Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, July 9, 1953—10:17 p.m.

CX 63567. References: A. JCS 943398.¹ B. GX 6799.² C. CX 63548.³

1. Appreciate promptness with which you dispatched reference A.

2. In conference with Harrison today at Seoul I directed him to endeavor to arrange a meeting with the Communists for tomorrow, meeting to be in executive session, at which he will develop the Communist intentions regarding the implementation of the Armistice Agreement and be prepared at an appropriate time to present UNC views along the following lines:

a. We assume that ROKA forces presently under the command of the UNC will remain so after an armistice and that they will carry out the instructions of the UNC and withdraw from that part of the demilitarized zone in which they are now deployed, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement.

b. As stated in my letter of 29 June,⁴ the UNC will make every effort to abide by the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. We cannot guarantee that ROKG will lend full support to it, but the UNC shall continue to do everything within our power to cause them to cooperate.

c. The UNC will furnish police protection to the NNRC, NNSC and Joint Red Cross teams and will take all feasible precautionary measures to insure their safety. However, the UNC will not undertake to use force against ROKA to insure ROK compliance with Armistice.

d. In order to have maximum assurance that the NNRC will be free to operate unmolested, we consider it highly desirable and advantageous to both sides to move both the Korean and the Chinese POWs not repatriated direct, to the southern portion of the demilitarized zone and there turn them over to the custody of the NNRC. This will impose a serious logistic burden on the UNC but it is one we are willing to assume to reduce the possibility of incidents. However, this is a detail that can properly be discussed by the Military Armistice Commission, and the UNC will not comment further on it at this time.

(Comment: After discussing this with Harrison, believe it preferable to eliminate step outlined in para 3a, ref C, since it might cause unnecessary delay. If, when the question of referring matters to the Military Armistice Commission is raised, Communists object, Harrison will drop further discussion in Plenary Sessions and reserve the right to raise it during an early meeting of the Military Armistice Commission with UNC MAC applying maximum pressure for acceptance of this solution. If, however, the Military Armistice Commission cannot agree on the use of the demilitarized zone, I will move non-repatriates to an area adjacent to the demilitarized zone as discussed in para 2b of ref C. As pointed out in ref B, I explained what area I had in mind to Rhee and he indicated no objection. It was at this time that he commented that while he would not object to CCF non-repatriates moving thru South Korea (from Mosulpo) to the demilitarized zone, he could not accept the Indians and Communist representatives moving thru South Korea.)

3. Since the Communists requested meeting for purpose of “discussing implementation of the Armistice” it is highly probably that they will pose direct questions on what we will do to establish military safeguards to prevent or minimize violations of the armistice by ROKG. Harrison will volunteer nothing, but if these questions should be raised, he will cover, among others, the following items in a general manner:

a. The UNC will immediately withdraw all logistical and military support from any ROKA unit that takes any aggressive action which would constitute a violation of the armistice.

b. Violations of the armistice will be matters for the Military Armistice Commission to consider.

4. After further consideration of our conference with Rhee this morning, I feel that there is no longer any doubt in his mind that we intend to have an armistice with or without him. Should negotiations proceed without delaying tactics on the part of the Communists, Harrison estimates we may be able to sign the armistice in approximately one week or less.

5. I outlined the above course of action to Robertson this afternoon.

1. In this joint State–Defense message, July 8, 1953, the JCS informed Clark that authority granted to him to conclude an armistice without assurances of cooperation from Rhee remained in effect. However, he should undertake no obligation at Panmunjom, expressed or implied, legal or moral, to use force against the ROK to ensure compliance with the armistice. Finally, Clark was authorized to sign the armistice agreement without the previous requirement that the final text be approved at the government level. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)
2. Dated July 9, p. 1356.
3. Dated July 8, p. 1347.
4. The text of CINCUNC’s letter to Marshal Kim Il Sung and Gen. Peng Teh-huai was transmitted to the JCS in an unnumbered telegram, DTG 290607Z June 1953 (HNC 1796), not printed. (JCS files) For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 13, 1953, pp. 46–47.