Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 72: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret
priority

Munsan, March 11, 1952—11:23 a.m.

HNC 1033. 1. Following summary of current status of armistice negotiations has been prepared following full discussion with all United States Delegates and Senior Members of Delegation Staff.²

2. A. We do not presume to know whether Communists desire or do not desire an armistice.

B. We do not presume to know Communist intentions with respect to any particular currently unresolved issues.

C. We deem it dangerous to assume that we do know his intention with respect to the foregoing and even more dangerous to the attainment of our objectives were we to base our plans on assumed Communist intentions which intelligence in our possession does not support.

D. With three major and several minor unresolved issues now existing;³ with the attitude of the Communist negotiators on all these major issues remaining obdurate without any indication of willingness to make concessions thereon; with the demeanor of the Communist negotiators becoming increasingly arrogant and threatening and their language intemperate; the position of the delegation verges on one of humiliation, derogatory to our national dignity without discernible probability of improvement and in fact with positive indications of the probability of further deterioration in negotiatory strength of our position.

E. There are, I think, two courses of action, either of which may arrest this deterioration, restore some measure of bargaining power to our delegation and relieve these honorable high-principled representatives of the United States of America who compose the delegation, of the rankling humiliation of having their government, the United Nations, and the principles for which both stand, daily subjected to vituperative venom and falsehood.

F. The first of these two courses of action is to reveal to the Communists the determination of the United States to stand inflexibly on stated minimum positions with respect to the major issues. The benefits to be derived from following this course will depend upon whether or not the Communists still desire an armistice. We should at least obtain an answer to this essential question by so doing. If the publicly announced statement of its position by the United States can be concurrently supported by like public statements from our principal United Nations allies, its effectiveness will be greatly increased.

G. The second course of action is to apply the one influence which the Communists the world over recognize, and that is force.

H. I consider the second course as one of last resort, and that the situation has yet to reach the point where it would be in order for me to submit to you my detailed views.

I. I consider adoption of the first course now imperative in order to arrest the very evident present deterioration in our negotiating position and permit progress with some measure of amelioration of the adverse influences under which we now negotiate. Removal of the USSR as an issue is a prerequisite to resolution of the other remaining major issues, i.e., airfields and voluntary repatriation.

3. Accordingly I recommend, the United States Delegation unanimously concurring, that the United States Government with the least practicable delay, publicly announce, and with concurrent like public announcements by as many of its principal United Nations allies as practicable, its decision irrevocably to reject the Soviet Union as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

4. It would be very helpful to know soonest the authoritative reaction of the United States Government to this recommendation.

1. A note attached to the source text indicated that this copy of the telegram was brought to the attention of the Secretary of State at the direction of the Secretary of Defense.
2. Just 2 days prior to dispatch of this telegram, Joy and his staff completed a review of the truce negotiations and recommended two alternative courses of action to Ridgway. The first entailed presenting the Communist side with a complete armistice agreement incorporating some concessions, but with an ultimatum backed up by a time limit after which hostilities would be resumed if the Communists did not agree. The second merely entailed submission of a complete armistice agreement—again with some concessions—but without the ultimatum. The Communist delegates would be informed that no further concessions would be made by the United Nations. Ridgway pointed out that each of these courses of action was an ultimatum—one stated, the other implied—and he informed Joy that the time was not right for such a move; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, pp. 163–165.
3. The major issues were voluntary repatriation of POWs, restrictions on construction and rehabilitation of airfields, and the participation of the Soviet Union on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Minor issues included rotation of troops, the number of ports permitted to handle rotation and replenishment of men and supplies for inspection purposes, and control of coastal waters. These minor issues were well on their way to settlement; ibid., pp. 160–162.