S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 154 Series
Memorandum by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council
top secret
Washington, June 17, 1953.
Subject:
- United States Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in
Korea
Reference:
At the request of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) the enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff with respect to the reference report on the subject are
transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security
Council in connection with its consideration of NSC 154 at its meeting on June 18.2
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense
(Wilson)
top secret
Washington, June 17, 1953.
Subject:
- United States Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in
Korea (NSC 154).
- 1.
- In response to the request contained in your memorandum dated
June 16, 1953, subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
submit herewith their views on the draft statement of policy by
the National Security Council Planning Board entitled “United
States Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea”
(NSC 154).
- 2.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that NSC 154 does not reflect the position taken in
instructions issued to General
Clark and Ambassador Briggs on May 30, 19533
with approval of the President to the effect that the United
States is willing to enter into a mutual defense treaty with the
ROK Government subject to
receiving assurances from President Rhee that his Government will refrain from
opposition to an armistice, cooperate in its implementation, and
maintain forces under the control of the Commander in Chief,
United Nations Command (CINCUNC). This position was restated in a letter of
June 6, 1953 to President Rhee4 in which President Eisenhower stated that he was
prepared after the conclusion and acceptance of an armistice to
negotiate a
[Page 1190]
mutual
defense treaty. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion
that in the absence of satisfactory assurances by the ROK Government that it will
cooperate with the United Nations Command in carrying out the
terms of an armistice, an offer to conclude a mutual defense
treaty with that Government would result in a commitment on the
part of the United States without any advantage in return. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, believe that paragraph 14 of
NSC 154 should reaffirm the
position adopted by the President in his letter of June 6, 1953
to President Rhee to the
effect that acceptance by the ROK Government of an armistice agreement and
cooperation in the implementation of its terms is a condition
precedent to conclusion of a mutual defense treaty.
- 3.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that one of the Interim Courses
of Action proposed in NSC 154 is
that the United States conclude a treaty with the Republic of
Korea (ROK) “guaranteeing its
political independence and territorial integrity.” It is
proposed that such a treaty cover the territory now or hereafter
brought peacefully under the administration of the ROK. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are
of the opinion that the language in which this course of action
is couched is undesirably broad and could be interpreted to
provide for numerous and unpredictable contingencies. It might
well constitute an over-commitment of United States military
forces and, in any event, would enlarge appreciably the current
gap between the forces being maintained and their ability to
meet United States commitments. Moreover, by implication, this
course of action involves no requirement for a defense effort on
the part of the ROK.
- 4.
- In his letter to Mr. Rhee of June 6, 1953, President Eisenhower offered to negotiate
with the ROK “a mutual-defense
treaty along the lines of the treaties heretofore made between
the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, and the
United States and Australia and New Zealand.” In effect, these
two treaties bind the Parties to consult together whenever in
the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political
independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
Further, each Party recognizes that an armed attack on any of
the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional processes. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff, from the military point of view, regard a
mutual-defense treaty of this nature as preferable to one which
guarantees the political independence and territorial integrity
of the ROK. Accordingly, they
recommend that subparagraph 14b of NSC 154 be modified to bring it
into consonance with the President’s proposal to Mr. Rhee.
- 5.
- Subject to the foregoing proposed modification, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff recommend that you concur in the draft statement
of policy contained in NSC
154.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
F. F.
Everest
Lieut. General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff
