795.00/5–1753: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
top
secret
priority
priority
Unnumbered. Repeated information CINCUNC Tokyo, Pusan unnumbered. Personal for General Clark and Ambassador Murphy. “I am preparing this message in Seoul.” Re Deptel 713, repeated Tokyo 2694.2
Following are my comments on proposals contained reftel, which I have not as yet had opportunity discuss with Ambassador Murphy and General Clark:
- 1.
- I agree as to importance coordinated representations at level envisaged reftel designed induce President Rhee to abandon anti-armistice campaign and to support our present course of action looking toward conclusion armistice and settlement outstanding political problems in subsequent conference.
- 2.
- Re Part II paragraph 2. Our unwillingness negotiate Mutual Security Pact at this time might well be regarded by Rhee as decisive feature of proposals contained reftel. Effect of such unwillingness would not in my opinion be significantly ameliorated by counteroffer to initiate informal discussions on series of other agreements, negotiation of [Page 1037] most of which Rhee might well regard as at least as much in interest of US as of ROK.
- 3.
- Re question release Korean non-repatriate POWs, to which Rhee also appears attach considerable importance. Position set forth reftel is equally negative (Part IV). On this point, I question wisdom, from tactical point of view, of giving in to Communists on proposal which we put forward as considered position as recently as May 13. As to reasons advanced for this change, I am convinced on basis information available here that “free world opinion strongly in opposition” to immediate release Korean non-repatriates. Rhee may be even less convinced. Regarding “logic” of release, this proposal may appear to Korean eyes at least as logical as any advanced heretofore and probably a good deal more so. In any event, I fail to see why proposals contained Parts II and III of reftel need be considered as alternative to proposal for immediate release Korean non-repatriates.
- 4.
- Re Part II paragraph 3. While Rhee would undoubtedly welcome assurances re withdrawal Chinese Communist forces from Korea, what he has previously had in mind has been accomplishment of such withdrawal as part of armistice terms rather than through political conference which might be indefinitely protracted. While Rhee recently appears to have weakened somewhat on this (Murphy’s 3594, May 14)3 that was on assumption of obtaining Security Pact.
- 5.
- Re Part II paragraph 5 Rhee would likewise be gratified by commitment to preserve integrity and sovereignty ROK in political conference. Our expressed intention consult with ROK “before and during” political conference might, however, scarcely impress Rhee, who has probably been thinking in terms full ROK participation in such conference.
- 6.
- Threat contained Part II paragraph 8 is ambiguous, though perhaps necessarily so. I believe that to extent feasible we should determine in advance just how far we would be prepared to go in opposing or at least withholding support from independent ROK military action, and so inform Rhee. I should defer to Clark’s judgment on this point.
- 7.
- Re Part III. Proposed draft statement by President, while helpful, would not in my opinion be regarded by Rhee as effective substitute for Security Pact. Most tangible commitment contained in that statement might be regarded by Rhee as deprived of much of its value by qualifying phrase “as loyal member of UN”. Remainder of text appears largely restatement of what has already been said to Rhee on previous occasions, including President Eisenhower’s personal message contained Deptel 653.4
- 8.
- At such time as we are able to give Rhee sufficient satisfaction on his major requirements, I agree it would be important obtain satisfactory assurances from him re support our policy and actions as suggested in Part II paragraph 4.
While I had hoped be able concert with Ambassador Murphy and General Clark concerning our views on proposal contained reftel, difficulties imposed by geographic separation make it advisable transmit this in advance such consultation.
Briggs