795.00/8–1453
Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)1
eyes only
Subject:
- Korea
Participants:
- V. K. Krishna Menon, Delegation of India
- Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., United States Mission
Menon began the conversation by asking what our general attitude was, and I stated it to him substantially as I have done to all the [Page 1494] others—that we favored a conference of two sides and not a round table, that we felt the conference should deal exclusively with Korea and that of course Korean participation was absolutely vital.
He started a discussion of the possible site and said that he thought it would be an excellent thing to have the conference in New York and that New Delhi had also been suggested, but he said of course India did not want to do anything which would be an embarrassment to us in our relations with the Koreans. Although this remark was made in connection with the selection of a site, I interpreted it to mean that India did not want to do anything to embarrass us in our relations with the Koreans in any respect, and said that I appreciated his spirit and that knowing how much he valued frankness and practices it himself, I would be equally frank and say that it would be a great embarrassment to us in our relations with Korea for India to be a member of the Conference because of the well-known attitude of the President of Korea. I said that we had the greatest respect and admiration for India and were delighted that India was Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. We felt grateful to India for having accepted this difficult post, thereby contributing to the ending of the hostilities. I said that we thought so much of India that we intended to support Mrs. Pandit for President of the General Assembly, and that if our own purely national views were all that were involved we might very well not have the same attitude as regards this Political Conference. But, I said, in view of the realities, it would be certainly much better if India did not participate. I pointed out that once you get away from the concept of two sides, you invite a chaotic situation because I could see no criterion that could be established. If one non-belligerent should be a member, then how could one say that Japan, who had a common frontier with Korea, should not be a member? How could one refuse the claim of Nationalist China, or even one of the large Latin American countries?
He asked what resolutions we thought would come up and what my ideas were on the procedure which should be followed. He said he felt there should be a two-day period after the Assembly opens on Monday2 for Delegates to consult with each other and to get the views of their Governments on the other resolutions which would have been introduced.
He asked whether I thought any valid arrangements could be made in Korea without the Soviet Union. I said that we had no objection to the Soviet Union being in on the Communist side, but we did not see why we should roll out the red carpet or put a halo around their heads when they had instigated the whole aggression; that you could never convince the everyday American that the Soviet Union had been neutral or had been on our side. I added that I did not think a successful [Page 1495] conference could be held without the Communist Chinese, or without Korea, or without the United States, and that the Soviet Union was not the only country which could play a big part in a valid settlement of the Korean affair.
He said that India would not make up its mind as to its role until they had had a chance to see what all the different factors were. He said that India would serve only if both sides requested her to, but that India would never shirk from a duty no matter how disagreeable. He said he thought that if we did not want India to be present we ought to send word through our Ambassador to India, and I told him we were doing so. He said he did not know how the Prime Minister would react.
He said that he gathered from what I said that what the Americans had in mind was just an extension of the Panmunjom system “with either you or Dulles or someone else sitting in General Harrison’s place.” I said that it was undoubtedly true that if the Chinese Communists and the Koreans and the United States agreed, that agreement would accomplish a great deal, but that the participants in this case would have much broader powers to deal with far more fundamental matters than was true with the military conferees at Panmunjom.
He said that as regards the repatriation of prisoners, India might be considered as neutral, but that since she had voted for the resolution condemning Communist aggression she could not be considered to be on the Communist side. He said that because India had sent a field ambulance to Korea but had not sent combat troops, although their present detachment was armed, it was rather hard for him to figure out just what India’s position was. I said that it was up to him to make up his mind as to what position he wanted his country to have.
He is nervous about a leak which occurred last Spring from a State Department source so I request this report be not distributed.