Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/10–653

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (O’Connor)¹

secret

[Washington?,] October 6, 1953—3 p.m.

Participants:

• Mr. Arthur H. Dean
• R. L. O’Connor, Secretary’s Office

Mr. Dean had just finished having luncheon with Krishna Menon and Mr. Dayal² of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, at the latter’s request. The Indians made the following three principal points:

1. They said that the recent statement of the Korean Acting Foreign Minister was in their eyes an act of aggression and raised the question in their minds whether they were duty bound as Chairman of the Neutrality Commission to bring this matter to the attention of the United Nations. Mr. Dean commented that the Secretary had taken up with Foreign Minister Pyun the bad effects of such bellicose statements. The Indians asked whether or not the Acting Foreign Minister’s statement had ever been officially transmitted to the UNC or was it purely an informal statement. They would like us to inform them the answer to this question, (I am checking this now) and to make the answer clear to the press. If the Minister’s statement had not been a formal protest, they felt that of course they would be under no compulsion to bring the matter to the attention of the United Nations but they would like to have this made clear in the American press in order to relieve them of their responsibility.

2. If the Indian troops were not going to be able to operate under the conditions of neutrality which had been guaranteed them, they wish to serve notice that they might have to withdraw. These conditions included not only the physical disposition of the U.S. and ROK troops but included also the atmosphere under which the Indian troops had to operate.

3. The Indians complained about the hostile press which they felt they were getting in this country. They felt that some responsible person should point out to the American press that on a mathematical basis no interrogator could spend more than 25 minutes with any single prisoner (I am checking the accuracy of this computation). They thought that it should also be pointed out to the U.S. press that some of the decisions of the Commission had been decided against the Poles and Czechs. The Indians were very disturbed at the hostile tone of the press in comment on the job that they were doing on the Neutrality Commission and felt it was our responsibility to correct some of these misrepresentations.

The Indians went on to say that they could assure us positively that Mao and Chou En-lai were very anxious to have this peace conference and to have it start on time; that essentially the question of participants did not bother them. They felt, however, that the tone of our statements had been peremptory; that we were sticking too much to a take-it-or-leave-it line. They did say that they were anxious to have “some” neutrals at the conference. (Mr. Dean commented that it was obvious throughout the talk that Menon did in fact feel that the Indians should be at the conference but that he carefully disclaimed having any such position.)

The Indians specifically wanted to know if in our opinion it would forward anything if they were to suggest to Peiping that we were ready to send an emissary for pre-conference discussions. They suggested that Panmunjom is the proper place. They felt that we would specifically have to say that our emissary would be able to discuss items on the agenda at such preliminary meeting, and they felt strongly that the first item on the agenda should be the subject of participants. Dean has the definite impression Menon was trying to accomplish indirectly what we had voted against in the General Assembly.

Menon wanted to know specifically if the emissary would go to Panmunjom and would discuss matters on a completely pre-conference basis so that the discussions would be completely outside the conference. Dean said, in principle, we would go anywhere other than New Delhi and Peiping.

Mr. Dean took the position that the discussion of participants could not be the first item on the agenda. He felt that we must get the conference started first on the basic Korean question and if it showed promise we could then consider the matter of additional participation.

He said that the emissary at any pre-conference discussions would have no authority to make commitments himself as to items on the agenda, and that, whereas he could discuss agenda items at such a discussion, he would have to refer back to Washington for authority before agreeing to any agenda proposals. Menon pressed Mr. Dean very hard a considerable number of times on making the first item on the agenda the discussion of participants. He felt that this was the only way to get the conference started and that we would have to give in on this point and be what he called flexible. Mr. Dean remained obdurate and said we could not in good faith take the position of voting against India publicly at the General Assembly and then secretly agree that at the discussion of the composition of the conference India would come in. Menon insisted on using the words “one or more neutrals”. Mr. Dean did go so far as to say that if, once the conference started we were making reasonable progress and it looked as though a neutral would be helpful, we would be prepared to attempt to get Rhee to agree to India.

Menon was very hopeful that some responsible American official would clear the air as to India’s duties and responsibilities. Mr. Dean promised to talk to the Secretary and take it up with Menon again.

Menon offered to be our emissary at Peiping. Mr. Dean replied that the Swedish Minister was handling the matter very well; if Menon wished to use his good offices, fine, but not to say he represented us.

As to their second point, Mr. Dean told them that the United Nations Command has taken every precaution in order to make sure that the South Koreans could not effect any release of the prisoners, could not molest the Indian troops and could not provide such an atmosphere in the neutral zone as to make it impossible for the Indian troops and the NNRC to perform its mission. He explained the disposition of our forces, the Marine Division, the British Commonwealth Division and the location of the Republic of Korea troops in relation to the prisoner compounds. He said further that he was sure Dr. Pyun would pass on to Dr. Rhee our attitude about his statements and he felt sure it would only add to the tension if Mr. Menon brought the matter up in the General Assembly. Mr. Dean believes that if we could get some accurate and definitive statements out of the NNRC as to their precise intentions with respect to the number of times or number of minutes a prisoner can be interviewed, if assurances can be given that no single prisoner would be allowed to undergo harsh interrogation or intimidation, and if a further statement could be made as to the matters in which the Swiss and Swedish representatives had acquiesced, it would be very helpful for some responsible person in our Government to brief the press on the exceptionally difficult nature of the role India is performing, of the necessity for keeping the tensions down, and of our intention to work closely with the NNRC in order to make sure that no anti-Communist personnel are intimidated or repatriated against their will. He feels that if we allow Dr. Rhee to become too jingoistic, it will have a bad effect upon Japan and the other fifteen nations signing the Sixteen Power Agreement. He believes that many of them would be secretly relieved if Dr. Rhee were to commit some act which would relieve them of their commitment. This would then leave us holding the bag alone with Dr. Rhee, and if we decided not to fight with Dr. Rhee it might be impossible to evacuate our forces safely before Rhee’s forces and ours were overrun by the Communists.

He also points out that in addition to having a successful political conference, we wish to keep both Japan and India out of the Communist orbit and that anything we can do to promote friendly relations between the United States and India or the United States and the Republic of Korea will promote that over-all objective.

On the other hand, if American public opinion continues to be inflamed against India and Dr. Rhee undertakes some overt acts which will make it impossible to have a political conference, we may then, despite our intentions, find ourselves fighting with Dr. Rhee and American public opinion will then blame the Administration severely for not having taken every step to curb Rhee and to bring about the political conference.

1. A marginal notation on the source text indicated that Dean discussed the contents of this memorandum with Dulles. A related discussion between the Secretary of State and Indian Ambassador Mehta, Oct. 7, 1953 is located in Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199.
2. Rajeshwar Dayal, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations.