Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

Washington, June 16, 1953—2 p.m.

Timing of NNSC Teams

Mr. Johnson: We should get a message out to Clark on the question of the lapse of time between the date of the cease fire and the probable arrival of the NNSC team. We have word that the Swiss will leave on the 25th from Zurich. The Swedes tell us that their team will leave on the 21st from Stockholm. The Swedes have asked the Poles as to when the Communist teams would leave. From the report we have, they have heard from the Poles that the Swedes are quite a bit ahead of them. I think the draft telegram you have here is all right.² I do think it is important that we have skeleton teams there just as early as possible.

Admiral Fechteler: The telegram says that the period of the lapse is “acceptable”. I should think the word should be unavoidable.

Mr. Matthews: That is in response to Clark’s view that too long a period of lapse would present an unacceptable risk.

General Twining: What worries me about not having the teams there is that the Communists will go ahead and build up their airfields.

Mr. Matthews: There is no provision in the armistice to keep the Communists from repairing or building up their airfields. You may remember that we gave up the restriction about repairing airfields in connection with the agreement of our Allies to issue the Greater Sanction Statement.

Admiral Fechteler: I think this telegram is OK if nobody has objections.

Diplomatic Immunity for Armistice Teams

Mr. Johnson: We should also get an answer out to Clark on the question of diplomatic immunity for the armistice teams. I had a draft which, unfortunately, I don’t have with me. We can call and have it sent over right away. In general what it says is that although these people will not have actual diplomatic immunity, the UNC will accord them the same privileges as in practice people with diplomatic immunity are accorded. We don’t think, however, that we should take this up with Rhee at the present time.

Possibility of a Neutralized Unified Korea

Mr. Matthews: As we approach the possibility of an armistice, we have been considering the question of what our own objective really should be with regard to Korea and in particular what we should be working toward in the political conference which is due to follow the armistice. We discussed this with our own Secretary. He thought that it was a most important question and one which should be put up to the NSC. We thought it would be helpful to get your preliminary reactions on the question today. In general it seemed to us there were two feasible alternatives. The first one is what, in effect, we will have at the time of an armistice and that is a divided Korea with South Korea allied to the U.S. and developed by the U.S. as a military partner. The second alternative would be a unified Korea but one which was in effect neutralized.

Admiral Fechteler: What do you mean by neutralized?

Mr. Matthews: In essence it would mean that we do not have any military bases in Korea and we would maintain no U.S. forces in Korea. We might give guarantees to Korea against external attack but we would not have an alliance with Korea.

Admiral Fechteler: Would it mean that Korea would be demilitarized?

Mr. Bowie: No, it wouldn’t necessarily mean that, although I should think we would have to expect that the Communists would insist there be some limit on the number of the ROK forces.

Admiral Fechteler: How about U.S. logistic assistance to Korea?

Mr. Bowie: We haven’t thought that through in detail but we have thought that possibly we might continue to supply the Koreans with some military equipment.

General Shepherd: What would the North Koreans think of the idea? Why should they go along with it?

Mr. Matthews: It might be more important to estimate what the Russians would think of it. By and large I should think the North Koreans would be apt to do what they are told to do by the Russians.

Admiral Fechteler: From the military point of view I don’t see how the alternative you described in this draft paper³ as alternative B of a unified neutralized Korea would work out. We would have to pull all our men and equipment out. The Chinese Communists would go to the other side of the Yalu and presumably we would withdraw to Japan. What would keep the Communists from walking right back in again?

Mr. Matthews: The theory would be that if the Chinese came back so would we or else we would take action against them elsewhere.

General McAuliffe:⁴ It would be much harder for us to get back in if the Chinese should come back than it would be to stay there.

Mr. Bowie: Would we visualize keeping U.S. forces there for any length of time after an armistice or would we visualize trying to keep forces there in case of general war?

General Twining: We really haven’t had a chance to talk this over. Personally, although I don’t know what the other Chiefs think, it seems to me that this idea of neutralizing Korea would create a military vacuum. I would like to take a look at it and talk it over with the other Chiefs.

Mr. Bowie: The basic theory is that it is possible that the Communists might be willing to give up their position in North Korea in return for our withdrawing from our military position in South Korea.

Admiral Fechteler: What would the tactics be?

Mr. Bowie: We would probably try to make it look as if we really didn’t want a neutralized Korea so that there would be more chance the Communists might be willing to accept the idea.

Mr. Johnson: The basic question is whether or not we would think it to our advantage to have Korea united under such terms.

Mr. Matthews: If general war broke out, would you want to retain our present position in Korea?

Admiral Fechteler: No, we wouldn’t, but as I read the description in your paper of why the Communists might agree to a neutralized Korea, I can’t follow it. For example, it says here that the Communists fear Korea as a jumping off place against Manchuria or Siberia. I just don’t think the Communists have any fear of Korea. It also says they would rid themselves of an economic liability but I don’t think they would let North Korea be a liability. They would just let them starve. This whole paragraph, it seems to me, is pleading a case for the alternative of neutralization.

