Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

[Extract]

²

top secret

Washington, July 10, 1953—11 a.m.

. . . . . . .

Korea

General Collins: We have a message in from Clark³ this morning in which he asks for instructions with regard to what he can tell the Communists about ROK participation in an armistice. There are two questions really—the first is whether he can use any part of Rhee’s statement to Robertson as an assurance to the Communists that the ROK will go along with an armistice. The second question is whether he can tell the Communists that the UNC would cut off logistic support to the ROK if the ROKs violate the armistice.

Mr. Johnson: I think that Rhee’s statement in his letter⁴ to Robertson that he will not obstruct an armistice might be useful as an assurance to the Commies that the armistice will include the ROK. On the question of telling the Commies that we will cut off supplies from the ROK if they violate the armistice, it seems to me that there are two objections, even though I realize that it may be necessary. The first is that it limits our freedom of action and the second is that the Commies may leak any statement we make in a distorted form.

General Collins: Before I left for Korea I had a talk with Secretary Dulles on this specific point. He thought that the question of cutting off logistical support from the ROK was one which merited very careful consideration. He cited the precedent of the Russians refraining from coming to the assistance of the Polish Underground in Warsaw and the unhappy public opinion repercussions that might eventually come. Personally, however, I don’t see how we can duck the question that the Commies have asked as to what we would do. Perhaps if we could get a public statement from Rhee that he would go along with the armistice, it might conceivably do the trick.

Mr. Johnson: (At this point Mr. Johnson read statement which Mr. Rhee had made in his letter to Robertson.)

Mr. Matthews: Couldn’t the statement of Rhee that he will not obstruct an armistice be used with the Commies?

General Collins: Of course Rhee puts qualifications on his statement which leaves him considerable latitude which the Commies would be quick to seize on.

Mr. Bowie: Rhee’s letter also really puts us on notice that he has the intention of reopening hostilities if the political conference doesn’t succeed.

General Collins: I do think we have to take up this question of what we can say about logistic support. I think that your Secretary’s worries about saying that we will cut it off are completely valid, but on the other hand how will the Commies sign an armistice unless we make a statement to the effect that we are willing to deprive the ROKs of logistic support if they violate an armistice.

Mr. Johnson: I have some question whether the Commies won’t sign the armistice anyway, even though we don’t answer their questions.

General Collins: Our negotiators on the spot think differently and I think to some degree we have to go on their opinion.

Mr. MacArthur: We are going to have some trouble in working out time to talk with the Secretary since he has meetings this afternoon with the British and French.

Mr. Johnson: It is my feeling that the Secretary is quite firm in his views that we should not say we will cut off logistic support. I personally don’t think we can say much more than Harrison has already said.

General Collins: If Harrison can’t say any more than he has said, I think there is real question whether or not we will get an armistice.

Mr. Amory: This may be butting in to what is none of my business, but are we really sure we want an armistice now. With this Beria business and the Russians in such a stew, maybe this is a bad time to have an armistice.

General Collins: If Harrison doesn’t have anything more to say than he has already said, perhaps we should think about having a recess in the talks. I think Clark and Harrison need to have instructions as to whether or not they can commit themselves.

Admiral Fechteler: Actually it seems to me that any commander in the field, if the ROKs started violating the armistice, would in fact go ahead and cut off supplies.

General Collins: But Clark is entitled to know where his Government stands on the question and whether or not he is authorized to make his position known to the Communists.

Mr. Bowie: Another point to consider is that of our relationship with Rhee. We are now standing on the position that we will reconsider our courses of action after 90 days of the political conference. Rhee has put us on notice that he may want to reopen hostilities if the political conference doesn’t succeed. He has asked for moral and material aid from us. Although we have not committed ourselves to give him such aid, it would be somewhat inconsistent if we now undertake with the Commies to cut off all aid.

General Collins: It seems to me that there are two questions that we need the answer to. The first is whether we can use a statement from Rhee that he will not obstruct an armistice and the second is the question of what Clark can say about cutting off supplies for the ROK.

Mr. Bowie: I should think there would be some difficulty in getting usable quotations from Rhee which he would not couple with his reservation on freedom of action after the political conference.

General Collins: The Commies might buy the statement from us to the effect that Rhee has told us that he would not obstruct an armistice even though we wouldn’t quote him directly.

Mr. Johnson: I should think they might buy that because after all an armistice does have military advantages for them in stopping air and sea attack. I agree, however, that Clark should have specific instructions.

Mr. MacArthur: If we want to talk to the Secretary about this we should set up a meeting right away. (At this point arrangements were made by phone for a meeting of General Collins and the Secretary at 12:15.)⁵

1. A note on the title page read: “Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”

   Of the JCS, General Collins and Admiral Fechteler attended. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent, while General Gerhard and Gleason represented the NSC and Amory the CIA. In all, 20 persons were present.

2. In addition to Korea, NATO and Indochina were discussed at this meeting.
3. This reference presumably was to telegram CX 63583, Clark exclusive to Collins, July 10, 1953, in which Clark argued that the Communists, who had been reasonable and calm at the plenary meeting of July 10, deserved concrete assurances as to what the UNC would do if the ROK forces should violate the armistice. (Department of Defense files)
4. Dated July 9, p. 1357.
5. No record of this meeting has been found. However, Clark was sent specific instructions in telegram JCS 943567 informing him that although he had the power to withdraw logistical support from ROK forces, he should offer the Communists a more general answer at Panmunjom. The JCS suggested the following language: “UNC will not give support during any aggressive action of units of ROKA in violation of the armistice. In saying this we do not imply that we believe any such violation to be probable.” (Department of Defense files)