Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, July 17, 1953—5:07 p.m.

CX 63766. Ref: C 63753.² This msg in two parts.

• Part I. 1. This supplements the rept contained in ref msg.

  2. Yesterday afternoon Taylor and I visited the fwd areas of recent large-scale Communist atk.

  3. I had an opportunity to talk with Jenkins, White, Chung (the II ROK Corps Comd), Williams³ (who is actually running the II ROK Corps at the present time), and some of the div commanders involved, as well as United States advisors with several ROK divs. The sit is not good.

  4. I have been sending you Taylor’s daily summary of these oprs but, in view of speculative press accounts resulting from nec censorship of units involved in this opr which may have led you to the conclusion that the II ROK Corps units had performed well, I desire to clarify this sit. My observations are as fol:

  a. The II ROK Corps in general did not perform well. Three of its four divs in line behaved rather badly, withdrawing to a depth considerably beyond the line they were ordered to form upon. Leadership at corps and div level was, in general, far from what it should have been, which emphasizes the fact that due to their performance under static conditions perhaps we have been too optimistic in expecting too much of these ROK gen offs whose level of proficiency is nearer the bn or, at most the regt level.

  b. Some units withdrew without much pressure from the enemy. Some came back by regt; others in smaller units; and some as stragglers.

  c. To close the gaps created by this disorganized withdrawal, Taylor had to use most of his reserve, including the 3rd US Div, together with the 8th and 11th ROK Divs. The 187 Abn RCT had been committed the day before to strengthen a critical portion of the IX Corps front.

  d. Through Taylor’s, Jenkins’ and Williams’ splendid leadership, together with Gen Paik, Chief of Staff ROK Army, on the ground, the Capital, 3rd and 5th ROK Divs are being assembled and reorganized to prov res. The 7th ROK Div in the X Corps is being replaced by the 5th US RCT and will go into res where it will be aval to the II ROK Corps. These are the only combat experienced units Taylor has aval at the moment except for the 25 US Div which must be kept on the more critical western part of the front.

  e. I was also impressed with the lack of info aval to the II ROK Corps Commander as to the disposition of his own units, of the enemy, and of the amount of air support he was getting.

  f. If the enemy cont to push in strength within the next day or two further withdrawals on the part of the II ROK Corps to the Wyoming line may be nec. This, of course, would entail readjustments by the corps to the east and west.

  g. I have ordered the 24 US Div, which has closed in Korea, less one regt of inf required on PW work, to move to the Eighth Army area. The first elms start their mvmt today.

  5. For the past two days the press has been reporting optimistically that the UNC is undertaking a counter-offensive. Nothing could be farther from the facts. The II ROK Corps after having withdrawn far below the line which they were ordered to occupy, has been ordered to adv to that line and at last rept was slowly moving to that line against sporadic and minor resistance.

• Part II. 6. As you know the 24 Div was sent to Korea to increase the scty of the PW camps and other vital rear area insts as well as to permit me to relieve the Eighth Army of the rqmt for maintaining a regt on this duty. I also desired to provide some combat res to KCOMZ in case ROK’s initiated action to interfere with our essential log oprs. The sit both in the PW camps and in KCOMZ has improved and I now feel the need for this div in the combat zone the more urgent, though I am fully aware of the calculated risk involved with the PWs, particularly in the camps on Koje-Do, in making this decision.

  7. I met with Rhee late yesterday fol my return from the front. I explained to him the true conditions in the II ROK Corps, as Taylor had done the day before. I felt it essential that he know the actual conditions. His immediate reaction was to state that this condition would never have occurred if the UNC had launched an offensive long ago designed to destroy the Communist Forces in North Korea.

  8. Among other subjects discussed I let him know of my decision to remove United States trps from scty missions at many of the PW camps and other rear area insts. I asked for his assistance in supplementing the PW Comd with reliable ROK forces and he stated he would take aprop action to see that this was done.

1. A marginal note on a copy of this telegram in the Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file, indicated that the President saw this report.
2. In this telegram, Taylor reported on the tactical situation at the affected front as of 1700 hours, 16 July (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413).
3. Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, IX Corps Commander; Lt. Gen. Isaac D. White, X Corps Commander; Maj. Gen. Samuel T. Williams, Commanding General, 25th U.S. Division and Deputy Commanding General, II ROK Corps; and Lt. Gen. Chung Il Kwon.