Mr. Matthews: It’s not pleading a case, it is just pointing out what the reasons might be that might lead the Communists to accept such a proposal. Obviously we don’t know whether or not they would go along with such a scheme.

Mr. MacArthur: My worry would be as to whether or not the ROK could maintain an army if we couldn’t provide them with military assistance and support.

Mr. Johnson: I think that is a perfectly valid question and one that we would have to think about.

Admiral Fechteler: Would you visualize Korea as being something like Switzerland?

Mr. Bowie: Yes, to some degree. The Koreans would have forces for their own defense and there might be guarantees from us and from the Communists, but the Koreans wouldn’t have any military alliance with anybody.

Mr. Johnson: The question is whether we could live with such an arrangement and whether it would be to our advantage.

Admiral Fechteler: The only difference between alternatives A and B is that our forces will be moved out of Korea but in any case they will still be pinned down in a general area near Korea.

Mr. Matthews: This paper is based on the assumption that there is an armistice and that there is no more shooting. If the Communists did violate the armistice or violate the Korean neutrality, our sanction against it would still be our general strength rather than the level of our forces in Korea.

General Eddleman: Wouldn’t this be a complete reversal of U.S. policy? We have been trying to build the strength of anti-Communist forces—this would be really leaving the Koreans weaker than they are now. What would other nations think of that?

Mr. Matthews: We feel that most other countries would be glad to see lessening of the possibilities of tension or conflict over Korea.

Mr. Bowie: Doesn’t part of the question depend on whether or not we ourselves really want to keep U.S. forces and bases in Korea.

General McAuliffe: We would only want to keep them there to the degree it was necessary to implement the mutual security treaty we have been talking about. But we have read that sentence of this paper that says “Korea excluded from the U.S. miltiary sphere” as meaning that we would not be able to give any support to the Koreans for their army. It seems to me this would create an impossible military situation for the Koreans.

Mr. Bowie: There may be an internal inconsistency in this plan since we have thought that even though Korea should be neutralized it would still have an army for its own defense. It may be this just isn’t possible without U.S. military assistance. That is one of the things we should look into very carefully.

General Shepherd: What would be done about the North Korean Army and people?

Mr. Johnson: That is a real problem and it is not spelled out at all. All we say is that we would insist there be a non-Communist government in Korea, but it is obvious that such a unification would involve real problems.

Admiral Fechteler: My own feeling is that we should stick to our present position and see what happens.

Mr. Nash: The NSC paper that is before the Council⁵ now calls for urgent consideration of the position the U.S. should adopt in the political conference, so I think we do have to consider this right away. Personally I think if we could get a neutralized Korea that I would buy it. I do worry though as to whether we would be able to help a neutralized Korea sufficiently so the ROKs wouldn’t go Communist in a fairly short time. But we do have to have a position for the political conference which has to be something either that the Communists will not accept or something we can live with if they do accept it.

Mr. Bowie: If the suggestion of a neutralized Korea were to be put up by Rhee, is there any interest that we have that would make us say no to such a suggestion?

Mr. Nash: I think it would make a difference what the source of the suggestion was. I personally would like to explore this further and think it over a little more.

Mr. Robertson: I came in late so I have missed much of what has been said before. I don’t want to repeat what you have already discussed, but we are now committed to give Rhee a security guarantee and to try and assist in getting a unified Korea. I think the question of military judgment which we need help on is whether from a military point of view we would be better off by having our forces and bases outside a unified neutral Korea or forces and bases in a divided Korea.

Admiral Fechteler: The President didn’t say to Rhee that he would work for a neutralized Korea.

Mr. Robertson: No, but he did say we would work for a unified Korea and how we can get a unified Korea without neutralization is a very real question. If anybody has the answer, I wish they would let me know since I have to start off for Korea in a couple of days.⁶

Admiral Fechteler: I don’t know what the merits of the alternative of neutralization are, but it seems to me that this involves a new step and I think we should stick with what we have got which is a divided Korea under alternative A. Actually to my way of thinking neither alternative A or alternative B is worth a good God damn.

Mr. Matthews: I think we have covered about as much ground as we can today. We know that you will want to think over this question and talk among yourselves. We just thought it would be useful to have this preliminary discussion. We will all have our chance to express our views on this when it goes through the NSC machinery.

1. A note on the title page read: “Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”

   Admiral Fechteler and Generals Shepherd and Twining attended for the JCS. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent, while Nash represented the Department of Defense, General Cabell the CIA, and General Gerhard and Gleason the NSC. Korea was the sole topic discussed at this meeting, at which 21 persons were present.

2. This draft was transmitted as telegram JCS 941491 to Clark, June 16, 1953, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)
3. Supra.
4. Lt. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration.
5. The reference was to NSC 154, June 15; for text, see p. 1171.
6. Robertson was going to Korea as Dulles’ emissary; see the letter from Dulles, infra.