795.00/5–853

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State 1

top secret

Subject:

  • Communist Proposal on POW Question

Although we can probably somewhat mitigate the effects on India by pointing out we are only adopting the formula embodied in the Indian Resolution, a refusal by the U.S. to accept the Communist proposal for India as the fifth member of the commission will undoubtedly offend India and be exploited to the maximum by Communist and other unfriendly propaganda within and without India. Agreeing to a formula which makes the appointment of India virtually inevitable would not appear to do much to mitigate the domestic aspects of the acceptance of India. Thus we will end up with most of the international disadvantages of having refused India as well as the domestic disadvantages of having accepted India. India will enter on its duties on the commission more or less offended by us and probably less subject to our influence than if we had accepted India. Thus if we are willing to accept or acquiesce in India being a member of the commission, FE most strongly recommends that we simply accept the Communist proposal in this regard. In view of the previous consultations with Congressional leaders we recommend that they be informed prior to such action becoming public.

In so far as eventual disposition of prisoners are concerned there are only three basic possibilities: (1) specifically provide in the armistice agreement that prisoners are to be released by the commission on the expiration of the period of custody or failure of political conference to agree upon their disposition within a specified time limit, to proceed to an available destination of their choice; (2) leave the decision of the disposition of the remaining prisoners to the commission; (3) provide for a UN decision for their disposition.

It will be extremely difficult to obtain agreement on the first formula. Under the proposed Communist composition of the commission, the [Page 995] second formula would present serious dangers that at the least the prisoners would be indefinitely held. The third formula was embodied in the Indian Resolution. While not ideal, it may be the best obtainable.

FE seriously questions the workability of a plan providing for custody of the prisoners being held by the combined armed forces of five such dissimilar states as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and India. The plan might be much more workable if the required armed forces were furnished by India alone, acting under the supervision of five members of the commission.

As General Clark states in his message today (CX 62301)2 “I believe we must realize that we and the ROKs would be faced with approximately 2500 carefully selected and thoroughly indoctrinated Communist military thugs, not to mention such others as may be introduced to ‘explain’ to the non-repatriates their rights, at mainland or island installations, all free to engage in espionage and disorder”. As Clark also points out the ROK will violently oppose having military forces of Communist satellite countries in Korea and probably even on the offlying islands.

  1. This memorandum was drafted by Johnson. A marginal note by O’Connor on the source text indicated that the Secretary saw it on May 8.
  2. Dated May 8, p. 987.