Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

695A.0024/6–1853

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)

secret

[Washington,] June 18, 1953.

Subject:

• ROK Unilateral Release of North Korean Prisoners.

Participants:

• Mr. Paek Tu Chin, Korean Prime Minister
• Dr. You Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador
• Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. Frank C. Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense
• Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
• Mr. Charles A. Sullivan, Office of the Secretary of Defense

The Secretary asked Prime Minister Paek Tu Chin to come in to see him today at 2:30 in regard to the unilateral action of President Rhee in releasing Korean prisoners. The Secretary summarized the President’s message to President Rhee which had just been sent out.¹ The Secretary particularly stressed that unless President Rhee was prepared immediately and unequivocally to accept the authority of the United Nations Command to conduct the present hostilities to bring them to a close, it would be necessary to effect another arrangement.

The Secretary then explained the whole situation as follows:

1. President Rhee’s action would only benefit the Communists. We completely fail to understand how President Rhee could plot and carry out such a plan behind our backs. It was obvious that the release had been carefully prepared and timed, and what made it so difficult was President Rhee’s public statement authorizing it.

2. This unilateral action not only challenged the integrity and authority of the United Nations Command, but it violated several assurances which President Rhee had given General Clark during the past few weeks that he would not take any unilateral action without prior consultation. The Korean armed forces had been placed under the Command at the wish of President Rhee soon after the invasion began in 1950. This had worked very well up to the present time. If President Rhee decided that he no longer could agree with us on an armistice and cessation of hostilities, we fully recognized his freedom to tell us that he had decided that he could no longer cooperate with the Command and that he was therefore withdrawing his forces from it. That would have been the proper and suitable way to have handled the situation. We would have known where we stood and would have been able to take the necessary actions. He would have been free to continue the hostilities if he desired, although in the Secretary’s opinion that would have led only to disaster for Korea.

3. Instead, President Rhee had chosen to plot secretly behind our backs and to defy the authority of the Command. This created a most difficult and untenable position for us because we do not know where it will lead to; we do not know whether he intends to break completely with the Command or whether it is possible for the United Nations Command to continue to function with its authority challenged by the Republic of Korea Government itself. The Secretary emphasized that we must either have unity and cooperation under the Command or some new arrangements will have to be put into effect by the United States Government. It will be impossible to continue partly divided and united at the same time.

4. Rhee’s action had obviously created a most embarrassing, difficult and perhaps explosive situation. Our allies find it hard to believe that in some way the United States authorities have not connived in this unilateral release of prisoners, or that we are so naive that we could not have known of this plotting ahead of time. It is too early to tell yet what the reaction of the Communists may be, but it is possible that it may lead to real difficulties regarding the armistice and the cessation of hostilities. American public opinion will probably react so strongly to Rhee’s action that many Americans will fail to see any reason why American soldiers should go on fighting and dying for Korea. It is a situation which could well divide us when we should be united and strong to continue the many tasks that have to be done in Korea.

5. Only the Communists will profit by such division. It plays right into their hands. We know they are our common enemy and we should work together against them not against each other. The first victim of disunity will be Korea, and perhaps even ultimately the United States will suffer. That is why the United States Government has felt it so urgent that we develop the closest possible relations and understandings between our two governments and people.

6. As he had pointed out in his conversation yesterday with the Prime Minister regarding the Political Conference and the general world situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union,² the Secretary again reiterated this Government’s intention to work closely with the Republic of Korea to build its economic, military and political strength so that it will rapidly become an effective attraction to the people in North Korea. He again told Paek that we hoped we could work closely with the Koreans in developing a strategy of pressures and inducements to bring about the reunion of Korea which the Secretary felt was possible but only if we worked in close partnership. He told Paek that he had always felt that forceful unification of Korea to its historic boundaries with China and Russia would be dangerous and unsuccessful. The United States and Korea together do not have the forces to guard a frontier of over 600 miles, even if they could push the Communists entirely out of Korea. Furthermore, the deployment of such strong American and Korean forces near sensitive base areas of the Soviet Union as Vladivostock and Port Arthur could provoke strong Soviet counteraction. The same situation was true in Germany where an attempt at forceful unification might provoke the Soviet Union to moving at least 200 divisions against Western Europe. They could also move superior forces into Korea if they so desired. An offensive had been attempted early in the war in Korea to move to the Yalu, but it failed. Therefore, the Secretary felt strongly that we should use every possible political and economic means to obtain Korea’s unification. This meant the strengthening of the Republic of Korea economy and military establishment and we hoped to do it. However, we could only proceed if we know that we have the confidence and cooperation of the Korean Government.

