Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

320/1–2054: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations¹

confidential

Washington, January 20, 1954—6:57 p.m.

336. Following is rationale underlying our essentially negative response Madame Pandit’s request for resumed GA session, for use with delegations and foreign offices.

1. We see no point in resumed GA at present because we believe it will not serve useful purpose in connection Korean problem. As long as we hold this view we do not expect send further communication in response to Madame Pandit’s request. Specifically we cannot agree to postponement of resumed session from February 9 to another date at this time. USUN should seek dissuade Urrutia from suggesting postponement to Indians and make same point to other dels inquiring re date resumption GA.

2. GOI request to Madame Pandit to reconvene eighth session indicates first purpose of session would be to consider work of NNRC and circumstances in which Indians have disposed of POWs. If Indians had complied with armistice agreement and had released POWs to civilian status January 23 as required therein it might have been desirable for GA subsequently express moral approval of Indian course and we would have viewed sympathetically Indian request for such action. However Indians have in effect washed their hands of problem and, in prematurely turning prisoners back to UNC, have stated UNC release of prisoners inconsistent with armistice agreement. By time assembly met POW controversy would be academic problem for legal dispute. GA consideration of POW problem could only result in presentation three conflicting points of view,—i.e., Communist, Indian and UNC views re what would have been proper disposition POWs—with fruitless recriminations and controversial resolution of dubious practical utility.

3. GOI also seeks have GA deal with question of Korean political conference or other steps looking toward settlement Korean question. Again, we fail see utility GA action. By resolution August 28, 1953² GA has already set forth its views on organization of political conference. As current liaison meetings at Panmunjom indicate, negotiations pursuant to August 28 resolution have not yet reached deadlock. We think it by no means impossible difference between two sides in these talks can be worked out and are continuing to explore methods for doing so. We believe we can do this more effectively than GA, unless or until some radically new basis of procedure becomes desirable. Meanwhile, if Communists should come to believe a resumed GA session is imminent, they will obviously refrain from any serious negotition. To throw political conference issue back into assembly would be to invite spate of new “compromise” proposals produced by Menon and by Communists which might result in creating dangerous splits within group of sixteen. GA consideration this question could also revive in very difficult form demands for GA hearings for Chinese Communists and North Koreans.

4. Therefore, since on our analysis GA to consider POW issue and Korean political conference would at present produce no useful result but would actually increase tension and difficulties of negotiation, we are not now prepared to agree that session should be resumed or to set date for resumption. We believe we should all keep open mind on this question and avoid commitment until clear prospect of concrete improvement in Korean situation through GA action seems likely.

USUN should make our position clear to other delegations and New Delhi should make foregoing points at high level, reporting responses.³ London should similarly approach FonOff if in its view UK position at variance with above.

We note January 20 press report Madame Pandit stated UNGA must decide fate 96 prisoners not desiring return to either side. Under paragraph 11 POW terms of reference in armistice agreement, it is responsibility NNRC and Indian Red Cross assist individuals choosing to go to neutral nations for period of thirty days after January 23. We would expect India, in its capacity as Chairman and Executive Agent of NNRC, assist resettlement of these individuals by active diplomatic means during thirty-day period. GA has no legal authority in this matter and we fail to see how GA action could be as effective as action prescribed in armistice agreement. Indian sources are also reported as implying GA might have to take action if Communists refuse to take back POWs desiring to go to Communist China and North Korea. We note Communist response to Thimayya, while attacking Indian decision to turn back POWs, does not refuse to accept POWs. Here again, GA has no legal authority deal with situation and we fail see how GA action at this time could be as useful as diplomatic methods to determine fate these prisoners if indeed Communists should refuse accept them.

Dulles

1. This telegram was drafted by Popper, Paul B. Taylor (Officer in Charge of General Assembly Affairs, UNP), and Betty C. Gough of UNP. It was cleared with Wainhouse, Drumright, Nicholas G. Thacher of SOA, Ward Allen, and Murphy; it was repeated to London as 3755, New Delhi as 864, Tokyo as 1695 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC, Munsan-ni as 208, and Seoul as 613.
2. See the editorial note, p. 1503.
3. In telegram 1182 from New Delhi, Jan. 26, Allen told of discussing the question of a special General Assembly session with Pillai in New Delhi, who said that the Indian Government would await the decision of the majority, and if it was against reconvening, would accept the decison with equanimity. (320/1–2654)