795.00/7–653: Telegram
The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State
niact
061600Z. (Army message) Sent Department repeated information Tokyo, for General Clark and Ambassador Murphy, Pusan and CINCUNC. Personal for Secretary from Robertson.
When I called upon Rhee this morning I found him in a highly emotional and indignant state over what he termed “broadcasts out of Tokyo last night and General Taylor’s broadcast here this morning”. He raged that the military were trying to cause dissension among his troops and that these broadcasts were attempts to intimidate and frighten him with threats. He said “I have some face too, and if I go out to people announcing agreement on President Eisenhower’s and Secretary of State’s program they will think it is because of these threats by military”. (General Taylor made no broadcast.) Following is transcript of broadcast from Tokyo this morning relating to General Taylor and heard by Rhee:
“General Maxwell D. Taylor called corps commanders and advisors to the ROK Army in a conference at Eighth Army headquarters this morning, as a South Korean decision on boycotting or accepting an armistice hung in the balance.
The Eighth Army commander was known to be making separate plans for the withdrawal of American and British divisions from the battle line, with or without the cooperation of the 16 division ROK Army, if a truce is signed with the Communists.
The military conference came shortly before President Syngman Rhee and American envoy Walter Robertson met again at 11:00 a.m. at the Seoul Presidential Mansion.”
Rhee then began recital of all the things he did not like about the armistice and of the concessions he had made in order to arrive at settlement with his friend the US. He stated that he was writing a reply to our aide-mémoire. I pointed out that no reply was needed, that our aide-mémoire was a statement of our final position and that if we exchanged notes indefinitely there would be nothing substantive to add to what we had already offered. For first time since our initial conference he raised again the question of Chinese POWs. He suggested that they, too, be delivered to demilitarized zone for take-over by NNRC. I replied that this was a point on which he had already indicated agreement as confirmed in my first aide-mémoire. He stated that he had not intended to make such agreement and went over again his pledges to his people that he would never allow Communist troops in South Korea. He said he saw no reason why General Clark could not make same arrangement for Chinese POWs as he had agreed to make for Korea POWs. He then came to principal sticking point—the mutual defense pact—which he said offered the only “security” he could hold out to his people to justify his support of the armistice. He again urged that the pact be rushed through the Senate so that he could present it to his people as a “fait accompli”. I reiterated that we had negotiated armistice in good faith and could not under any circumstances delay signing when the Communists were ready to sign. He then asked if we could not give him some evidence of Congressional support. I replied that President would not have offered pact in consideration of his agreement to certain actions if he had not felt that the Senate would support him. I further stated that President Eisenhower had no more assurance that Rhee would carry out his commitments than Rhee had that President Eisenhower would carry out US commitments, that each of us would have to accept as fact the good faith of the other. All of this being true it would rob Rhee of his biggest argument if the President would do what I suggested for consideration in Embtel 192 this morning; namely to call in Congressional leaders of both parties, obtain their promise to support pact and then advise Rhee to this effect through me. I earnestly hope that the President will not consider such a procedure beneath his dignity. I assure you that his personal good faith has in no way been questioned.