State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417
Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting1
Korean Negotiations
(The State Department and JCS Representative read a draft memorandum for the President2 which had been prepared after the morning session.)
General Bradley: On page 2, paragraph 5, does the UNC delegation state right off the bat that we would be willing to accept the Indian General Assembly Resolution providing for reference to the question of the U.N.
Mr. Johnson: That was our thought in drafting this, but I should explain that we thought it would be best to bring out clearly the questions which the President should decide and so we put in definite terms positions which were left somewhat vague and undecided in our discussion this morning.
Mr. Bowie: What is the advantage of having a statement made orally?
Mr. Johnson: Merely that we don’t really like the idea of referring to the U.N. and although we want to be able to say for the record that we have made the offer, it seemed a little less conspicuous to make it orally rather than to include it in writing.
Mr. Bowie: It is no less harmful to us with the Commies if we make it orally and it is less beneficial with our Allies. I should think if we were going to make the offer that we should include it in writing as an alternative.
Admiral Fechteler: I have a question on language which says that the prisoners will be released to civilian status after 30 days discussion by the political conference. It might just be that the political conference [Page 1045] might never meet. I think it should read that the prisoners will be released within 120 days.
Mr. Matthews: Clark has raised the point that the Commies might stall on disposition of the prisoners by refusing to convene the political conference.3 I think that Fechteler’s language is clearer.
Admiral Fechteler: I don’t understand the next point on the Indian Resolution at all.
General Bradley: The point is that we have already agreed to the Indian Resolution and so we couldn’t break if the Communists proposed it and we probably couldn’t break without having proposed it ourselves.
Mr. Johnson: The judgment on the acceptability to us of the Indian Resolution depends largely on what we can do in the U.N. if the question is actually referred there. If we can get our Allies committed in advance to support us we would be in a much better position to handle any U.N. action and therefore the Indian Resolution would be easier to live with.
Mr. Matthews: What is the advantage in having all previous agreements voided and all outstanding proposals withdrawn if the Communists don’t accept our position.
General Eddleman: We might want to be in a position of having called off all bets in a new situation. Starting from scratch we might be in a better position on such things, for example, as ruling out construction of airfields.
General Bradley: Would we tell our Allies now that we were going to void all previous agreements.
Mr. Johnson: Personally I should think not.
General Bradley: I think the really important thing is to terminate the negotiations and to rule out the sanctuary agreements for Kaesong and Panmunjom. I think there would still be a question as to whether or not we wanted to keep the liaison road open.
Admiral Fechteler: If you are thinking of referring the thing to the U.N., how about setting some time limit for U.N. action.
Mr. Johnson: We would not be able to commit the U.N. to a time limit. The real question is one of how much political power we can wield in the U.N.
General Bradley: Couldn’t we say that if our Allies insist on the Indian Resolution or if the Communists insist on it we would be prepared to go along with referring the question to the U.N.
Mr. Matthews: The difficulty is that what we want to do is give Clark a firm, final position. If we leave Clark something still to be negotiated or conceded on, we will lose out on the value of having a firm, final position.
[Page 1046]Mr. Robertson: I still don’t see why we should propose it ourselves.
Mr. Matthews: Without it we wouldn’t really have a final position.
General Bradley: If we are going to present this as a final position, I personally think we will have to include the reference to the U.N. part of the Indian Resolution.
Mr. Johnson: If we do include it, it will be important to get our friends on the line to support any action, even before we make the proposal.
General Bradley: I don’t think though that it should be done orally. Can’t we just strike “orally” and insert an “also”. The next question is on the last part of the next sentence. I would like to include a specific reference to terminate all agreements on the neutralization and immunity of Munsan, Panmunjom, and Kaesong.
General Collins: I personally don’t think we want to void the other agreements.
Mr. Matthews: We could decide that if and when we begin the next set of negotiations.
Admiral Fechteler: I think we should just call all bets off.
Mr. Bowie: But we can call all bets off equally well when we begin further negotiations.
Colonel Matthews: If you consider the new situation that we might face under changed conditions, I don’t think we would want the albatross of the present draft armistice agreement hanging around our neck particularly if we had inflicted serious defeats on the Communists.
Mr. Matthews: I think we could remove the albatross just as well later as now.
Mr. Johnson: There is one other point that we left out and that is our willingness to go ahead with unilateral release of the POWs if the Communists should not accept our proposal. I think we should add that and make it clear to the President what we have in mind.
A note on the title page read: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”
Of the JCS, General Bradley and Admiral Fechteler attended as did Vice Chief Twining. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. General Ruffner and Admiral Page Smith represented the Department of Defense and General Cabell the CIA. In all, 18 persons were at the meeting. Korea was the sole topic of discussion.
↩- For the memorandum in final form, see infra.↩
- See telegram CX 62413, Clark to JCS, May 14, p. 1020.↩