USUN files
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)
Dear Charlie: Many thanks for yours of the 17th1 referring to our conversation on the Williamsburg on the problem of getting more foreign troops for service in Korea. I am delighted that you are taking such a keen personal interest in this matter.
Mr. Nash’s memorandum2 seems to be a good statement of the policy regarding logistical support which existed under the previous Administration and the arguments for that policy. The arguments seemed inadequate to me then and the march of events here and abroad, beginning with the election, make the arguments seem even less valid today.
Incidentally, the memorandum appears to draw the conclusion that I am talking about waiving completely the reimbursement obligation. This [Page 1243] is not my position. We should certainly try to get governments taking part in a collective security action to pay as much as possible of their own way, as well as supplying men.
But when it comes to financing in dollars, we cannot assume that there are in fact many nations which have dollars which they are unwilling to furnish. Most nations simply have not the dollars. But they have the men. And if a nation without dollars is willing to put up the men, we should certainly take the men every time and save the equivalent in our manpower.
In the previous Administration, the Defense Department, on September 27, 1952, in an argument against facilitating the bringing in of more foreign troops, referred to the fact that there was no longer “the atmosphere of urgency prevailing in 1950 and in early 1951”. It was the very failure of the last Administration to sense the urgency about Korea which aroused such public criticism and caused it to be so discredited. This is a position which our Administration must not maintain.
The United States has, in effect, wisely adopted the general policy that it is profitable to the United States, which has only six percent of the world’s population, to provide munitions of war, so that, while we must inescapably provide most of the munitions, we would not also be required to provide most of the men. Certainly one of the ideas inherent in NATO is that it is a sound practice for us to provide weapons so that the Europeans may provide some of the men—and that we will not then have to provide all the men. Having taken an active part both in the drafting of the Vandenberg Resolution which underlay the North Atlantic Treaty and in the debates on both measures, I feel sure that this was the intent of Congress.
Indeed, if a major purpose of foreign military aid is not to lessen the drain on American manpower, there is very little point in it. We are spending huge sums of money on aid to Latin America, for example, which is creating political enmity for us by laying us open to the charge of supporting would-be military dictators and, except for Colombia, we have not had one single Latin American soldier helping us out in Korea. If the policy continues to provide no more Latin American troops in Korea we should seriously consider the economies which could be effectuated by very drastically reducing military aid to those countries.
I cannot see how the policy which I advocate in any way justifies the raising of what Mr. Nash calls “possible charges of the use of mercenary troops by the United States”. This charge can only be raised effectively if the United States does not provide its own share of manpower, and if the foreign troops have no great cause for which to fight. In the case of NATO, and in the case of Korea, the United States contributes its fair share of troops and the foreign troops have the inspiring cause of repelling the Communists.
[Page 1244]Nor do I follow Mr. Nash’s inference that acceptance of troops without dollars would “undermine the growth of the United Nations as an effective mechanism for collective action”. Actually it would be just the other way around. The effectiveness of the United Nations depends on the extent to which member governments are willing to make their manpower available to repel aggression by force if necessary.
The United Nations will not fail because of dollars. But it may very well founder because of inadequate manpower. This is the very heart of the United Nations problem.
I very much hope that you will continue taking a vigorous personal interest in this matter so that we can get more forces from more United Nations countries to assist in Korea. The American public, I am sure, expects this Administration to make a constructive and imaginative change from the policy of the preceding Administration so that, in the words of the General’s speeches last fall, the drain on American manpower may be drastically reduced.
Sincerely yours,