795.00/12–2353
The Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
top secret
Washington, December 23, 1953.
Dear Foster: Attached is a copy of a memorandum from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff which contains the statement of the initial
military objectives and the major courses of action which they recommend
be undertaken in the event that hostilities in Korea are renewed by the
Communists in the near future. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken into
account in this statement the discussion of the National Security
Council on this subject at the 3 December meeting.1
As you know, this subject is scheduled for presentation to the National
Security Council again on Thursday, 7 January 1954. I hope that you can
examine the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that your
representatives can meet with representatives of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs on this subject at an early date so that we may present to the
Security Council a coordinated paper.
[Page 1674]
[Attachment]
Memorandum by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of
Defense
top secret
Washington, December 18, 1953.
Subject:
- Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea
- 1.
- Pursuant to your memorandum of 10 December 1953, subject as
above,2 the
Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith a restatement of the
initial military objectives and the major course of action which
should be undertaken in the event that hostilities in Korea are
renewed by the Communists in the near future.
- 2.
- In light of the discussion at the 173rd meeting of the
National Security Council on 3 December 1953, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff believe the course of action which they recommended to
you in their memorandum of 27 November 19533 should now be
restated as follows:
- a.
- Employing atomic weapons, conduct offensive air
operations against military targets in Korea, and
against those military targets in Manchuria and China
which are being used by the Communists in direct support
of their operations in Korea, or which threaten the
security of US/UN forces in the Korean area.
- b.
- Simultaneously, exploit as practicable such successes
as may be gained as a result of action outlined in a above, by coordinated ground,
naval and air action to destroy enemy forces in
Korea.
- c.
- In light of the circumstances prevailing at the time,
and subject to an evaluation of the results of
operations conducted under a and
b, be prepared to take
further action against Communist China to reduce their
war-making capability in the Korea area, such as:
- (1)
- Blockade of China Coast.
- (2)
- Seizure of Hainan and other off-shore
islands.
- (3)
- Raids on the China mainland by Chinese
Nationalist forces.
- d.
- Immediately consider what further military build-up is
then required to meet the resulting contingencies in
Korea or elsewhere.
- 3.
- The above course of action should achieve the following
initial military objectives:
- a.
- Destroy effective Chinese Communist military power
applied to the Korean effort.
- b.
- Reduce Chinese Communist military capability for
further aggression in the Korean area.
- c.
- Create conditions under which ROK forces can assume increasing
responsibility for the defense of Korea.
- 4.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that any positive course
of action to oppose renewed Communist aggression in Korea might
involve increased risk of World War III. However, if the
Communists
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attack
our forces in Korea, there is no suitable alternative to this
course of action.
- 5.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that this restatement of
the major course of action and the initial military objectives
be approved and coordinated with the Department of State prior
to submission to the National Security Council.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur
Radford
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
