795.00/7–953: Telegram
The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State
niact
DTG 091125Z. Repeated information CINCUNC Tokyo. For Ambassador Murphy and General Clark and AmEmbassy Pusan. For the Secretary from Robertson.
At suggestion Prime Minister Paik I saw Rhee alone this morning for over an hour. Paik’s inference was that it would be best for Foreign Minister Pyun not to be present. It was first time I had seen Rhee since Communists requested truce meeting.1 Rhee was tense and nervous. He immediately protested my anticipated return home tomorrow. He said he believed we were nearing and could reach agreement, that we had agreed on many points but there were still several points that needed clarification. When I pressed repeatedly to learn points on which we were disagreed he finally went into a long tirade about the activities of the military, State Department and “psychological warfare people” trying to break down the morale of his people, alientate them from the government and cause defection among his officers and troops. He went into many details which I shall not repeat in this message. The purpose of the long recital was to explain why he could not agree to keep troops under UN Command for a specified period of time, regardless of other conditions. He stated he had not rejected the truce and that he contemplated leaving his troops under UNC so long as command did not engage in activities which he considered to be against interests of Korea. I reiterated, of course, that our proposals to him were conditional upon his acceptance of the terms outlined in paragraphs a and b of our aide-mémoire of July 2.2 We terminated the discussion by Rhee’s agreeing to clarify his exact position in writing which he promised to let me have this afternoon if possible. It now appears Rhee is seeking avoid issue which would provide us with clear-cut basis for ending talks in non-agreement.
Clark is strongly of the opinion that if we could get a commitment out of Rhee not to violate truce or to take other action to obstruct armistice, and to leave ROK army under his command without specifying a time limit, that such an agreement would be “worth a million dollars” to Clark. He pointed out that what we need is a breathing spell of a few months, that once armistice is implemented he believed it would be extremely difficult for ROK to make up its mind to renew fighting alone. If Rhee will not give unequivocal commitment of his army to UNC for specified time, and it is decided his temporary cooperation is [Page 1356] needed so urgently that a conditional commitment will not be rejected by, [sic] we shall have to decide.
(1) What kind of deal could be made on this basis with reference to our proposed program on a contingency basis, and (2) What kind of statement should be made in Washington and here upon my departure. I assume that we would refrain from public statement which would inflame Rhee, however just they might be from our standpoint. I emphasize again my opinion that Rhee is not bluffing and is capable of the most irrational and damaging action. You might consider the advisability of a joint statement to the effect that
- (a)
- We had cleared up many differences and misunderstandings in our discussions,
- (b)
- I was returning to Washington to report to my government,
- (c)
- ROK would continue its cooperation with UNC on the present basis,
- (d)
- It is hoped ROK and US can soon clarify all other points at issue. Request your comments and guidance.
President Eisenhower’s personal message3 was received upon my return from Rhee’s office. I sent it to him immediately so that he would have the chance of reading it before our meeting soon to follow with Clark, Briggs, Murphy, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Clark and I have already reported in joint message (GX 6799)4 result of that meeting.
Rhee’s letter5 referred to above just received. Text follows by separate telegram. Defer action this message until letter received.