Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/8–153

Memorandum of Conversation, by Elizabeth A. Brown of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

secret

[Washington,] August 1, 1953.

Subject:

• Special Korean Briefing Meeting, August 1, 1953

Participants:	Australia	Ambassador Sir Percy Spender
		Mr. Arthur Tange
	Belgium	Mr. Georges Carlier, Chargé d’Affaires
	Canada	Ambassador A.D.P. Heeney
		Mr. Peter Campbell
	Colombia	Ambassador Zuleta-Angel
	Ethiopia	Mr. A. Tesemma, Chargé d’Affaires
	France	Mr. Daridan, Minister
		Mr. Pelletier
	Great Britain	Ambassador Sir Roger Makins
		Mr. Scott
	Greece	Mr. Phedon Cavalierato, Counselor
	Netherlands	Dr. J.G. deBeus, Minister
	New Zealand	Ambassador Leslie K. Munro
		Mr. Hunter Wade
	Philippines	Dr. M.J. Gamboa, Chargé d’Affaires
	Thailand	Ambassador Pote Sarasin
	Turkey	Ambassador Feridun Erkin
		Mr. Benler
	South Africa	Mr. B.J. Jarvie, Chargé d’Affaires
		Mr. Botha
	United States	Mr. Murphy, UNA
		Mr. Dulles, S
		Mr. Sandifer, UNA
		Mr. O’Connor, S
		Mr. Henkin, UNP
		Miss Brown, UNP
		Mr. Johnson, FE
		Mr. Lodge, USUN
		Mr. Wadsworth, USUN
		Mr. Allen, EUR
		Mr. Arthur Dean, lawyer
		Mr. White, SA–M

The Secretary said that he had thought it might be useful to have a meeting of the participating countries before he departed for Korea. He explained that he had hoped to take with him several Senators, but in view of the delayed adjournment of the Congress, they could not have left this weekend, and he did not feel he could postpone his trip appreciably, particularly because of the importance of his returning a few days before the United Nations General Assembly reconvened on August 17.

Mr. Dulles stated that he assumed the character of the Korean problems that would concern the respective governments in future would be more political than military and more related to the United Nations as a political body than had been the case heretofore. The United States considered that political negotiations should now be centered with the respective UN missions in New York rather than through the Embassies in Washington. He asked for the views of those present on this point, emphasizing that he did not intend to exclude meetings in Washington on the development and implementation of the Korean armistice or on other questions arising in connection with the armistice, such as alleged violations. He did believe, however, that negotiations relating to the role of the General Assembly and to the calling of the political conference should be centralized in New York.

Ambassador Spender (Australia) said that, on the assumption the briefing group would continue to meet on armistice problems, he felt that it was wise insofar as other problems primarily concerned the United Nations, they be discussed in New York. Ambassador Makins (United Kingdom) expressed his full agreement, and the representatives of New Zealand, Canada, France and Turkey also concurred in this procedure.

The Secretary said that he recognized that some of those present might wish to consult their governments further on this point. The United States was disposed to move consultations to New York where Ambassador Lodge would represent this Government. Mr. Dulles noted that Ambassador Lodge would accompany him on his trip to Korea, and he thought that there would be a real advantage in Mr. Lodge’s having participated in the discussions in Korea in preparation for negotiations in New York.

Mr. Dulles said that he knew there were questions in the minds of many of the participating governments as to the purpose of his trip to Korea and what he planned to do there. In order to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, he wished to recapitulate the situation for the group as he saw it.

As all those present knew, the conclusion of the Korean armistice had been an extremely difficult operation; in fact, he regarded it as one of the most difficult which he had experienced in more than forty years of contact with international affairs. Negotiations with the Communists and with the ROK had made the situation extremely awkward. The issue had hung precariously in the balance a good many times, and, in his view, it was only by great determination and by outstanding skill on the part of our negotiators that an armistice had been achieved. In the course of these negotiations, we had been obliged to make certain promises and assurances which we had not particularly liked to make, but we had made them because of the general feeling, which he felt sure all those present shared, that we should be prepared to make considerable sacrifices if necessary to obtain an armistice. The United States seemed to be in the position where the greatest burden of making such sacrifices had fallen upon it.

The Secretary continued that, in order to get President Rhee’s agreement not to obstruct the armistice, the United States had made three basic undertakings.

• First, we had promised to give the Republic of Korea a substantial amount of economic aid to promote rehabilitation in South Korea. Already, as the first installment of such aid, the Congress was expected to vote a special appropriation of $200,000,000 in addition to funds already available through the Mutual Security Program. We also hoped to be able to implement in its general features—and Mr. Dulles expressed the hope that other governments would also help—the so-called Tasca Report which called for a three to four year reconstruction program with a total cost of $800–900,000,000 over that period.

• Second, we had indicated our willingness to negotiate a security pact with the ROK along the lines of the security treaties which we already had with the Philippines and ANZUS. The Secretary pointed out that the ROK has desired such a pact for several years but said that the United States had not been willing to accede to this desire because of our reluctance to assume such commitments on the Asiatic mainland and also because of the divided position of Korea which made the risk of war an abnormal hazard, as was not the case with the island countries. However, we had set aside our own preferences and agreed to negotiate such a treaty with the ROK. Mr. Dulles said that this would be one of the matters that he would discuss with President Rhee next week. He emphasized that the United States did not have in mind a treaty which would in any way make it impossible to carry out the mandate of the political conference with respect to the unification of Korea.

