Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

695A.0024/1–1554: Telegram

The Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) to the Department of State

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Munsan-ni, January 15, 1954.¹

219. Repeated information Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC, New Delhi unnumbered. Reference my telegrams 214² and 216³ and New Delhi 1094⁴ and 1098⁵ to Department regarding NNRC and POW problem:

Thimayya had quite a bit to say yesterday about the Communists reaction to the Indian proposal to turn back POWs. Apparently Nehru had purposely informed Chou En-lai of Indian intentions to release the prisoners. Thimayya indicated the Chinese Communist Government had reacted violently and furiously and had protested in the strongest terms to Nehru against any Indian action releasing the prisoners in any manner whatsoever. According to Thimayya, Chou En-lai told Nehru in substance, “they are our prisoners, not yours, and you cannot release them. It would be better let them break out on 23 January and then you must shoot them whatever happens.” Nehru responded to Chou’s outburst by saying that India would have no part in shooting or bloodshed, it was India’s duty to see that the prisoners were handled in a humanitarian way since the functions of the CFI end midnight 22 January, and India could not be left in position of being held responsible for bloodshed and major disturbance after 22 January.

Thimayya described his visit on Wednesday afternoon with the Communist Generals in Kaesong as two of the unpleasantest hours of his life. He said they attacked him personally, in his official capacity, and as an Indian representative for the whole two hours. His characterization of them to Stenstrom, Daeniker and me was in unusually profane terms. They also strongly protested any Indian release of the prisoners as dangerous to “peace and tranquility in Korea”. He did not accept their attacks or protests.

Apparently both he and Nehru maintained their firm position on the POWs with the Communists despite the strain it is creating in New Delhi–Peiping relations at this time.

The Indians may after 22 January seek some means to make up with Peiping for their action on the POWs. Perhaps this will appear at UNGA or concerning the political conference, since Singh has talked to me quite personally but frankly several times about the problem of compensating the Chinese Communists for their “psychological defeat” here, or at least our not insisting on positions which register more loss of face or retreats for Peiping at this time.

Young

1. No time of transmission was indicated on this telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 1:15 a.m., Jan. 15.
2. In this telegram from Munsan-ni, Jan. 13, Young reported on the beginning of a “Communist war of nerves in Panmunjom” against the Indians and the planned release of remaining POWs on Jan. 22. (695A.0024/1–1354)
3. This telegram related a discussion among Young, Thimayya, Stenstrom, and Daeniker in which these members of the NNRC expressed concern that the Indian Government in New Delhi had insisted that the remaining prisoners held by the Commission be returned to each side for retention until the political conference. (695A.0024/1–1454)
4. Dated Jan. 12, p. 1718.
5. In this telegram, Jan. 13, the Ambassador reported that Thimayya had been given full authority on Jan. 10 to work out the release of the 22,000 nonrepatriate POWs to the UNC. In discussing this issue with Allen, Krishna Menon said that his government would point out that the UNC should hold the POWs until the political conference considered their case. Allen commented that this was an obvious gesture to placate Peking and Menon did not disagree. (695A.0024/1–1354)