FE files, lot 55 D 338, “Korean Political Conference, June 1953”
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)1
Assuming President Rhee is willing to accept the substance of President Eisenhower’s letter of June 6, 1953,2 there are the following three aspects to be negotiated in detail with the ROK Government:
[Page 1237]1. A Mutual Defense Treaty:
- (a)
- The Secretary believes we should only negotiate a treaty of the ANZUS or US–Philippine treaty type. He definitely opposes the NATO formula because that gives the President certain extra powers to consider territory attack similar to the territory of the United States. Instead, the general formula in the other defense treaties is of the Monroe Doctrine type.
- (b)
- The Secretary also stressed the necessity for making clear that the treaty would cover only territory peacefully under the jurisdiction and authority of the ROK.
2. Economic Assistance:
- (a)
- The Secretary agreed that it would be all right to show President Rhee and the Prime Minister a synopsis of the Tasca Report3 provided discussions are conducive. Both the Secretary and the Under Secretary felt that the President would be able to approve a request for $300 million and that Congress would accept it provided things go well in Korea.
- (b)
- The Secretary agreed that every effort should be made to seek the President’s approval so that Mr. Robertson would have the authority to inform President Rhee that the Executive Branch had approved Tasca’s recommendations and was submitting them to the Congress.
3. Political Conference:
(a) The Secretary particularly emphasized that Mr. Robertson should make clear to President Rhee that we are not going to allow the U.S. to become so entangled with the United Nations regarding the Political Conference that we cannot stand shoulder to shoulder with the ROK in the future. Mr. Robertson is to convey the Secretary’s views as outlined for a joint US–UK strategy for obtaining Korea’s unification. The Secretary feels that in time we can get Korea’s reunion. It will be wrong and foolish to accept any permanent division of Korea. That does not have to be even considered if Rhee has the U.S. and other friends working constantly with him for Korea’s reunion. It would be foolish to take out our troops before we can use all of their presence in Korea for bargaining purposes and pressures, along with inducements, and a strengthened economy. We must work away together and wait for this to come.