795.00/7–2353: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
priority
60. Repeated information priority Tokyo 30 (for CINCUNC) pouched Pusan. Pass Defense. Re Deptels 541 and 552 July 22.
President Rhee having left early this morning to visit front with General Taylor, it was not until his return that I was able to deliver text of Secretary’s statement. Foreign Minister Pyun was present.
I explained statement intended be helpful and assist Rhee with reference to preoccupations expressed by him and his Ministers in conversations during last few days. I also pointed out that statement, like joint message given Rhee yesterday, is directly responsive to Korean representations.
President read statement attentively. His initial comment was that it is “one-sided” and “full of what President Rhee promised but where does US promise anything in return?” Rhee talked heatedly and at times irrationally along that line for several minutes, apparently working himself in direction of regarding statement as “provocation” to which Rhee can now consider himself entitled to reply “in order to tell Korean side of story”. In this connection Rhee also referred to commitments (which he did not define) which he said had been made to him by Robertson, implying that Rhee might now feel free to make them public also with reservation concerning vagueness with which Rhee often expresses himself (perhaps at times intentional).
Position toward which President now seems to be moving is that on Robertson’s departure all Korean commitments were contingent on Robertson’s obtaining for Rhee US promise of “moral and material support” of ROK unilateral action following withdrawal from political conference. Pyun’s present line, which I have no doubt he is making every effort to have Rhee adopt, is in effect “since US has failed provide those promised assurances, ROK is now automatically relieved of commitments provisionally given Robertson”. This may represent over-simplification, but it has been implicit in all my conversations since my return to Seoul on July 20, and equally in Pyun’s series of newspaper interviews, “leaks” to press et cetera.
It is my conclusion that Rhee has not made up his mind and that he is accordingly likely to continue present cat and mouse tactics, mean while harassing us through series of further interviews and statements. Toward end of 45 minute discussion this afternoon, President expressed regret at having spoken at time heatedly, and he declared Secretary’s [Page 1420] statement would receive most careful consideration in connection with exposition he intends to make of Korean point of view. In circumstance of precarious balance such as now existing, speed in concluding armistice obviously is all important.
Comments on certain other aspects of today’s conversation transmitted separately.3
- Not printed, but see footnote 3, supra.↩
- Supra.↩
- In telegram 62 from Seoul, Briggs reported that Prime Minister Paik had issued a “singularly unpleasant” statement giving the impression that the United States was using economic aid to force Korea to accept an armistice and disclosing that such aid would amount to over a billion dollars. When Briggs saw Rhee pursuant to telegram 55 to Seoul, he had asked Rhee not to disclose the billion dollar figure for fear of prejudicing Congressional action. Rhee failed to mention that his Prime Minister had already released the figure, but did observe that he deplored efforts to connect the armistice with economic aid—a statement Briggs believed was probably calculated to disassociate himself if Paik’s public statement backfired. Also during the Rhee–Briggs conversation, according to telegram 63 from Seoul, Rhee referred to Dulles’ letter of June 22 for the first time thus: “Yes, Secretary Dulles is our great friend, but nevertheless he was unjust in his letter of June 22 and he made statements causing resentment.” (Telegrams 62 and 63; 795.00/7–2353) For text of the Secretary’s letter of June 22, see p. 1238.↩