795.00/7–2453
The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Secretary of State1
My Dear Mr. Secretary: We understand that truce is about to be signed. Before deciding the position of my government, it is of utmost importance to have your answers to two vital questions which at present remain in an uncertain status:
- First, in proposed mutual security pact, may we count upon inclusion of a provision for immediate and automatic military support in case ROK should be attacked by an external enemy? As you know, a pact that is sufficient for a nation not in our position would not be adequate to our needs.
- Second, when the political conference fails in 90 days, may we count upon US joining with us to resume military efforts to drive the Chinese Red invaders from our land? If this joint effort to achieve our common objective is beyond your present ability to promise us, can we count upon US for moral and material support, in addition to general economic assistance, for our own military efforts to eject the invaders from Korea?
In our conversations with Mr. Robertson, he promised to send me answers to these questions after his return to Washington, but thus far we have not received any assurances on these points.
When we have received your replies to these questions, we shall be [Page 1429] enabled fully to formulate our own governmental policies in regard to the truce.
With sentiments of high esteem, I am, sincerely yours,
- This letter was transmitted to Washington in telegram 73 from Seoul, July 24, 1953, 11 p.m. Earlier in the evening Pyun phoned Briggs to say that Rhee had just written a letter “of utmost importance” to Dulles, which Rhee would like forwarded by cable. The text was received at the Embassy an hour later. In the estimation of Briggs, the letter was a last minute effort to find a pretext for rejecting the armistice, which Rhee had just learned was imminent.↩