  President Rhee has suggested that the treaty should contain certain provisions with regard to the right of the United States to maintain forces and bases in the ROK along the lines of the first article of our security treaty with Japan. The Secretary commented that, as he had already pointed out at his press conference, the Japanese treaty and any comparable provisions that might be negotiated with the ROK simply gave the United States a right, an option to maintain troops and bases and would not obligate it to do so. Any security treaty we might negotiate would not be an obstacle if the political conference should achieve some agreement with respect to withdrawal of foreign troops in Korea. The treaty would not in any way embarrass the freedom of the political conference to explore all possibilities with reference to the unification of Korea. Mr. Dulles said that he would have much preferred not to negotiate such a treaty, but we had accepted it as one of the prices that we thought we were justified in paying in order to get the armistice.

• Third, Mr. Dulles said, it had been agreed that if the ROK did not obstruct the armistice, he would confer personally with President Rhee with respect to the policies and positions that might be followed at the political conference in the hope that we would find that the position of the ROK was one with which we could be in accord and with which the other governments that might participate would also agree. Mr. Dulles emphasized that he had not undertaken to come to any agreement about these matters but simply to explore them together. He assured the group that the United States would not assume any commitments to work with President Rhee in any particular way except subject to the further full exploration of the matter with other governments that might be concerned and discussions in the United Nations. The discussions, the Secretary continued, were designed to allay the great fears that Rhee has had that, if there were an armistice, the United States and other United Nations Members would consult and fix their positions without regard to the ROK. President Rhee felt that his country had made great sacrifices. The ROK was the subject matter of the conference, and it should not be ignored. In the past President Rhee felt there had been a tendency to proceed without consulting the ROK. This point had become an obsession with him so great that this Government felt that it had to make the concession of promising to consult first with the ROK. Mr. Dulles repeated that his talks would be exploratory in character, and that he would not make any commitments with respect to the positions to be taken in the political conference merely as a result of these talks. He would return in a position of flexibility, able to reach decisions that would involve consultations with other governments whose views might be relevant to the political conference.

The Secretary remarked that he hoped everyone would appreciate that these commitments which the United States gave the ROK were not things which we wanted to do but represented a sacrifice on our part to achieve an armistice. He thought the world was gratified that there was an armistice, but he pointed out we could not expect to get an armistice and not pay the price which seemed inevitable. He concluded that he did not think any commitments had been made that were in any way incompatible with our close relations with other governments in the United Nations Command or with our obligations to the United Nations.

Turning to the political conference, the Secretary said that the United States did not have any firm views regarding it. There were a good many perplexing problems to be resolved. Our own feeling was that, if the conference were to succeed, it was probably preferable to limit the participation. A very large conference would be less likely to accomplish results than one with rather limited participation. However, except for this consideration, the Secretary said that as yet we had no specific views respecting the composition of the conference.

The Secretary expressed the hope that the other participating governments would maintain their forces in Korea and said that, as a matter of fact, we hoped that some other Members of the United Nations who had not previously sent any forces might still do so. The importance of maintaining the United Nations front in Korea had by no means ended.

Our military authorities considered that our forces must remain on the alert against the possibility of a resumption of hostilities. We knew that the enemy has in no way relaxed his vigilance and the combat readiness of his forces. As a matter of fact, the latter had probably been increased in violation of the terms of the armistice; he referred to the reports based on radar findings that the Communists had flown a number of planes to Korean airfields. At any rate, there was a very large build-up of enemy strength, and there was always the possibility that, through some provocation, an incident could be created that might be alleged to be a violation of the armistice and used as an excuse to break it. The United Nations forces must remain ready to meet this possibility. Mr. Dulles stated that the United States had taken steps to move additional forces into the Korean area just before the armistice on the basis that it was important to build up rather than subtract from our strength. Mr. Dulles said that of course the United States would also welcome any additional troops, although these could only come in on a rotation basis as provided in the armistice agreement.

The Secretary said that the United States was extremely anxious to start the economic rehabilitation of South Korea in a way that would be impressive not only in Asia but throughout the world as an example of what the free nations can do. In many ways this was the best chance of bringing about the peaceful unification of Korea as it would make Korea an almost irresistible force attracting the North Koreans. We had already seen one demonstration of how this force operates in Berlin and in Germany. The Secretary said that President Eisenhower was extremely interested in this matter. At an hour’s meeting yesterday with Secretary Wilson and Mr. Stassen,¹ the President had outlined his views; they constituted a very exciting, imaginative vision of what might be done. The President had commented that the one thing he would like most to do would be to go over to reconstruct Korea. Something could be done there, he believed, that would capture the imagination of the free world, and that would do more than all our other activities to break down the solidarity of the Communist world. The President planned to utilize our armed forces in Korea as economic missionaries building bridges, roads, hospitals, factories, schools, etc. He believed that at this time the soldiers could serve as missionaries in a spectacular demonstration of what the free world stands for. Our military people are being instructed to make such arrangements as quickly as possible.

The Secretary pointed out that the funds available for Korean rehabilitation would include the immediate $200,000,000 appropriation, plus MSA funds already allocated, UNKRA funds and the assistance of private relief organizations. By putting our armed forces into this great peacetime effort, we could do something which might be a great contribution not only to the peaceful unification of Korea but to the free world. He requested the other governments to consider the extent to which they would be willing to have their forces participate in such a program, noting that President Eisenhower believed it was better for our armed forces to have something to do rather than remain idle in circumstances which might lead to problems with the local population.

Ambassador Makins thanked the Secretary for his comprehensive and interesting statement. He said that all those present recognized and appreciated very much the efforts which the United States Government had made in order to obtain an armistice and also the part which the Secretary and his colleagues had played in that effort. He recognized the very difficult and arduous tasks involved in the negotiations and expressed his own appreciation for the results achieved.

Mr. Dulles replied that he knew that all those who had been meeting with us on these problems over the past years appreciated better than outsiders what a really difficult task this has been. There could be no doubt as to the sincere efforts of the United States to bring about an armistice in Korea.

1. See footnote 1, supra.