying on table. Also might be worth considering whether continued deadlock in spasmodic unproductive meetings Panmunjom is not perhaps as much if not more obvious reason to other governments to convoke GA to discuss PC than would be indefinite recess and possibility any time renew preliminary talks here. Yet, can basic issues with Communists—USSR role, voting procedure, agenda, and perhaps neutrals at PC—be negotiated in public at Panmunjom, or might some other avenue be more productive, if anything will paragraph 8 [sic]. Meanwhile, alternatives to both Panmunjom and GA might be sought. At same time effort should be made arrive common position with ROK of PC, since wherever question is negotiated basic divergence with ROK will constitute major stumbling block to success and weakness our side easily exploited by Communists.

• Part III.

  Therefore, I would recommend that, unless the Communists make some new and constructive proposals on Tuesday, (1) we seek recess the liaison meetings at the following meeting after Tuesday (2) leave channel open through MAC secretariat and Embassy Seoul so that means are always available meet with Communists Panmunjom (3) I deliver to Communists after indefinite recess letter outlining main points our efforts implement paragraph 60 and desire for reasonable constructive atmosphere for talks and PC, and (4) explore new channels to iron out, if possible and it may not be, differences between 30 November and 8 December proposals. If that done satisfactorily on a general basis, then talks could be resumed Panmunjom or elsewhere to draft and initial agreement on PC.

• Part IV.

  General Lacey has seen.

Young

1. There was no time of transmission indicated on the source text, which was received in the Department of State at 2:04 p.m., Jan. 23.
2. Not printed. (795.00/1–2354)
3. Jan. 25.
4. In this telegram to Munsan-ni, Jan. 16, Young was instructed to continue his present course of action in the liasion meetings until the crisis over the release of POWs had passed. At that point, the Department of State would review the whole picture bearing in mind the courses of action Young had outlined. (795.00/1–1654)
5. Dated Dec. 31, 1953, p. 1680.
6. Dated Jan. 3, p. 1686.
7. Printed as telegram 336 to USUN, Jan. 20, p. 1728.
8. Not printed. (795.00/1–2054)
9. Dated Jan. 9, p. 1712.
10. Printed as telegram 336 to USUN, Jan. 20, p. 1728.