Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/6–2953

Aide-Mémoire From the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

top secret

Seoul, June 28, 1953.

Aide-Mémoire

This aide-mémoire is intended to convey the understanding reached in the course of the conversation between the President and Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson: Special Representative of President Eisenhower, this morning and to be response, mostly appreciative, to the American aide-mémoire² received yesterday afternoon. The chief points are as follows:

The main purpose of the United States in strengthening the Republic of Korea forces is to build up a sufficient military power to defend democracy against communism in Korea, which largely means, in turn, the defense of the common cause. In other words, the United States is to make democratic Korea strong enough to defend its own strategic peninsula, part of the free world’s bulwark, against Communist aggressors without depending upon the United States manpower. This should be the final objective of the proffered mutual defense arrangement.

The arrangement for a mutual defense pact between the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea and the continuation of economic aid and military assistance in building up the Republic of Korea defense forces as outlined in the letter of President Eisenhower dated June 7 [6], 1953,³ are accepted by the Republic of Korea Government with appreciation and gratitude.

In connection with the suggested mutual defense treaty, it is the hope of the Republic of Korea Government to conclude such a pact prior to the signing of the armistice. As regards the military aid, sea and airforce must be built up sufficiently for the support of the land forces.

The United States Government is prepared to provide economic assistance to the Republic of Korea towards its economic goal of self-sufficiency and logistical and other support for the strengthening and maintenance of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea including the Republic of Korea army up to the level of twenty divisions. If necessary, further build-up of the Republic of Korea forces will be carried out with the United States assistance, with matching them against [those?] of an immediate neighbor in view.

Regarding the question of the prisoners of war and the time limit of the political conference, the government of the Republic of Korea makes following suggestions.

The Government of the Republic of Korea will cooperate with the United Nations command in moving the Communist Korean prisoners of war, and the Chinese prisoners of war now in the custody of the United Nations command from their present location to the demilitarized zone. Those loyal Korean prisoners of war still in detention are to be questioned in presence of the United Nations command and the Republic of Korea Government representatives. The questioning is to be finished in a few days, not longer than one week in any case, with the understanding that, when the questioning is finished, those who desire to go back to the Communist camps or country should be at once removed and those loyal ones who want to remain in South Korea should be released at once.

The political conference to be convened after the signing of the armistice should conclude its discussions or talks within 90 days from the date of the signing of the armistice with the hope of accomplishing the common objectives of reunifying under its only legal government and evacuating the Chinese Communists from Korea. If the concrete procedures, to be immediately implemented, of achieving those objectives fail to be agreed upon at the end of the time limit, the United States delegates together with the ROK delegates will withdraw from the political conference and immediately resume the military operations jointly without consulting with any other nation or organization for the purpose of accomplishing the original objective by military means.

As suggested in the United States aide-mémoire, the United States will cooperate with the Republic of Korea in checking the Communist infiltration into and their subversive and other disturbing activities in the latter during the period from the signing of the armistice to the end of the 90 day session of the political conference. During the same period, the United States will strengthen the ROK forces to counter balance the unimpeded build-up of the Communist forces in the north.

As likewise suggested in the United States aide-mémoire, after the signing of the armistice agreement between the two military commands, the United States will sponsor a high-level conference with the Government of the Republic of Korea to be held at some intermediate point to confer on all aspects of our common objectives at the political conference to follow the armistice.

The ROK agrees to continue the present arrangement with the United Nations Command as stated in the President’s letter to General MacArthur dated July 15, 1950⁴ so long as the UNC cooperates and supports the ROKG in its efforts to promote the common cause by settling the war with victory.

It is also agreed that when the ROKG should ever decide to take its forces out of the UNC, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, will notify it to the UNC in advance.

The Republic of Korea Government wants to have the following doubts cleared as far as possible through written clarifications:

a) How soon will the political conference be opened after the signing of the armistice?

b) What will be the composition of the political conference?

c) Will North Korean Communist puppet participate in the political conference?

d) What will they do with the Chinese non-Communist prisoners of war who will persist in their opposition to repatriation to the end?

e) Will the Republic of Korea be invited to take part in the political conference?

1. This aide-mémoire was received by Robertson on Sunday, June 28, and sent to the Department of State from Seoul in Army message 281330Z that same day.
2. Transmitted in telegram 31, dated June 27, p. 1279.
3. For a text of this letter, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 377–380.
4. President Rhee had assigned operational command of ROK ground, sea, and air forces to General MacArthur as CINCUNC in a letter of July 15, 1950. (UN document S/1627; printed in Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 7, 1950, p. 206)