Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/1–1154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State¹

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Seoul, January 11, 1954—10 p.m.

660. Reference: Embtel 635, January 6.² I believe we should interpret Rhee’s current campaign of recrimination and misrepresentation as echoes for public ear of statements made to me January 6.

These attacks unchecked will soon adversely affect US–ROK relations if they have not already done so. I accordingly urge we consider initiative from Washington, either statement or perhaps observations by Secretary at press conference, which without entering into personal polemic with Rhee might nevertheless clear the air and thereafter produce greater ROK restraint. I cannot recommend we accept these continuing false charges without response, even though there may be little we can say to Rhee in his present temper (short of offering resume fighting at his side) which likely alter his attitude toward armistice and related matters.

As germane to foregoing I today received call from departing American citizen associated with Rhee for past several months in advisory capacity. Caller expressed astonishment at US permitting Rhee’s attacks to go on, thus encouraging as he put it other Korean officials to conclude Rhee has our government in retreat and way to handle US is through abuse. In this connection he pointed to quick termination ROK nonsense about invading demilitarized zone in face of courteous but firm Hull–Taylor stand last week. While admittedly situations are hardly comparable, nevertheless I doubt whether we ought much longer to let Rhee’s behavior pass unnoticed.

Or we might defer submitting defense pact to Senate and without public statement let word out we had matter under advisement, and were observing developments.³

Briggs

1. Attached to the source text was a covering memorandum which transmitted a copy of this cable from Drumright to Robertson and advised the following:

   “You will note from the attached telegram that Briggs is continuing his campaign to slap Rhee down.

   “While we are under provocation, I think that we have to understand Rhee’s position and motives. I believe that Rhee’s and his PIO’s recent statements are mainly for the record and home consumption, that we should not indulge in public recriminations with Rhee, that such tactics on our part could only give Korean pronouncements added prominence and significance, and that we should not allow these verbal blasts to deflect us from our attempt to arrive at an understanding with Rhee. Neither should we allow such activities to deter us from submitting the defense pact to the Senate.”

2. Ante, p. 1696.
3. In telegram 589 to Seoul, Briggs was informed that the Secretary considered it inadvisable to engage in public controversy with Rhee or the Korean Government. Instead, Briggs was to stress that abusive statements only harmed U.S.-South Korean relations and prejudiced the attainment by peaceful means of a united and independent Korea to which the United States was committed. Furthermore, in reliance on understandings and agreements already reached with Korea and in the belief that the United States could expect South Korea’s further cooperation, the Executive branch had submitted the Mutual Defense Treaty to the Senate. Briggs was to remind Rhee, not as a threat but as a simple statement of fact, that ratification of the treaty could be seriously jeopardized by his government’s continuing to issue such unjustified and baseless statements. (795.00/1–1254)