795.00/5–1953
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)1
Subject:
- Korean Armistice Negotiations
Participants:
- Sir Christopher Steel, Minister, British Embassy
- Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
- Mr. Arthur Tange, Australian Embassy
- Mr. J. L. Allen, Australian Embassy
- Mr. Sidney D. Pierce, Minister, Canadian Embassy
- Mr. Peter Campbell, First Secretary, Canadian Embassy
- Mr. B. J. Jarvie, Counselor, South African Embassy
- Ambassador Munro, New Zealand Embassy
- Gen. W. B. Smith, Under Secretary
- Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
- John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary, UNA
- U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE
General Smith invited the foregoing foreign representatives to a meeting in his office at 11:45 a.m. today to discuss the Korean armistice negotiations. General Smith opened the meeting by pointing out that progress was not being made at Panmunjom. He stated that the last proposal that the UNC had made did not represent a final position as it was necessary to have a few points on which the UNC could give in order to reach agreement and obtain the essential safeguards necessary in any agreement. With the permission of Mr. Steel, he then read a pertinent portion of a recent note from the U.K. Foreign Office2 stating that in the opinion of the U.K. there were two points in the Communist May 7 proposal on which it was important to obtain improvement. These were the question of stationing of Czech and Polish troops in South Korea and a clear future for POWs who did not return. General Smith stated he agreed with these points and that there was a third point which involved U.S. domestic political considerations.
General Smith went on to state that the UNC position on release of Korean POWs at the time the armistice went into effect was introduced [Page 1053] at the earnest recommendation of Clark, Murphy and Briggs following a conversation with President Rhee. They felt that Rhee meant business with regard to this point and that the position should be taken. However, General Smith felt that it was a mistake and both he and the President agreed that it could not be maintained. Yet Rhee has a capacity for causing trouble and we will have to do something for him if this point is dropped.
The question of unanimous decisions by the commission on substantive matters was taken in deference to very strong feelings in Congress that India should not be the controlling vote on the commission. It was the feeling of several influential Congressional leaders that with India having the controlling vote the commission’s votes would be consistently three to two against UNC interests. Nehru’s recent statements have done nothing to help this situation. This whole question is coming up just at the time Congress is considering military and economic aid programs for the next fiscal year and there have been open threats by influential members of Congress not to vote the funds for aid being requested by the Administration.
We are therefore in a position of trying to reconcile the irreconcilable. We cannot go on haggling over the armistice negotiations in Korea. When the negotiations were reopened we announced that we would not permit them to be dragged out. The question now is where can we go, as Allies standing together to get an armistice, or, if we fail, we fail honorably and standing together. We have tried to arrive at a final position which would be presented to the Communists shortly. However, we will carefully avoid baldly stating to the Communists that it is a final position and otherwise avoid any ultimatum aspects. We want to make it as easy as possible for them to accept. We will have to make clear to them that it is as far as we can go. The question is that if the negotiations are terminated how this can be done most to our advantage. Harrison’s handling of the negotiations has been excellent but the ill reporting by the press has been a great disservice to all of us.
On May 13 Harrison told the Communists that the major portion of their proposal was acceptable but there were some provisions which required amendment and modification. The principal points of difference between the proposal put forward by Harrison and the Communist position were:
- 1.
Armed forces and operating personnel for the commission to be supplied exclusively by India instead of equally by the five member nations of the commission. In this connection General Smith commented that Indian soldiers and officers fought along side the Allies during the war and have much the same ideas of decency as we do. They are trained in the tradition of the British army and we would not be worried at having professional Indian officers and troops. Our position in this regard is eminently reasonable and could only be opposed by the [Page 1054] Communists on the grounds of sheer intransigence. We cannot accept Czech and Polish goon squads and under no circumstances would Rhee agree. Rhee has not even agreed to the presence of Indian forces. In reply to General Smith’s query as to whether there was any dissent from this view, Mr. Tange stated that the solution we were proposing was obviously much to be preferred. However, Australia wondered whether it would be practicable to locate prisoners in a restricted area, that is, an isolated island, and under these conditions it would be possible to concede admission of a controlled number of Czechs and Poles. In reply General Smith stated that there were no island areas from which it would be practicable to take off the civilians. We are probably very prone to overlook the question of ROK sovereignty involved in these questions. It would probably be difficult to induce Rhee to agree even to Indian troops. Our Congress would consider the presence of Czech and Polish troops as a catastrophic surrender to the Communists. It is a great error that the Korean POWs at least were not long since released.
General Smith went on with the other points of differences between Harrison’s proposal and the Communist position.
- 2.
