Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
operational immediate
HNC 1678. 1. This afternoon I had a frank discussion with Rhee with reference the critical situation which has developed in connection with the ROK attitude toward the UNC counter-proposal pertaining to the presence of Communist custodial troops in Korean rear areas. In this connection attention is invited to my rad C 62369.1
2. Rhee is adamant that no foreign Communist custodial forces be permitted on Korean soil and equally adamant that no Korean non-repatriates be turned over to a neutral state. It is my considered opinion that Rhee may have been and may still be bluffing about other matters, but he is in dead earnest about the release of Korean non-repatriates to any other state or group of states, particularly if any are Communist-controlled. In fact Rhee feels very strongly that India is not neutral and is opposed to having its armed forces, as well as Communist troops, on his sovereign soil, even on Cheju-Do. I feel, however, based on his question pertaining to numbers and other details, that he may go along with the idea of the custodial commission taking custody of the Chinese in Korea if the non-repatriated Koreans are released to return to civil life on effective date of the armistice. In any event, I feel that I can handle any developments based on this solution.
3. I am sympathetic with Rhee’s position not because of any compulsion to comply with his personal desires, but because his position reflects a realism in the situation which we cannot ignore without jeopardizing the vital interests of our government and the UNC in connection with the armistice negotiations.
I feel that the only realistic and workable solution is to release the Korean non-repatriates on the effective date of the armistice. I also feel [Page 1009] that the ROK position in this matter and the dangers and gravity of the situation have not been fully appreciated in Washington, as reflected in instructions contained in para 3 of urad DA 938571.2
4. Anticipating the ROK attitude and the difficulties in connection with retaining Korean non-repatriates, I have consistently recommended their release. I now feel more strongly than ever that this is the only solution. With the Chinese it is different, but Koreans belong in Korea, and their early release in Korea is, clearly, the most humane as well as the most practical solution. We, of course, previously suggested that in case Korean non-repatriates were retained, they be placed on off-shore islands to minimize the problems involved, but this suggestion was based on assumption of control by an acceptable neutral, and further, on the fact that only technical control would be assumed by the neutral. Now that the presence of representatives of Communist-dominated states is anticipated, the situation is materially altered even though we obtain agreement on India’s dominant role in custodial operations.
5. I believe that the release of Koreans will be supported by Asiatic peoples, for it will not involve their prolonged retention as prisoners of war, and will avoid the necessity of using force, which undoubtedly will be necessary in turning them over to the control of other states or even temporarily relocating them for this purpose. Our strong-arm methods, taking place at a number of camps in full view of our South Korean allies, will have a most damaging effect upon the US position in Korea, the fact that the majority of our security forces in POW camps are from ROKA should also be considered. In fact, Rhee queried me this afternoon as to the possibility of his security troops releasing Koreans without involving me. While I forcibly reminded him that these troops are in my command, this does emphasize the seriousness of the ROK attitude.
6. I feel, if properly presented, that the release of non-repatriate Koreans will not be opposed by our allies. In this connection, Murphy and I discussed the general situation with Ambassador Dening yesterday. During the discussion Dening volunteered the suggestion that in view of the situation, this is the only practicable solution. He states that he has so reported to his government and that he believes that his government will see the logic of this solution.
7. As to the probable Communist reaction to the release of Korean non-repatriates, I feel that if they really want an armistice they will accept an adamant position of the United Nations Command on this question. The matter of release of Chinese non-repatriates would be different from theirs as well as from the ROK point of view. The Communists have indicated, however, during previous negotiations that they are primarily concerned with repatriation of Chinese and we of course [Page 1010] can remind them, as we have done in the past, that they have established the precedent on release of Koreans.
8. Regardless of whether the Communists accept our position on release of Korean non-repatriates, however, I strongly recommend that I be authorized to include this solution in our counter-proposal, as an initial and final position. Unless I am given this authority,3 I will be committed to a situation fraught with grave danger and faced with implementation of other threats from the ROK which we have carefully striven to avoid.
9. A careful examination of our counter-proposal, contained in ourad CX 623544 as modified by urad JCS 938626,5 indicates that in order to introduce the proposal with reference to release of non-repatriate Koreans, no other amendments will be necessary, except to reduce the maximum number of representatives of neutral states in view of the fact that the custodial commission would assume custody of non-Korean non-repatriates only.
10. I strongly recommend that I be authorized to introduce, as a part of our counter-proposal, the proposal that non-repatriate Korean prisoners of war be released on date armistice is effective. I am dictating this at Munsan-Ni, and the delegation can submit this revised proposal to the Communists on 13 May or as soon thereafter as your approval is received. I feel that this matter is of such transcending importance that I have instructed the delegation to delay the submission of our presently approved counter-proposal until we receive your reply. If your reply is not received by 0900 hours 13 May our time, the delegation will ask for recess for administrative reasons since current probing questions have reached limit of usefulness.
11. I have thoroughly discussed this matter with Murphy, Briggs, Harrison and Taylor, and they are all in complete agreement with my views.
- Supra.↩
- Dated May 9, p. 997.↩
- In telegram JCS 938704 to Clark, May 12, Clark was authorized by the JCS to introduce, as part of the UNC counterproposal, a proposal that nonrepatriate Korean POWs be released on the date the armistice was effective. This constituted an initial position pending further consideration of the problem. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)↩
- Dated May 11, p. 999.↩
- Dated May 11, p. 1006.↩