795.00/5–2453: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State
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1625. Eyes only for Acting Secretary. Since time factor would preclude any possibility of a visit to Molotov having any influence on initial Communist reaction to new proposals, believe we should await initial Communist reaction at Panmunjom before definitely deciding when to see Molotov. Nature of representation would, of course, depend a good deal on Communist reception new proposals. If initial Communist [Page 1096] reaction is not total rejection and week’s recess is accepted, believe I should see Molotov as soon thereafter as possible Wednesday or at latest Thursday.1
In order to ensure that Molotov receives clear unslanted version of latest UN proposals, would suggest I be authorized to leave with him on plain sheet of paper the six points as summarized in Deptel 8552 which will be presented Panmunjom May 25. I would not, of course, include any reference to our contemplated action in event of refusal or other material contained in Department’s telegram.
While I will make every effort here to keep visit to Molotov secret, there could be no guarantee on that score. It will therefore be necessary to work out what would be said to press in event visit becomes known and would suggest that, if necessary, I merely state that it was follow-up on my previous visit on protection cases (British Ambassador called twice on Molotov before receiving any reply to his representations on similar subject). Would also appreciate being informed to what extent proposed call on Molotov has been discussed or will be known to principal allies. Of diplomatic colleagues only British and French Ambassadors would present problem in view of tradition of confidential interchange of information with those missions.
In event Department authorizes visit in circumstances suggested above, I believe I should emphasize to Molotov the extreme importance and seriousness of latest proposals, pointing out especially the lengths to which the UNC has gone to bridge the existing gap and making it quite clear that these represent the extreme limit to which we can go. I would avoid all indication of threat but it might not be harmful to point out to Molotov that a rejection by North Koreans and Chinese of these proposals and consequent failure to reach agreement in armistice talks would create a situation which the US Government is seeking most earnestly to avoid.
I will, of course, make no request for interview with Molotov until specifically instructed to do so.