795.00/10–2453: Telegram
The Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Department of State1
358. Repeated information Tokyo 174, New Delhi 16. For the Secretary from Dean; Tokyo for General Hull and Allison. Arrived Tokyo Friday October 23 at 1:30 Tokyo time and was briefed by Ambassadors Allison and Briggs.
[Page 1559]At 3 o’clock met General Hull and his staff and had excellent briefing on relations to NNRC and military situation. Substance of briefing as follows: As far as anyone can gauge situation at present time, while unilateral military action by ROK is possible, it is not regarded as probable in near future and disposition of our troops and logistics such that (a) ROK troops would not have more than six days supply, (b) our troops could make other supplies unavailable, (c) our troops could be disposed in Korea in such manner as to make serious troop loss improbable, and (d) while opinion varies, consensus seems to be that without enabling action by US, ROK military could act on Rhee orders to proceed unilaterally with the greatest of reluctance though they would probably accept orders to proceed against Communists rather than face removal from command or firing squad. Our relation with ROK military continues excellent and situation has not deteriorated since your visit early August.
Spent considerable time exploring relations NNRC and General Thimayya in particular. Refer to wire from Ambassador Allen2 for more details those relations. Explored whether our attitude possibly too rigid and whether possible prisoners could be persuaded to accept explanation quietly and then decide against repatriation. Explained this was out of my province except as it bore on general question of success of political conference and possibility of there being one, and inadvisability of permitting Indians to throw whole question into General Assembly for debate. General Harrison accompanied us to Seoul this morning and is exploring that situation with General Thimayya today. Believe top command doing everything possible to promote harmonious relations Indians. Explained to Allison and General Hull wanted to maintain very close liaison. General Harrison gave us excellent briefing on dealing with Communists.
Arrived Seoul noon today and had satisfactory talk with Dr. Rhee. US representative is to be sole emissary from our side but I volunteered to accept as observers Vice Minister Cho and Colonel Li. I made clear there must be only one spokesman for our side. Assured Rhee no change in our ideas as to composition of conference and that we would maintain closest possible liaison with him. Informed Rhee my instructions were to agree on time and place, administrative details, and I was not authorized to change on composition. Rhee urged that we should walk out if composition even discussed but I advised I would listen but make no agreements. Rhee reaffirmed his absolute objection to India at conference and inquired several times how many governments would be at political conference and I explained General Assembly resolution of August 28 was invitation to sixteen UN nations contributing troops [Page 1560] plus Republic of Korea and that any of them could decline and that some might do so.
After first obtaining explicit approval General Hull and Ambassador Briggs that it was wise to discuss subject at this time I made clear to Dr. Rhee that belligerent statements on his part or statements that if he proceeded unilaterally to renew hostilities he had commitments from us, were seriously hurting chances ratification defense pact and possibility of obtaining further appropriations for economic rehabilitation, and that both President Eisenhower and you were very insistent that political conference should be given every chance to bring about free independent and united Korea by negotiation.
Dr. Rhee insisted there was only one way to do that, namely by force, and that neither defense pact nor gold was of possible use to him if there were still a million Chinese Communist troops in Korea. He related Chinese fable about fish gasping on the sand, moribund for pail of water while the Chinese philosopher promised to rescue victim by bringing entire eastern sea. I countered this with Aesop fable of fox who lost cheese in his mouth by mistaking reflection of cheese in water for substance of cheese. I reminded him again of the specific wording of your joint communiqué of August 7. He reiterated his extreme skepticism as to the utility of political conference and his great faith in unification by force. I referred him to statements by both President Eisenhower and you including particularly your Herald Tribune forum speech that the release of modern weapons was too horrible to contemplate and that we must use every reasonable effort to negotiate peace at the conference table. I again made explicitly clear United States has no commitment beyond August 7 joint communiqué. Rhee suggested our refusal accept his view that unification could only be achieved by force and that if we did not support him, this, in his opinion, constituted indication our intention to desert him, which I emphatically assured him was not the case. I cannot in all honesty say that he seemed particularly impressed by my arguments or by my new status.
Following conference with Dr. Rhee, I had very satisfactory talk with General Taylor. General Taylor pointed out that there is a wide range of unilateral action possible from merely shooting a gun to the north across the line in violation of the armistice to the actual ordering of ROK troops to proceed north. All here are agreed that there seems little likelihood that Rhee has any intention of taking any major unilateral action in the near future. Inquired of him at some length on military situation. General Taylor reported (1) his relations with ROK military commanders have improved over situation existing in August, (2) seemed somewhat doubtful of automatic obedience and expressed view that if ordered to proceed ROK military would not do much more than lean forward in their foxholes, although they could always take action which would constitute a violation of the armistice, (3) did not seem to [Page 1561] believe that there was any evidence that Dr. Rhee was prepared to proceed unilaterally in the near future. In fact he cited a number of matters to the contrary in which Dr. Rhee had readily agreed or advocated recently, including a substantial reduction in the draft, his insistence on rebuilding buildings in the capital, etc., which apparently indicates he has no present intention of proceeding unilaterally. General relations and military relations seem excellent and neither General Hull nor General Taylor seemed any where near as alarmed about possibility unilateral action as some thought expressed in Washington just before I left. In view of fact Indians apparently not going to use force with respect to prisoners and this situation seems to be improving somewhat, none here see any instance immediately on horizon which might cause him to act in a manner inimical to safety our forces or in a manner threatening peace. However, opinion given me in meetings Tokyo and Seoul that we should soon inform Rhee we will not support any unilateral action, and that we will be remiss not to inform him soon.
Communists today advised MAC secretariat they would hold meetings in a hall built by them and astride the demarcation line, which hall General Lacey considers entirely satisfactory our purposes. Am making preliminary inspection trip tomorrow to be sure there is no propaganda value to them in selecting this hall. Receiving most complete cooperation from Ambassador Briggs and everyone concerned and will leave for Munsan-Ni either late Sunday or early Monday morning.3 Colonel Babcock and Kenneth Young will make preliminary check Monday morning to make sure status Communist presentation satisfactory. Press statement on arrival Tokyo and Seoul being sent separately.
- In a memorandum to the President, Oct. 27, Dulles enclosed a copy of this telegram and suggested that Eisenhower might wish to read it before the NSC meeting on Oct. 30. Although Dulles thought it somewhat long, he recommended it for its “atmosphere and flavor” and noted that it was reassuring on the likelihood of Rhee reopening hostilities. (795.00/10–2653)↩
- Not printed.↩
- Oct. 25–26.↩