Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/3–2452: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret
priority

Tokyo, March 24, 1952—11:05 a.m.

C 65765. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 1082.

“Ref C 65730.²

• “1. In view of recent developments at Pan Mun Jom,³ the statement outlined in CX 65424⁴ is obsolete. The Communists have made their position as clear as they are likely to unless and until UNC indicates a willingness to talk in concrete and specific terms. It is vital that we take advantage of Communists present apparent willingness to make a deal and evident to delegation that further indefinite and vague ‘exploration’ can serve no purpose. Requisite degree of informality is in our view implicit in the fact that staffs rather than sub-delegations are conducting discussions, and that starting tomorrow these will likely be executive sessions. The stage is set for getting right down to cases. We are convinced that this should be done now. Communists made us a proposal on 21 March.⁵ Experience has proved that the best way to progress is to submit them a counter-proposal or a revision of their proposal.
• “2. To this end, and in consonance with JCS 904385,⁶ we propose to proceed along the following lines at staff officers meeting 241100I March.

  • “A. Give a statement, couched generally as follows: Careful consideration has been given to the discussions of the past several days and particularly to the proposal of March 21 and to the further exposition made of it on March 22. These have encouraged hope that a solution acceptable to both sides is not beyond the realm of possibility.

    “The proposal of 21 March with proper adjustments might well constitute a suitable basis for such a solution. Obviously, however, neither side can agree to a proposal without a thorough understanding of its contents and of its implications with respect to its minimum objectives. Consequently, agreement in principle must follow rather than precede a general understanding on the details of the proposal. Our side is interested only in the end result and in the welfare of the POWs. This need not be inconsistent with the result to be obtained through application of the principle of repatriating all the POWs in the custody of both sides at the time of signing of the armistice agreement.

    “We seek to insure the return to our side of all the captured persons of our side and to insure the return to you of all captured personnel held by us except those released because they originally resided in the area of our side or because they are subject to a special situation such as you referred to on March 22.

    “In this connection the figure 132,474 set forth in your principle of the 21 does not fully reflect all pertinent factors. This figure included approximately 16,000 persons who are residents of the area of our side. Therefore it should be reduced by this number. Some additional adjustment might be needed to accommodate POWs released because they are subject to a particular situation. What, if any, such additional adjustment might be we cannot estimate. However, our side will make every effort to insure that any such additional adjustments will be reasonable. Such an indefinite answer may not be satisfactory to you as a basis for an agreement. If an accurate estimate would be helpful we are willing to suspend discussion of the March 21 proposal until such time as it can be prepared.

    “Once the numerical adjustments are agreed to, it would be desirable to revise the lists of POWs previously submitted to reflect such adjustments, as well as deaths, escapees, and so forth. On the basis of these revised lists there should be no trouble in agreeing upon a principle of repatriating all POWs in the custody of each side, when the armistice agreement is signed. We are prepared to submit a revision of the 21 March proposal which should be acceptable to both sides. Agreement to this proposal would be contingent upon the acceptability of the revised lists to both sides.

  • “B. If Communist reaction to foregoing is favorable, submit to Communists at appropriate time the following revision of their 21 March proposal:

    “The Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers on the one hand and the United Nations Command on the other shall release and repatriate all prisoners of war held in custody at the time the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. The release and repatriation of such prisoners of war shall be effected on the basis of lists which shall be checked by staff officers of both sides prior to the signing of the armistice agreement.”

• “3. In summary, we are convinced that only by being specific to this limited degree can any progress be made. Even if Communists reject our ideas we have lost nothing; and if they accept them we shall have gained much. On the other hand, further temporizing can serve no purpose, confuses the issue, and may result in loss of favorable opportunity to settle this issue.
• “4. Request any additional instructions you deem necessary prior to 240800I March if possible. This is last message for item 4 for 23 March. Signed Joy.”

1. A marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram.
2. The source text indicated that this telegram could not be identified; it has not been found by the editors.
3. In the Staff Officers meetings on item 4, there were signs that the Communist Delegation was altering its position and the UNC Delegation discerned hints that the Communists wanted executive sessions so that free discussion could ensue; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 168.
4. Dated Mar. 17, p. 91.
5. On Mar. 21, the Communists offered their “provision in principle” based on their proposal of Mar. 5 that the POW question be settled on the basis of the lists exchanged on Dec. 18, 1951. This “provision of principle” called for release and repatriation of the 11,559 prisoners in the Communists’ custody in exchange for release and repatriation of the 132,474 prisoners held by the UNC and for a final check of the lists of POWs by the staff officers of both sides. On the next day, the Communists asserted that some “adjustments” to the numbers of POWs might be necessary. A record of the submission of the proposal of Mar. 21 can be found in telegram C 65665, Ridgway to JCS, Mar. 21, 1952 in FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 36. For a general discussion of the significance of the proposal and the “adjustment” statement, see Vatcher, Panmunjom, pp. 140–141.
6. Supra.