795.00/8–1153: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
111340 Z. Repeated information CINCUNC personal for General Clark and Ambassador Murphy, Pusan personal for Bond.
[Page 1165]I believe Rhee visit to Washington would be desirable if he agrees to make it, as that will probably mean he is prepared to abandon (for a consideration) his opposition to armistice. However, I interpret Rhee’s opposition as based primarily on sincere if irrational patriotism and if that interpretation is correct Department may wish to consider effects of possible refusal by Rhee before invitation is extended.
Also, Rhee might conclude from invitation that he will be able to extract very substantial additional concessions from US (for example in terms of economic aid) in return for abandonment of opposition.
Again, failure to convince Rhee that no amount of bluff or threat can budge us from our position as set forth in President Eisenhower’s latest letter1 might well impair whatever chances exist that Rhee will eventually accept armistice.
Thus, to dart forward with invitation to Rhee without awaiting reply to President Eisenhower’s letter which clearly and eloquently sets forth our position might prove tactically premature. Although I realize time is pressing, I recommend invitation be deferred at least until Department considers whether foregoing factors warrant delay.