795.00/7–953
The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
My Dear Mr. Robertson: Let me say again that since your arrival in Korea we have had many intimate and cordial exchanges of views which have emphasized the close and deep friendship existing between our two peoples and which have done much to achieve mutual agreement on the troubled questions which had arisen in connection with the arrangements for a truce.
In particular, we have agreed to hold in abeyance our original demand for the withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops and for reunification of Korea prior to signing of an armistice. In order to demonstrate our determination to cooperate with USA and other nations which have fought by our sides during this fateful struggle for our national survival, we have agreed not to insist upon these conditions pending an effort to secure them in political conference which is to follow signing of a truce. Since experience indicates that polite discussions with Communists have tended to be protracted and without results, we have agreed that representatives of ROK and USA will withdraw from conference at expiration of ninety days after its commencement.
[Page 1358]In regard to question of POWs, it was our determination to release all remaining Korean prisoners who refuse to return to Communist control. However at your request, we have agreed to retention of these prisoners in captivity and to cooperate with UNC in transporting them, along with all other POWs into DZ where they may be subjected to three months of indoctrination prior to their release.
In order to make this procedure possible, it is understood that no troops from India or from any other foreign power will be landed in South Korea to guard these prisoners. It is further understood that at expiration of the three-month period of questioning and screening, all Korean prisoners who desire remain in South Korea will be released south of neutral zone, and all Chinese prisoners who refuse to return to Communist control will be transported to Formosa, according to their will.
In regard to mutual defense pact to be ratified between our two governments, we understand the difficulty of securing immediate ratification by US Senate, and we agree that it may be ratified, if not at this session of Congress, then at next session. We have not hesitated to accept assurances of President Eisenhower and of Secretary Dulles that we may depend upon its ratification by Senate.
A rough draft of this projected treaty is enclosed2 for consideration and discussion.
In your communication of July 8, you indicate that ratification of treaty may depend upon lack of “further deterioration of confidence in willingness of Korean Government to cooperate in armistice” and in subsequent political conference. I am sure we both realize that terms of this statement are undefinable, but I am confident they will stand the test of sincerity, goodwill, and depths of friendship which have characterized relations of our two governments and sentiments of our two peoples. Although we cannot sign truce, we shall not obstruct it, so long as no measures or actions taken under armistice are detrimental to our national survival.
We shall endeavor to cooperate fully and earnestly in political and peaceful achievement of reunification of our nation, which is our most fundamental national objective and necessity. The fullness of our determination to achieve reunification is a sufficient guarantee of our intentions in this matter. However, this promise of cooperation should not be interpreted as binding us to forego our unquestioned sovereign right to interpret our position freely, to reply to Communist or pro-Communist propaganda, or to deal internally with Communist subversion.
Most vital to survival of Korean nation is question of how reunification of Korea is to be achieved should political conference fail to accomplish it. When our talks began, we asked that forces of UN or of [Page 1359] US should join with ROK forces to achieve joint objectives of reunifying Korea. However, if this proposal is not agreeable to US, we should like to have specific assurances of moral and material support for an effort with our own armed forces to repel aggressors from Korea.
I am sure there is no question between US and ROK concerning urgent necessity for taking every feasible step to accomplish reunification and to maintain independence of our nation. With deep gratitude for assistance which we have received from US, I have sought every available means of cooperating most unreservedly in plans which you have presented and in surmounting difficulties which you described. I am confident that spirit of accord in which our talks have progressed, and large areas of agreement which have resulted, will be followed by continuing mutual consideration and by spirit of mutual accommodation which will lead most certainly to our common objective of a secure and lasting peace in the Far East.
Sincerely yours,