Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of the Embassy in Korea (Calhoun)

confidential

Seoul , August 6, 1953—2 p.m.

Subject:

• Discussion of Problems Relating to Economic Aid, Military Assistance and ROK Armed Forces

Participants:

• Americans
• Secretary of the Army Stevens
• Mr. Charles Sullivan, Defense Department
• Mr. John A. Calhoun, American Embassy
• Lt. Colonel Dwan, Defense Department
• Koreans
• Prime Minister Paek Tu Chin
• Defense Minister Son Won II
• Gen. Paek Sun Yup, C/S, ROK Army
• Adm. Park Ok Kyu, C/S, ROK Navy
• Gen. Choi Yong Duk, C/S, ROK Air Force; other military officials from ROK Armed Forces

In his introductory remarks the Prime Minister requested Secretary Stevens to give final United States Governmental approval to the Memorandum of Understanding¹ on implementation of the aid program through the Combined Economic Board transmitted to Washington earlier this week by CINCUNC and the Embassy. He stressed the importance of being able to show the Korean people a concrete result with respect to the aid program and expressed the hope that before Secretary Stevens’ visit was concluded it would be possible to announce such an agreement publicly. Mr. Stevens stated that this Memorandum of Understanding required consideration by various branches of the United States Government and that he could not, therefore, give any assurance that agreement could be given before his departure. He added that he would, however, discuss this problem with Secretary Dulles and suggested that it should be discussed with Tasca and Wood who would be arriving in Korea shortly.

The Prime Minister also raised the question of settling on a permanent military conversion rate of 180 to 1. He sketched briefly the background to the present situation and stated that the Korean Government considered a permanent rate as essential. Mr. Stevens pointed out that this question also involved other agencies of the United States Government, in particular the Treasury Department. He suggested to the Prime Minister that this problem should also be discussed with Tasca and Wood. In response to the Prime Minister’s expressed hope that a speedy solution could be found to this question which has been outstanding so long, Mr. Stevens stated that he would do his best.

The Prime Minister also made a formal request for the United States to assume the 10% of the local expenditures for facilities, labor, etc. now carried by the ROK Government. He pointed out what a heavy burden this obligation was on their already seriously-weakened economy. Mr. Stevens and Mr. Sullivan pointed out some of the difficulties which such a shift would create within the United States Government, in particular with respect to Congress, which was highly sensitive on this type of question.

The Prime Minister also mentioned briefly one or two subjects which were discussed at the morning meeting with President Rhee, but there was no discussion of them. He then took up the question of the Tasca recommendations and inquired as to their status. He expressed the strong desire of the ROK Government for a commitment from the U.S. Government to support the Tasca recommendations. Mr. Stevens replied that he wasn’t sure of the exact status today of the recommendations, although he understood there was an agreement in principle within the Executive Branch of the Government on them. He observed that the recommendations would, of course, be subject to approval by Congress through appropriations to implement such a program and that one could not therefore give a firm commitment for a program which covers several years.

The Prime Minister raised for consideration the payment by the U.S. Government for services and utilities provided by the ROK which have been used by the UN forces for the past three years. In this connection he cited the need for a general agreement covering such matters and mentioned that under the Japanese Administrative Agreement a large percentage of the cost is borne by the U.S. Government. Mr. Stevens pointed out again the problem of the Congressional attitude on such matters and emphasized the necessity for presenting such problems to Congress on a reasonable basis.

There followed a summary by the Defense Minister of the programs proposed by the three ROK armed services. In brief the ROK Army requested approval and implementation of the 20 division program with full logistical support by the U.S., including improved food rations for the troops. The programs for the Navy and Air Force were based on the assumption that these branches of the armed services should be built up sufficiently to give the ROK what it considered to be a balanced independent force capable of defending the country. The Prime Minister requested approval by the U.S. Government of the programs outlined by the Defense Minister, and in conclusion mentioned the problem of the ROK position following 90 days of the political conference. He referred to a “promise” by Mr. Robertson to President Rhee to build up the ROK naval and air forces. Finally, he stressed once again the urgency of reaching decisions on the matters which had been discussed.

1. This Republic of Korea Memorandum of Understanding, dated July 31, 1953, was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 121 from Seoul, Aug. 3, 1953. In it, the Korean Government asked for U.S. concurrence and cooperation for a series of policies which were clearly designed to place the control for Korean aid under the sole direction of the Combined Economic Board. The Board, with its American and South Korean representatives as joint chairmen, would also take responsibility for directing and coordinating existing relief and reconstruction agencies and organizations in Korea. (895.00/8–353)