Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Mark W. Clark Collection, Archives-Museum, The Citadel

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark)¹

secret

Seoul, June 18, 1953.

Dear General Clark: Enclosed herewith please find a copy of my statement issued this morning relating to the release of the loyal Korean prisoners of war. I know your personal view regarding this matter and I know also that you could not do anything about it on account of the international complications. Under this circumstance, if I had revealed to you in advance my idea of setting them free, it would have only embarrassed you. Furthermore, the plan would have been completely spoiled. As I have spoken to you about this matter, more than once, I do believe that these innocent boys should not have been detained in stockades so long.

What is uppermost in my mind is the fear that if the Indian armed forces, a thousand or more, come to guard these boys to help the Communist brainwashers grill them and indoctrinate them for two or three long months, urging them to go back to the Communists, the Korean people will not let them alone. There will be a clash of a serious nature between the Communist or pro-Communist Indians and the anti-Communist Koreans. No one will be able to stop it.

In this connection, I suggested several plans which might be agreeable to all concerned. None of these having been heeded, however, I felt I had to take this final action. Consequently, I took my own responsibility and ordered the Korean military police to release them at once. If there is any difficulty arising from it, please kindly let me know and I shall be only too glad to settle this question, like all other questions, in a friendly way.

There is, however, one danger; there are always some people on both sides who try to take advantage of such a situation as this, making trouble for any one and everyone. Please advise them not to make a bad situation worse. Though my share of the job may be too much for me, I am trying my utmost with a hope of success. I believe it is the best way out, under the present circumstances.

Meantime I wish to assure you that it is not the beginning of what we referred to as a “unilateral action.” I am glad to say that we have not come to that as yet, and I still hope that we shall not have to come to that at all.

One thing that worries me, however, is that when the armistice is signed, you and General Taylor will be, of course, ordered to carry out the terms of armistice, right or wrong. According to the terms, the armies on both sides shall drop back two kilometers, within a specified number of hours after the signing of the armistice. The ROKA may not be allowed to draw back along with their friendly forces and that is where the question comes in. While I still hope such may never be the case, we must see what we should do in case we have to take a stand. Personally I hate it like a poison to tell you that I shall have to withdraw the ROKA from your command, but things standing where they are now, there seems to be no alternative. You know, General, we are all creatures of circumstance and we have to come to some understanding about the ways we shall have to severally go.

The next serious point is that when you order the U.N. forces in the front line to withdraw two kilometers from it and the ROKA refuse to do so, there will be open gaps somewhere along the front which may give the enemy a chance to break through. For the sake of our mutual safety, there must be some definite understanding about it. I wish you would enlighten me on this point.

Let us keep our official duties and our personal friendship separate. You and I are not our own masters. We are trying to discharge our duties which we owe to our respective nations and certain things we cannnot escape, much as we want to.

Please keep this confidential. The enclosed copy of my cable message to our Embassy in Washington² had better be destroyed after you have a look at it.

Sincerely yours,

Syngman Rhee

[Enclosure]

Press Release of the Office of Public Information, Republic of Korea

S–61

Seoul, June 18 (OPI)—President Syngman Rhee today issued the following statement in connection with the release of anti-communist Korean prisoners this morning:

“According to the Geneva Convention and also to the principles of human rights, the anti-communist Korean war prisoners should have been released long before this. Most of the United Nations authorities with whom I have spoken about our desire to release these prisoners are with us in sympathy and principle. But due to the international complications we have been unjustly holding these people too long.

“Now the United Nations agreement with the communists is making the complications worse than ever, which will lead to a serious consequence and result in something to the satisfaction of our enemy and misunderstanding among our own people.

“In order to avoid the grave consequences which might result, I have ordered on my own responsibility the release of the anti-communist Korean prisoners on this day, June 18th, 1953.

“The reason why I did this without full consultation with the United Nations Command and other authorities concerned is too obvious to explain.

“The Governors and police officers in the various provinces have been instructed to take care of these released war prisoners to their best ability.

“We trust all our people and our friends will cooperate in this so that there will be no unnecessary misunderstanding anywhere.”

1. This letter was transmitted to the JCS for their information in telegram C 63182, June 19, 1953; a copy of this radio telegram can be found in Matthews files, lot 53 D 413.
2. In the enclosed cable, not printed, Rhee instructed the Korean Embassy in Washington to investigate the origin of a story that Clark had threatened to withdraw aid from South Korea if the armistice was not signed and to report if any Koreans were responsible. Otherwise, the Korean Ambassador was to make no comments and not commit himself in the controversy over the release of the prisoners.