Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

611–95/12–353

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] December 3, 1953.

Subject:

• JCS Memorandum—US Courses of Action in Korea

1. The JCS, pursuant to NSC Action 949d, by Memorandum of November 27 to the Secretary of Defense,¹ have recommended a military course of action to be undertaken in the event that Communists re-initiate hostilities in Korea. The Department of State was requested by the same NSC action to prepare a report on the political implications involved in the recommended course of military action. The Department has given urgent consideration to the JCS paper, and is of the opinion that it cannot make a useful report on political implications without a clearer understanding of the military courses of action which the JCS have in mind.

2. The primary question on which it is necessary to have clarification is the geographic location and general nature of the targets which the JCS intend to attack. The recommended JCS course of action is stated in paragraph 3a of their paper: “Employing atomic weapons, conduct large-scale air operations against targets in China, Manchuria, and Korea.” Within this very general course of action there could be various general types of attack which would carry markedly different risks of Russian reaction against U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa, and consequently would involve markedly different reactions from the Allies of the U.S., and from the other nations of the Free World.

a. U.S. attacks against the air bases above the Yalu, against communications lines supplying the Korean theatre, and against Chinese forces moving toward that theatre, would undoubtedly meet Russian resistance but might not impel the Russians to undertake attacks against U.S. bases outside of Korea.

b. U.S. atomic attacks on important Chinese cities would face the Russians with a critical political problem in their relations with the Chinese, might indeed impel them to undertake attacks against U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa, but by avoidance of Russian-controlled territory would leave the Russians some choice as to the nature of their reaction.

c. U.S. attacks on Port Arthur and Dairen would almost certainly result in Russian attack on U.S. bases in Okinawa and Japan.

d. U.S. attacks on Vladivostok and the Soviet Far East would probably spark World War III.

3. The JCS paper is imprecise on which type of action is envisaged.

a. The JCS state that one of the “primary military objectives” which should be adopted is (2b (2)) “To render the enemy incapable of further aggression in Korea and the Far East”. Since “the enemy” is defined only as Communist, this objective, if literally applied, would call for the destruction of all Chinese and Russian military capabilities in the Far East, and could hardly be achieved without attack on Soviet bases in the Far East.

b. The JCS state (Appendix B, para 7) “Provision for attacks in the Dairen-Port Arthur area will be included in the plans. Specific approval by the JCS will be required prior to implementation of such attacks.” It is not clear whether the JCS are recommending NSC approval of this course of action.

c. The JCS describe one of their “major implementing actions” as follows (Appendix A, para 4): “Upon the outbreak of hostilities launch immediately a large-scale air offensive employing atomic weapons to destroy Chinese Communist forces and selected targets in China, Manchuria and Korea.” If read literally this would call for the destruction of all elements of Chinese Communist forces in China Proper, in which case the “selected targets” would involve practically every Chinese city.

d. None of the types of action described above would be inconsistent with the JCS general recommendations (para 3a) “Employing atomic weapons, conduct large-scale air operations against targets in China, Manchuria and Korea. Exploit such successes as may be gained by coordinated ground, air and naval action to destroy enemy forces in Korea.” But this general course of action could also be interpreted as including only those attacks against air bases, communication lines and enemy forces which were required to defeat the Chinese Communists in Korea.

4. A second important question on which clarification is required is whether or not the JCS recommended “primary military objectives” (para 2b) are intended to be applicable no matter how hostilities in Korea are initiated. Allied and Free World reaction to U.S. courses of action will differ markedly in accordance with the degree of conviction that the Communists are responsible for the renewal of hostilities. The JCS paragraph on “military objectives” (para 2b) is so worded that it reads as if these objectives should be adopted by the U.S. now, as its general objectives rather than in the contingency of Communist renewal of hostilities.

Recommendations

1. The Secretary request a postponement for two weeks of the State Department formal report on political implications of the recommended military course of action.

2. The Secretary question the JCS in the NSC as to whether their recommended military course of action involves attacks against air bases, communication lines and enemy forces in and proximate to Korea; wide-spread attacks against Chinese cities; attacks against Darien and Port Arthur; or attacks against Russian bases in the Soviet Far East.

3. The Secretary question the JCS in the NSC as to whether the JCS recommended “primary military objectives” (para 2b) are intended to be applicable as our general objectives now, or only in the contingency of Communist renewal of hostilities.

R. R. Bowie

1. Ante, p. 1626.