Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
emergency

GX 7452. Following amplifies my Flash message:1

1.
Yesterday when I received word that agreement had been reached, I directed Taylor to notify Rhee of this fact in advance & that the armistice would be signed today. I asked for an appointment for early this morning, since Briggs also had one or two matters to discuss. We went together with Taylor.
2.
Pyun and Prime Minister Paik were present. The meeting was extremely satisfactory, and there was a pleasant atmosphere throughout. Rhee congratulated me on having finally obtained an armistice.
3.
During the conference I raised the following points with Rhee:
a.
I explained reason why the commanders did not meet at Panmunjom to sign the armistice was because we would not be a party to Communists demands made upon us restricting Koreans, including the Korean press, from the conference site and signing area. I told Rhee my government would not be a party to such an unreasonable demand. He seemed to appreciate this.
b.
He was told that I would sign at 1300 hours at Munsan-ni where my senior commanders and representative of UN countries having forces in Korea would be present; that the UN flag, the US flag, and the Korean flag would be displayed. I again extended an invitation for him to provide a military observer of General Officer rank. He is to advise me without delay if he accepts.
c.
I again impressed upon the President the necessity of his personally appealing to the Korean non-repatriates to have patience and confidence in the UNC pledge that no forced repatriation or duress or intimidation would be used against them. I told him speed was important in getting this message to these prisoners. He told me he would do so, but first he had to get a message to the Korean people immediately [Page 1443] following the signing of the armistice telling them the course of action his government would take. He added he will tell them that “we will cooperate with the armistice”. He said immediately following his message to the people he would prepare a message to be read to the Korean non-repatriate POWs.
d.
Rhee was told that I had received instructions from the President of the US indicating his desire that at this time approximately 10,000 tons of food be made available to the civilian population. I told him this information was classified at the present moment for we had not yet worked out exactly what types of food would be made available. I told him I had recommended C–Rations because they were available and there would be no loss from spoilage and that as soon as I receive approval on this item from Washington, I would commence implementation through KCAC in cooperation with the ROK Government. He was told that this information was being given to him now so that he would know of it before any release might come out of Washington or from me. He said he would be glad to have his people receive this food.
e.
For Some time Rhee has indicated his desire that some temporary shelter be provided for the National Assembly in Seoul when the government officially moves north. I have always indicated that at the proper time I would do what I could. He raised the question again with Taylor a couple of days ago. At that time a message was sent to Rhee to the effect that if he would let me know his requirements we would do our best to be of assistance. Today I told him again to give his requirements to my representative and we would do everything in our power to assist him.
f.
There are some salvaged trucks which were being publicly auctioned which the Prime Minister asked me recently to turn over to the ROK Government. I stopped the auction, told them I was looking into it, and today informed Rhee I would take necessary steps to have these turned over to the ROK Government.
4.
Rhee expressed great interest in the 200 million dollars which our government is arranging to be furnished ROK in the near future. Briggs will comment on that. Rhee also expressed an interest in the coordinated direction of all economic rehabilitation for Korea in the future; he is particularly hopeful that UNKRA and extraneous units would be coordinated through our representative and his on the CEB. I told him it was my desire and the desire of my government that such coordination be effected.

  1. Presumably telegram C 64007, Clark to JCS, July 26, p. 1441.