Office of the Historian

795.00/12–3053

Memorandum by the Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Secretary of State

secret
[Washington,] December 30, 1953.

Subject:

  • Considerations for and against continuing our efforts to arrange for a Korean Political Conference

Considerations Supporting Continuation of Efforts to Arrange a Political Conference:

1.
The Secretary’s and the President’s recent and repeated statements we are willing to negotiate with Communists on specific issues.
2.
Previous commitments in armistice agreement and UNGA resolutions.
3.
Desires of our Allies (e.g., Jebb–Scott–Dean conversations and Murphy-Heeney conversations1).
4.
Continued imminence of conference might possibly tend to retard Communist timetable for North Korea, assuming any negotiation really retards their timetable.
5.
Conference would provide us with strong propaganda platform for pressing for free, supervised elections throughout all of Korea—a position we have very successfully maintained re Germany—assuming Rhee would acquiesce.
6.
If, as expected, no political unification is possible, conference may furnish useful means replace cumbersome armistice machinery by modus vivendi perhaps including mutual withdrawal of troops, although possibly full-fledged conference is not needed for this.
7.
Demonstration of Chinese Communist intransigence at conference will help us maintain line on Chinese representation in UN, China trade, etc., and enable us take a full look at their picture.
8.
Similarly, imminence or existence of conference will help prevent damaging actions in UN General Assembly.
9.
Imminence of conference, or beginning of conference, helps to counteract Russian pressure at Berlin for Five-Power Conference and for discussion of other Asian questions as means of “relaxing international tensions.”
10.
Possible test of extent to which Chinese Communists are willing to take line independent of Soviets, although conference may not be needed for this.

Considerations Opposing Convocation of Political Conference

1.
They would use the conference as a means of gaining time to buttress their position in North Korea—i.e., build up North Korean economy, build up armed forces, consolidate political control. Though absence of a conference might not retard this.
2.
They might build up North Korean army, withdraw Chinese forces across the Yalu and then use it to demand UN troop withdrawal (non-Korean forces as agreed to by Admiral Joy), before we were ready for it, thus putting us in a difficult propaganda position.
3.
ROKs may refuse to agree to any reasonable proposals we wished to present such as non-voting observer, plebiscite, withdrawal of UN forces, etc.
4.
If unification is impossible in any event, it may be easier to reach modus vivendi through MAC or in direct conversations with Chinese Communists unencumbered by sixteen neutrals, ROKs, etc.
5.
Chinese Communists would seek to use conference to promote their admission to UN and consideration of other Asian questions.
6.
Pressure of public opinion might force us into undesirable concessions.

Recommendation

On balance I recommend that:

(a)
We try, on a completely appropriate basis either through Young and the Indians at Panmunjom or the Swedish Ambassador at Peiping to resume the preliminary talks about January 10, 1954.
(b)
The fact that the talks are resumed may take off the pressure for the reconvening of UNGA.
(c)
If they are not resumed before January 22, it may take months to get them going afterwards.

Arthur H. Dean
  1. The records of these conversations have not been printed; generally they are located in file 795.00.↩