Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram
The Commanding General, United States Eighth Army, (Taylor) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)1
operational immediate
G 5812 KCG. 1. I called on President Rhee at 1000I to discuss assignment of 15 officers hld back from Leavenworth. Rhee immediately launched into discussion of ltr he is preparing to Pres Eisenhower. He states he is finding it very difficult to write because, while not wishing to oppose the Pres, he feels that he must state the reasons for his present opposition to armistice. He repeated many of his statements regarding inacceptability and his determination to go it alone with present ROK resources.
2. I took advantage of opportunity to stress deficiencies of ROK Army and need for time to make it a balanced force capable of protecting Korea. It apparently had never occurred to Rhee that the delay entailed by the political discussions would allow the completion of the 20 division program to which he has attached so much importance. He likes the idea of having the eventual 20 division force and the political power which would go with it. This thought seemed to make the idea of an armistice somewhat less repugnant but he stressed need for definite assurances from the US to allow him to convince Korean people. I asked him to specify the points which, if met by the UN, would satisfy his requirements. He wrote down the following points (text not verbatim) on a paper which he started to give me, then withheld:
- a.
- Reasonable limit on duration of political discussions, preferably about 60 days.
- b.
- Mutual security pact with the US.
- c.
- Continued expansion of the ROK Army to 20 division ceiling, accompanied by development of Navy and Air Force.
3. I expressed view that these terms were probably not far from what I understood the US position to be. However, a formal mutual security pact would take some time to draft and, in the end, might require Senate ratification. Rhee brushed this to one side, saying all he wanted was simple statement in writing that the US would come to aid of Korea if attacked.
4. After discussing the 3 points which he seemed about ready to lay down as his terms, Rhee suddenly added a fourth, the barring from Korea of Indian and Communist representatives. The consideration of this point led Rhee to tense and emotional statements of his deep resentment of this particular provision, which he has repeatedly said his people would never accept. I asked him whether, in view of the long range advantages which might accrue from the first 3 points, he would not use his great influence to overcome the national objection to this provision. Rhee seemed to try to bring himself to an acceptance of this thought but could not swallow the loss of face arising from a withdrawal from the uncompromising position which he has taken publicly on this point.
5. Rhee then said that he was reluctant to put these points into his letter to Pres Eisenhower without getting some advance indication of how they would be received. He toyed with the idea of asking me to transmit them to CINCUNC on a trial basis but in the end said that he was not yet ready to take a final position and that he wanted to think the matter over a little longer.
6. In connection with the assignment of the 15 officers, he indicated he will take no final action pending return of Paik. I feel sure that his action in suspending their movement overseas was largely a gesture and that he has no real feeling about retaining them in Korea at this time.
7. My overall impression is that Rhee has not yet accepted the inevitability of an armistice and the unchangeability of the essential provisions with regard to prisoners. He needs to be convinced that since the armistice is an accomplished fact, it should be used as a point of departure in building up new terms most favorable to Korea. In readjusting his position, he is greatly handicapped by the extreme position on foreign troops which he has taken and he can find no face saving means of escape. He needs help to get over this hump.
- This telegram was repeated to the JCS for their information.↩