7. Unfortunately President Rhee’s action has shaken the confidence that we can continue together, for his action shows that he has no confidence in us despite all of the assurances and efforts that we have recently made. His unilateral action was not carried out just to release the prisoners because they were to be released anyway. The extraordinary and incomprehensible thing about his action was that it occurred after fifteen months of negotiating and fighting to uphold the principle of nonforcible repatriation. After thousands of casualties and great effort, we had won the struggle. The Communists had conceded. The Korean prisoners would be released after a short time under the Repatriation Commission. Just at that point President Rhee plotted behind our backs to upset all this work. However, it was clear that his purpose was not so much to release the prisoners as to frustrate and overturn the possibility of an armistice. The United States Government could not understand why he had waited until this very last moment when he had many an opportunity to talk this matter over with this Government and to follow the course of action which he considered right and proper for his country.

8. Accordingly, the question of whether we continue united or whether we shall have to separate is not entirely up to President Rhee. We cannot decide how to go forward until we know what his determination is in response to the President’s letter. This is an extremely serious situation and the United States will be forced to reconsider the Command relationships with the Republic of Korea if we cannot count on President Rhee’s cooperation any longer.

9. Since the Communists will be the only ones to profit by such disunity, the President continues to hope that it will not come about since every evidence of our disagreement only gives the enemy aid and comfort. Therefore, the President will not make public his letter to President Rhee. Our two governments are fighting the same enemy and should do so together rather than apart. Ambassador Yang said he and the Prime Minister had been talking about the situation at some length today and that they were in agreement with what the Secretary had said. They both felt that their immediate departure for Korea for discussions with President Rhee could turn the tide and help work things out. Neither was specific but they both professed agreement with the general principle that our two countries must continue united rather than to proceed separately. Ambassador Yang also said that he and the Prime Minister strongly felt that Mr. Robertson’s trip should not be cancelled and in fact was more urgently needed than ever. They both hoped that the United States Government would reconsider its decision to defer this trip. The Secretary replied that he would give consideration to their suggestion in the light of developments. However, it was impossible for Mr. Robertson to proceed with his trip at this time until President Rhee’s intentions were clarified.³

Speaking on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Nash told the Prime Minister that United States military authorities are gravely concerned over the military implications of President Rhee’s unilateral action. In view of Intelligence reports of a big buildup of Communist forces and supplies in North Korea, giving the Communists capability of launching a major offensive, any disunity, division of Command or cross-purposes between the United Nations Command and the Republic of Korea would only benefit the Communists. They might seize the opportunity to launch this offensive. If the authority of the Command is challenged and the Korean forces are not to cooperate with the United Nations Forces, a Communist offensive might successfully exploit the situation. However, if the Korean and United Nations forces stay united under the authority of the Command they can hold against any Communist offensive.

In conclusion, the Secretary told the Korean Prime Minister that the coincidence of his visit to Washington with critical developments in Korea had afforded a helpful and useful opportunity to discuss fully and frankly with him these vital matters to both governments. The Secretary said that he hoped the Prime Minister would be able to do everything he could on his return to Korea to help the situation.

1. For text, see Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 185–186.
2. For a report of this discussion, see the memorandum of conversation, by Young, June 17, p. 1193.
3. A message to this effect, drafted and signed by Dulles, was sent to Briggs in Seoul for immediate delivery to Rhee in telegram 3 to Seoul, June 18, 1953, not printed. (795.00/6–1853)