795.00/5–1853: Telegram
The Political Adviser for the Armistice Negotiations (Murphy) to the Department of State
3620. Department pass Pusan. Repeated information Pusan 246. From Murphy. Your 2694.1
While Clark and I have had no opportunity to consult with Briggs, we have seen his May 17 from Seoul.
We feel that Department telegram 2694 should be tied in with CX 624562 which transmitted our ideas regarding future tactics to be pursued at Panmunjom and outlined suggested final position. We believe [Page 1049] that when action of the character proposed in Department telegram 2694 is taken, we should be in position to inform Rhee plan outlined in CX 62456.
Clark is agreeable to making joint approach with Briggs and Rhee, but we believe action would be strengthened if ROK Ambassador in Washington were called to the Department first and given a strong statement incorporating reference to part 2, paragraph 6, your telegram 2694 by the Acting Secretary or the Secretary if he has by then returned to Washington.3 We also believe that the text draft statement by the President is weak and frankly would leave Rhee unimpressed. It would be far better in our opinion if Presidential statement could be reserved until he is in position to send stronger message and if situation becomes more acute. After Acting Secretary has delivered strongest possible message to Ambassador Yang, Briggs and Clark would then call upon Rhee and do their best to impress upon him the seriousness with which United States Government views his government’s attitude.
We are still mystified over reasons why United States is not prepared to engage mutual security treaty with ROK under present circumstances. When informing Rhee of this fact, if we could indicate reasons it is believed our statement would be strengthened. Information that United States is prepared to begin informal discussions with ROK looking to conclusion of agreement on military assistance and related matters is valuable and we believe may be helpful in rectifying to some extent ROK attitude as there would be included an administrative agreement covering the disposition of United States–United Nations forces in Korea and the other features regarding the strengthening, training and maintenance of ROK armed forces, et cetera. This, we find, most important feature of Department’s present proposal.
Department, of course, will fully understand ROK cynicism regarding statement that United States is endeavoring to conclude an armistice with view that total withdrawal Chinese Communist forces from Korea should be accomplished through political conference. We fear that Rhee will classify this strictly under heading of wishful thinking in view of our continued inability to settle through political conference withdrawal of Soviet forces from eastern Germany and eastern Austria after many years of futile effort. Specious talk about achieving unification of Korea through peaceful effort at the conference, it is believed, is likewise destined to fall on barren ground in light of our past experience in Central Europe subsequent to the Potsdam agreement which provided for politically and economically unified Germany.
We believe that Acting Secretary’s statement incorporating reference to greater sanctions which would be issued immediately following an [Page 1050] armistice will be most helpful. This should be linked to a request for a corresponding public declaration by President Rhee regarding a termination of ROK to fully cooperate with United States–United Nations.
As stated, Rhee has little faith in the ability of political conference to settle the question of unification of Korea and while statement that United States will not permit dissolution of ROK in such conference would of course be helpful, in face of Rhee’s conviction that only effective solution is to drive Chinese Communist forces from the soil of Korea, effect on him of this general statement will be weak. Are we to assume also that suggestion that United States intends to consult with ROK both before and during political conference that ROK will be a participant at such conference?
We had hoped the information that United States prepared assist development and maintenance ROK ground forces to level 20 divisions, plus one marine brigade might be an effective bargaining counter at this stage. Unfortunately, this information has been publicly released by spokesman of Pentagon, according to press sources. It is understood that Rhee already has this information via press. However, we concur that whatever commitment is made should be conditioned on cessation of ROK agitation and serve as quid pro quo for cooperative attitude.
We agree that it is essential United States receive from Rhee full assurance that ROK will cooperate with United States–United Nations Korea [Command] before discussions regarding mutual assistance agreement would be opened. Also agree that Rhee should be told United States will be compelled to take necessary measures to assure security of United States–United Nations forces in unfortunate event Rhee orders ROK forces take unilateral military action, et cetera.
Clark concurs.