- The second was the question of release of Koreans upon the coming into effect of the armistice. As he had previously stated, we were prepared to recede on this point. We agree with the U.K. that there must be a clear future for the POWs. Even if this is worked out we must recognize that we may have to use force to turn Korean non-repatriates over to the commission. It is probable that many of them will strongly resist and we may be faced with a very ugly situation. Some of the Allied governments concerned are not sufficiently alive to the problem we will face in turning these men over. In the case of the Chinese, for example, there are at least 1900 staunch Roman Catholics among the Chinese non-repatriates.
- 3.
- The next point of difference was unanimity of decisions by the commission on substantive matters. We had discussed this with the President and it was quite clear that our Congress would never accept a solution involving decisions by the commission upon a simple majority basis. The President has suggested that the commission operate on a basis of a majority of four. Mr. Pierce and Mr. Steel stated that on the basis of either unanimous or a majority of four decision the Communist members of the commission would be in a position to veto action by the commission. General Smith stated that we well recognized that it may work out to our disadvantage and we would be grateful for the views of those present on this question.
- 4.
- General Smith then pointed out the next difference between General Harrison’s proposal and the Communist position, that is, on the question of detailed terms of reference for the operation of the commission. In this regard he felt it necessary to assure Chinese Communist [Page 1055] and North Korean access to the prisoners would be subject to conditions which would prevent the use of coercion and force against the non-repatriates. This was very important. For example, unless there were provision to the contrary it could be expected that the Communists would insist on sending large numbers of their people to the camps and upon interviewing prisoners in private. This was something that could not be permitted.
- 5.
- The next question was that of a cut-off period for custody of the prisoners by the commission. General Smith expressed doubt that we should take the Indian formulation in this regard. He pointed out that the question was how long should the prisoners be held and at what point did it become entirely unreasonable to hold them any longer. Mr. Steel expressed the view that it would tactically be an excellent thing to put forward the formula in the Indian resolution. However, he thought the Communists would turn it down. Mr. Pierce stated that Canada would favor putting forward the Indian resolution formula. In general, Canada felt that the UNC should keep as close as possible to the Indian resolution. Ambassador Munro also expressed the view that the Indian resolution should be followed. There was some general discussion of whether the question would go to the Security Council or the General Assembly. It was generally agreed that the General Assembly was the proper forum. General Smith raised the question as to what would happen if it went to the General Assembly and a two-thirds majority on a resolution could not be obtained. Would we then be agreeable to holding the prisoners in captivity for an indefinite period. Mr. Steel stated that the success of any plan would largely be dependent upon whether a “good Indian” was representing India on the commission. Mr. Pierce stated that we did not have a situation in which we had a clear-cut victory, in fact there was no victory by either side and therefore we cannot get all we might want. General Smith stated that if we propose the alternative of agreement to defer the question to the UN in accordance with the Indian resolution we would expect the Allied governments to sponsor and support immediate consideration of the problem by the General Assembly with a resolution providing for the prompt release of the prisoners to proceed to any available destination of their choice. All of the representatives present agreed that there was no question in their minds that their governments would support such a resolution with a brief debate thereon of at the outside not more than two weeks. General Smith indicated that our position on this would be to agree to submit to a political conference the question of the disposition of the remaining non-repatriates with provision that failing determination of their disposition within a total of 120 days (90 days for access by Chinese and North Koreans and 30 days consideration of the question by the political conference) of their being handed over to the POW commission, they would be released. We would indicate our [Page 1056] willingness to accept the alternative formula contained in the Indian GA resolution providing for deferral of the question to the UN following 30 days consideration by the political conference.
General Smith stated that Rhee very much desires to obtain a bilateral security treaty with the U.S. but the U.S. view is that the question of Korean defense must be kept within the UN. In the post-armistice period the security of Korea centers around the “greater sanctions statement” to which we attach much importance. However, the harsh fact is that Rhee does not have confidence in the UN or anyone but the U.S.
Mr. Pierce asked whether this conversation should be considered as informing the governments concerned or were we consulting with them. General Smith replied that the U.S. was asking the advice of the governments concerned and hoped the representatives there would obtain it as urgently as possible. The meetings of the delegations were scheduled to resume on May 25 and it was important that we decide upon our final position and transmit it to General Clark as quickly as possible. The representatives indicated their understanding and except for South Africa stated that they thought they could have the views of their governments by Thursday.3
General Smith pointed out that the question was, how long could we go on with the negotiations. When decisions have been reached on the position which we were discussing, the UNC would have reached the end of its bargaining position and in the absence of clear indications from the Communists that agreement could be reached upon the basis of these positions within a reasonable period there would be no purpose in carrying on negotiations any further. General Smith pointed out that if it should come to a break-off in negotiations it cannot be expected that military operations can just sit where they are. The people of the U.S. would not stand for such a situation and it must be expected that the military operations will have to be intensified.
In closing, General Smith re-emphasized the completely confidential character of these consultations and the unfortunate effects among some of our other Allies if it became known that this consultation had taken place. As those present realized, the security considerations prevented widening the consultations at this time.